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| Excerpt：維根斯坦的《論色彩》 曾經讀過兩本書：《天才的責任》以及《魔法師的年代》，都是跟維根斯坦有關的傳記或歷史，但這本《論色彩》才是真正第一次閱讀他寫的書。 從這本小書，試著開始接觸維根斯坦吧！ 書名：論色彩 作者：維根斯坦 譯者：蔡政宏 出版社：桂冠圖書 出版日期：2005年2月 https://www.books.com.tw/products/CN11813667 內容簡介 本書是著名哲學家路德維希·維特根斯坦在人生最後十五個月裡做的關於顏色的筆記。如何得當地言說顏色？這是本書的根本追問。維特根斯坦背後有他反對的本質主義的傳統顏色理論，特別是牛頓的顏色理論，更有讓他欣賞又令他不滿的歌德及其友人倫格的顏色學說；他嘗試顏色探討的第三條道路，可謂“現象學－語言哲學的顏色論”。這種顏色探討是開放的和自由的，它力圖超越科學還原論，也想與文藝的和神秘的色彩言說保持距離，而首先是要喚醒一種敏感的顏色感覺力。因此，本書沒有告訴我們顏色是什麼，而是留下了一個不定的結論，即顏色和顏色感知的不確定性。誠如作者所言：“在每一個比較嚴肅的哲學問題中，不可靠性直抵根底。我們不得不總是準備好去學習某種全新的東西。”未來藝術，愈發成為一種開拓此在的可能性之維的生活方式，它不再僅僅是對日常生活的簡單復現，而浸潤于日常蔬飯之間，成為介入生活的感人力量。 【Excerpt】 I 1.有個語言遊戲，它要我們去比較並陳述兩個物體之間的明亮關係。現在有另一個相關的語言遊戲，它要我們去比較並陳述兩種顏色之間的明亮關係。（這兩個語言遊戲的對比，好比是下面兩者的對比：一個是判斷兩根棍子長度間的關係，一個是判斷兩個數字間的關係。）這兩個語言遊戲中的命題，其形式相同，皆是「X比Y來得亮」。但在第一個語言遊戲中，其命題談的是外在關係，而且命題本身具有時間性，在第二個語言遊戲中，其命題談的是內在關係，而且命題本身不具時間性。 1. A language-game: Report whether a certain body is lighter or darker than another.--But now theres a related one: State the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour. (Compare with this: Determining the relationship between the lengths of two sticks--and the relationship between two numbers.)--The form of the propositions in both language-games is the same: "X is lighter than Y". But in the first it is an external relation and the proposition is temporal, in the second it is an internal relation and the proposition is timeless. 2.在一幅畫有藍天和白紙的畫中，白紙從藍天獲得亮度；在這層意義下，畫裡的天空理應比白紙亮。但在另一層意義下，藍是暗色，白是亮色（哥德）。白是調色盤裡最亮的顏色。 2. In a picture in which a piece of white paper gets its lightness from the blue sky, the sky is lighter than the white paper. And yet in another sense blue is the darker and white the lighter colour. (Goethe). On the palette white is the lightest colour. III 86.難道我們不能想像有種人，他的顏色幾何學不同於我們正常人的？這當然是在問：我們能描述出這種顏色幾何學嗎？或者是，當被要求去描述這樣的幾何學時，我們能立刻回應這樣的要求嗎？也就是說，我們能夠毫無歧義地知道別人是在要求什麼嗎？ 困難很明顯地是在於：顏色幾何學有很明確精地指出我們要去討論的對象是什麼嗎？也就是，它有指出我們要去討論的就是顏色嗎？ 86. Cant we imagine people having a geometry of colours different from our normal one? And that, of course, means: can we describe it, can we immediately respond to the request to describe it, that is, do we know unambiguously what is being demanded of us? The difficulty is obviously this: isnt it precisely the geometry of colours that shows us what were talking about, i.e. that we are talking about colours? 101.我們在字詞使用上帶有偏見。 101. We have prejudices with respect to the use of words. 102.當被問及「『紅』、『藍』、『黑』、『白』這些字詞的意義為何？」時，我們當然可以直接指向有這些顏色的東西。但是，這也是我們所能做的全部；而且這樣做並不代表我們對這些字詞的說明能力有任何增長！ 102. When were asked "What do red, blue, black, white, mean?" we can, of course, immediately point to things which have these colours,--but thats all we can do: our ability to explain their meaning goes no further. 103.至於其他顏色，我們要嘛是沒有任何如何使用它們的概念，要嘛就是有著非常粗糙，甚至在某種程度上為假的想法。 103. For the rest, either we have no idea at all, or a very rough and to some extent false one. 104.「暗色」與「黑色」是兩個不同的概念。 104. Dark and blackish are not the same concept. 106.為什麼暗黃色不被想成是「黑的」，即使我們稱它作暗的？ 顏色概念的邏輯比起它外表看起來複雜許多。 106. Why is it that a dark yellow doesnt have to be perceived as blackish, even if we call it dark? The logic of the concept of colour is just much more complicated than it might seem. 107. 兩個概念：「無光澤」與「發亮」。當我們想到「顏色」時，如果我們所想的是空間中某個點所具有的性質，那麼無光澤與發亮這兩個概念就跟顏色概念無關。 107. The concepts matt and shiny. If, when we think of colour we think of a property of a point in space, then the concepts matt and shiny have no reference to these colour concepts. 108. 關於顏色問題，我們想到的第一個「解決方法」就是，「純的」顏色概念與空間中的點或是細小至不可分的塊狀相關。問題：我們如何比較兩個這樣的點的顏色呢？僅靠我們將視線從一個點轉向另一個點嗎？或者是我們不去移動我們的注視方向，而是靠移動那個有色物體來讓我們比較其上兩點之間的不同？如果是後面這情況，我們怎麼知道這物體在移動過程中沒有改變顏色；如果是前面那情況，我們怎能確保兩個色點在比較時沒有受到色點周遭環境的影響？ 108. The first solution which occurs to us for the problem of colours is that the pure colour concepts refer to points or tiny indivisible patches in space. Question: how are we to compare the colours of two such points? Simply by letting ones gaze move from one to the other? Or by moving a coloured object? If the latter, how do we know that this object has not changed colour in the process; if the former, how can we compare the coloured points without the comparison being influenced by what surrounds them? 133.我也許必須先對灰綠色留下深刻記憶，之後才能不藉助任何顏色樣本，隨時正確地指出該顏色。不過對於純紅色（或純藍色等等），我卻可以隨時重構出它。這不過是因為紅色不會偏向任何其他顏色，而且我可以不用顏色樣本就認出它；這就像是我可以認出直角，但卻無法認出一個隨意的銳角或鈍角。 133. I may have impressed a certain grey-green upon my memory so that I can always correctly identify it without a sample. Pure red (blue, etc.) however, I can, so to speak, always reconstruct. It is simply a red that tends neither to one side nor to the other, and I recognize it without a sample, as e.g. I do a right angle, by contrast with an arbitrary acute or obtuse angle. 135.顏色自然史（natural history）必須報導顏色在自然界中的展現，而不是它們的本質（essence）。顏色自然史中的命題必須是時間性的。 135. A natural history of colours would have to report on their occurrence in nature, not on their essence. Its propositions would have to be temporal ones. 248.的確沒有所謂現象學這樣的東西，但卻有許多關於現象的問題。 248. There is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems. 323.「我看到一棵樹」，這是一個用來表示視覺印象的表式——這表式是對於現象的描述嗎？什麼現象呢？我要如何向別人解釋這現象呢？ 但是，我有這視覺印象的這項事實對別人來說是種現象嗎？因為這是件他在觀察的事，而不是我。 「我正在看一棵樹」，這些字並不是對現象的描述。（例如我不能說「我正在看一棵樹！多麼奇怪啊！」但我可以說：「我正在看一棵樹，但是那裡並沒有樹。多麼奇怪啊！」） 323. "I see a tree", as the expression of the visual impression,--is this the description of a phenomenon? What phenomenon? How can I explain this to someone? And yet isnt the fact that I have this visual impression a phenomenon for someone else? Because it is something that he observes, but not something that I observe. The words "I am seeing a tree" are not the description of a phenomenon. (I couldnt say, for example, "I am seeing a tree! How strange!", but I could say: "I am seeing a tree, but theres no tree there. How strange!") 324.或許我應該這樣說：「這印象不是現象；但是我，維根斯坦，所擁有的這個印象的確是個現象」？ 324. Or should I say: "The impression is not a phenomenon; but that L.W. has this impression is one"? https://kupdf.net/download/ludwig-wittgenstein-remarks-on-colour_59facbc4e2b6f58b13eda238_pdf |
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| ( 知識學習｜隨堂筆記 ) |
