第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十一章 論能力(Chapter XXI: Of Power) 繼續再進一步討論追求善、惡和幸福的的端點，這是蠻困難的論述!! 約翰•洛克的經驗主義的主張---強調”感官是我們一切經樣驗的來源”，因此必然對生理感官層面快樂的選擇，作為我們對幸福，追求的端點， 也就是是幸福建立在享樂主義基礎上!! 但是，再追問如何在心理理性層面產生前面所說的延緩的能力(Power to suspend.)的質變，那麼，柏拉圖"善的型相”(the Form of the Good)概念就又必須搬上檯面了，他就以”錯誤的判斷”避開這個質變的難點，然後引入宗教的觀點以死後的審判所獲致的極樂或苦難，以解釋我們意志選擇行動質變的原因---這個論據是經不得深究的，未來的”極樂或苦難”絕對不是來自我們經驗，能”推動”我們”延緩的能力”，硬要牽扯到現實的感官經驗實在”勉強”，那麼，對未來”極樂或苦難”的型相，是如何產生的? 約翰•洛克就"自說自話”的解釋造成錯誤判斷的各種原因，跳脫了這個”必須面對的質疑” ----這是一個難題，在這一篇末由演化的角度看看”可能”的解答!!  

• 現實的善或惡，我們判斷總是正確的 (Our judgment of present good or evil always right.) 首先，我會考慮人們對未來善和惡的錯誤的判斷，他們的欲望怎麼被誤導。因此，至於現實的幸福和苦難，當單獨進行思考，後果一定被排除，人們的選擇絕不會出錯:他知道什麼最使他歡愉，和他真正喜歡的選擇。(In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their desires are misled. For, as to present happiness and misery, when that alone comes into consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a man never chooses amiss : he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.)
• 我們錯誤的判斷僅和未來善與惡相關。(Our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only.) 但是因為我們自願的行動並不能引導出所有的幸福和苦難，還有賴於他們(自願的行動)以及他們(自願的行動)在其目前的表現，而自願的行動只是善與惡先前的起因，他們(善與惡)牽引其後的他們(幸福和悲慘)，當他們自己(善與惡)已經過去和不存在，然後帶給我們(幸福和悲慘); 因此，我們的欲望追求超越當下的享樂，引領心靈出脫趨向佚失的善，我們認為它(追求超越當下的享樂)達成或增進我們的幸福，符合必然性。……( But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are past and cease to be ; our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to absent good, according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness. ……)
• 經由錯誤判斷組成了他們的幸福必要部分(From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.) 他們的完善無缺因此得出結論他們不需要它(善)而可以是幸福的，是一個最大的可能，人們往往不會提升思考最大佚失的善的欲望。 因此，當他們有了這種思想，未來狀態的歡愉便不能感動他們；他們對他們(未來狀態的歡愉)不關心或不會不安;而意志，免於那些欲望的決定，是用於立刻滿足的追求，是用於對那些(立刻滿足)的欠缺及渴望追求他們(立刻滿足)後所感覺到不安的移除。(Their aptness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest absent good. For, whilst such thoughts possess them, the joys of a future state move them not ; they have little concern or uneasiness about them ; and the will, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them.) 但是人們對這些事物的觀點改變了;讓他瞭解美德和宗教是他的幸福所必需的;讓他認識未來極樂或苦難的情況，在那會見到上帝，公義的審判者，準備”必照各人的行為報應各人;凡恆心行善、尋求榮耀、尊貴，和不能朽壞之福的，就以永生報應他們：給一切作惡的人，忿怒、惱恨，患難、困苦” ; 對他，我認為，對所有人類在他生命結束後都要參加，依賴於他們在這裡(塵世)的行為，有完全不同情況的幸福或苦難的情景，  因為他會看到，來生底要看人們自己在上如何而定。則支配他的善、惡選擇標準，一定會有劇烈的改變。……(Change but a man’s view of these things ; let him see that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness ; let him look into the future state of bliss or misery, and see there God, the righteous judge, ready to « render to every man according to his deeds ; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto every soul that doth evil, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish. » To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness or misery that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the measures of good and evil that govern his choice are mightily changed…….)
• 錯誤判斷的較詳細的說明(A more particular account of wrong judgments.)

第一 : 正當的善或惡行，不是別的就只是快樂或痛苦。 (First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or pain.)

• 第二 : 但因為不僅現實快樂和痛苦，而且也有助於會經由其(現實快樂和痛苦的經驗)將遠方的功效或後果帶來加之於我們，成為我們欲望的正確目標，(這些)是有助於驅使有遠見的生物；因此這些事情也導致他們後來的快樂和痛苦，被認為是善和惡。(But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight ; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and evil.)
• 沒有人願意選擇苦難，但僅因由錯誤判斷(造成)(No one chooses misery willingly, but only by wrong judgment.)誤導我們的錯誤判斷，使意志經常執著於較壞的一面，並在進行這些(判斷)的比較時(意志)被置放於錯誤的報告中。 我這裡所說的錯誤判斷，並非是說一個人推想另一個人的決定，乃是每個人他自己必須承認(判斷)是錯的。。(The wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himself must confess to be wrong.) 因而我很確信，一切有智慧的生命都切實在追求幸福，幸福存在於快樂的享受，沒有混雜任何不可忽視的不安，不可能任何人會願意願地在自己的飲料加入任何苦的成分，或遺漏他能力中有助於他的滿足的任何事物，和他的幸福的實現，(苦難)只是因由錯誤判斷。(For, since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness ; it is impossible anyone should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out anything in his power that would tend to his satisfaction, and the completing of his happiness, but only by a wrong judgment.)
• 在比較現實和未來時，人們可能犯錯 (Men may err in comparing present and future.) 第一 : 因此，至於，心靈現實的快樂和痛苦，先前已經討論過，從不會弄錯因為是真實的善或惡;這是較大的快樂，或是較大的痛苦，正是因為它(快樂或痛苦)的出現(在心靈的感覺)是真實的 。 但是，儘管現實的快樂和痛苦是如此明白的顯示他們的差異和等級，以至於沒有留下錯誤(判斷)的空間;然而，當我們在以現在的快樂或痛苦和未來相比較，（意志的許多最重要決定都是這樣的），我們往往對他們做出錯誤的判斷;因為我們對他們(快樂和痛苦)的量度標準因距離的位置而不同。 ((1) Therefore, as to present pleasure and pain, the mind, as has been said, never mistakes that which is really good or evil ; that which is the greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it appears. But, though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrees so plainly as not to leave room to mistake ; yet, when we compare present pleasure or pain with future, (which is usually the case in most important determinations of the will,) we often make wrong judgments of them ; taking our measures of them in different positions of distance.) 物體比較接近我們的視野就會易於認為比遠方更大物體還要較大些。快樂和痛苦亦是這種情形:現實容易傳達它(快樂和痛苦);至於在遠方的，在比較時，陷於不利。(Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size that are more remote. And so it is with pleasures and pains : the present is apt to carry it ; and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison.)……… 第二，錯誤的判斷在考量行動的後果(Wrong judgment in considering consequences of actions.) 至於隨後事情的善、惡行，經由它們(事情)的特性使我們在未來獲得善或惡，我們判斷失誤有幾條途徑。(As to things good or bad in their consequences, and by the aptness that is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amiss several ways.) (一）當我們判斷很大的惡，不是真的由於他們所具有的真實性。 ( 1. When we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does.)

（二）當我們判斷，縱然在那一刻的結論，雖然它是不確定的，但也可能用某種方法放棄，或用一些方法避免;如經由勤奮、靈巧、變通、悔悟等等。 這些是錯誤的判斷途徑，如果我願意籠統單獨的審查他們，在每個特例都是很容易顯示的：不過我僅要概括的說明，也就是它是非常錯誤和非理性的處理方法，以較大的善博弈較少的，依據不確定的猜想;在進行適當的審查前，按照事物重要性的比例，和對我們不能發生錯誤的關係程度。 (2. When we judge that, though the consequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some means be avoided ; as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to show in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly : but I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, upon uncertain guesses ; and before a due examination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to mistake.) 我想這是每個人必須承認的，如果他特別考量常造成錯誤判斷的成因，有下列這些:--(This I think every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual cause of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are some : –)

• 造成這些。第一無知：他在判斷時沒有使他自己盡他的可能得到充分的訊息，不能免除他自己錯誤判斷的責任。(Causes of this. (i) Ignorance : He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.)

第二疏忽：當一個人忽略了他確知的。這是一個有影響和現實的無知，誤導我們的判斷如同其他的(原因)一樣多。判斷一直是，平衡的考慮，然後決定勝算位在那一邊。如果因此任何一邊倉卒草率攪和，而若干必須列入推斷的要點被我們所忽略和遺漏，這種輕率行為導致的錯誤判斷正如同絕對無知(所導致的)。((ii) Inadvertency : When a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie. If therefore either side be huddled up in haste, and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance.) 導致這種情況最常見的原因是，因為一些現實快樂或痛苦的優勢，被我們易被情慾所支配的薄弱本性增強，經由現實是最強的鍛鍊。制止這種輕率行為，我們被賦予理解和理性(能力)，如果我們願意正確地利用他們，調查和觀察，然後據此做判斷。沒有自由，則理解將是沒有意義:然而沒有理解，自由(如果可能)將意味著虛無。 (That which most commonly causes this is, the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason were given us, if we will make a right use of them, to search and see, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty, the understanding would be to no purpose : and without understanding, liberty (if it could be) would signify nothing. )是否人們觀察什麼(事物)對他是好的或有害的，並且看到了，什麼(事物)將使他快樂或痛苦 ，不能驅使他自己向它(快樂或痛苦)邁出或遠離一步，雖然能觀察，對他有何幫助？ 而他是自由的在全然黑暗中漫步，他似乎被風力吹的忽上忽下的水泡，那麼他的自由有何超越？ 經由外，或由內，盲目衝動的行動，是沒有勝算的。因此，自由的首要功用就在阻止盲目的輕率行為;自由意志的最重要功能是保持沉靜，張開眼睛，察看，並掌握我們將要採取行動後果的願景，盡可能對需求要素的權衡。……(If a man sees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one step towards or from it, what is he the better for seeing ? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind ? The being acted by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little odds. The first, therefore, and great use of liberty is to hinder blind precipitancy ; the principal exercise of freedom is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. ……)

注意 : 柏拉圖"善的型相”(the Form of the Good) ---是不能以經驗主義(empiricism)主張推翻的。 倘若沒有一種與生俱來的"型相” 為什麼各個地方的人類都能夠像”蜘蛛結網”一樣----創造出他們的神” ?  

路德維希·安德列斯·費爾巴哈（Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach，1804年7月28日－1872年9月13日）就主張: 神與人類本能的一般特性和需要是一致的; ”若人類想要找出神的意涵，他就要在神的意涵中找出他自己”;神就是人:可以這樣說，神是人類的內在本性向外的投射。 (In every aspect God corresponds to some feature or need of human nature.  "If man is to find contentment in God,……he must find himself in God."   Thus God is nothing else than man: he is, so to speak, the outward projection of man's inward nature. )。 這個內在本性是像”鳥築巢”、” 蜘蛛結網”、”植物的開花結果”一樣，是與生俱來的"型相”，也就是物種的本能(instinct)，是經由基因(gene)傳遞的”內塑型相”。

達爾文(Charles Robert Darwin，1809年2月12日－1882年4月19日）在他”物種起源”(On the Origin of Species)論述中也是一項”不能回答的困難”，十九世紀尚未發現及理解”基因”的功能，他在書中寫到:“……許多本能是很奇妙的，他們的發展大概將對讀者出現足夠的困難，推翻我整體的理論。也許，我這裡作為前提的是我不涉及心智力量的起源，而且我更多的(涉及)生物的本身。我們僅關心本能變化和在相等級的動物其他智力的機能。我不會試圖對本能(給予)任何定義。 很容易的顯示許多明顯的智力活動可很平常的地領悟這個(本能)術語;當說到本能驅使布穀鳥遷移和將她的蛋下在其他的鳥巢時，每個人都瞭解是什麼意思。一個行動，我們自己需要經驗使我們能實施，當由動物實施，更特別是由一個非常年輕的，沒有經驗，而且當由許多個體用相似的方法實施，對它們為什麼要實施的目的沒有它們的認識，通常說是本能的。……”(“……Many instincts are so wonderful that their development will probably appear to the reader a difficulty sufficient to overthrow my whole theory.I may here premise, that I have nothing to do with the origin of the mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself. We are concerned only with the diversities of instinct and of the other mental faculties in animals of the same class. I will not attempt any definition of instinct. It would be easy to show that several distinct mental actions are commonly embraced by this term; but every one understands what is meant, when it is said that instinct impels the cuckoo to migrate and to lay her eggs in other birds' nests. An action, which we ourselves require experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal, more especially by a very young one, without experience, and when performed by many individuals in the same way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be instinctive..……”) 應該在二十一世紀，或許可以應用奈米科技(Nanotechnology)以科學的實驗”證明”可感覺(horaton---perceptible)”內塑型相”的存在!!

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