第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十三章 論我們實體的複雜概念(Chapter XXIII: Of our Complex Ideas of Substances) 繼續探討精神實體和物質實體的關聯: 洛克認為我們對兩者相關的概念，我們幾乎是一無所知;所”以為知道的”都是建立在”一種東西” (something)之上的----而卻是我們沒有清晰明白概念的!! 經驗認識論認為我們的感官所感覺的識”現像”必須以”歸納”輔助驗證我們的認知。

• 特定的實體概念(Our specific ideas of substances.) ……我說，我們的特定的實體概念，僅只是一些簡單概念的集合，考量作為我一個物體的聯合。這些實體概念雖然普通叫做簡單的理解，並以簡單的術語給予名詞，然而事實上是複雜且組合的(簡單概念的集合)。 在英文中特定的“天鵝”名詞，是白色、長頸、紅嘴、黑腿、和蹼掌，還有一定的大小，在水中游泳的能力，和能夠發出特有的叫聲，或許，長期觀察這種鳥的人們，還有其他的特性:所有這些都歸於在可感覺的簡單概念，所有這些都聯合在一個共同的主體。 (……I say, our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing. These ideas of substances, though they are commonly simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple terms, yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an Englishman signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise, and perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds, some other properties : which all terminate in sensible simple ideas, all united in one common subject.)
• 精神實體的概念同物質實體的概念明白的程度一樣(Our ideas of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily substances.) 除了已經討論過我們對物質的可感的實體所形成的複雜概念，--我們自己日常的嘗試，經由我們自己心靈的作用形成我們的簡單概念，如思考、理解、意志、認知，和始動的能力等等，和一些實體共存，我們能夠架構一個複雜的非物質精神概念。( Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken, – by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c., co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. ) 因此，經由將思考、感知、自由、 使他們自己或其他事物移動的能力(I.E. 就是始動的能力)等等概念置放在一起，我們對非物質實體有一個如同對物質(實體)一樣清晰的感覺和觀點。 因為將思考和意志放在一起，或移動或停止物質運動的能力，和我們沒有清晰概念的實體結合，我們得到一個非物質的精神概念;正如有條理的把凝固的部分、受動的能力概念，結合實體(概念)，正如同我們沒有肯定的概念，我們得到物質概念。(And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit ; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter.) 這個和另一個的概念清晰和明白程度都是一樣的:思想、和移動物體的概念，如同對於廣延性、堅實性、被移動的概念，清晰和明白程度都是一樣的。至於我們的實體概念，在兩者(精神和物質)，都是一樣含糊，或是完全沒有;它只是一種“我不知道是什麼”的假定，支持這些概念我們稱之為偶然屬性。( The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other : the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all, in both ; it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents.) 我們很自然的認為我們，的感官就是呈現出物質的本性，乃是因為反省的欠缺。每一種感覺的作用，當充分考究後，給予我們自然界兩個部分對等的見解，物質和精神。 ( It is for want reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual.) 因為當時我知道，經由聽或看等等，有除我以外的物質存在，那些感官的物體，我更確實知道，在我自身中有一種精神存在，遂行看和聽。 這裡，我必須被說服，這些不可能僅是由無知覺物質的活動;而且沒有非物質(精神)思考的存在，(物質)也不能存在。( For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter ; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.)(I.E. 這就是笛卡爾第六個沉思：論各種物質的存在；論心靈和肉體之間的實在區別(Meditation VI: Concerning the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body)的精簡結論。)
• 扼要的重述(Recapitulation.) 因此我們已經看到我們對各種實體所有的各種概念，他們由何組成的，我們是如何經由他們(感官的簡單概念)獲得(實體概念)。由此，我想我們分明看到：( And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,)

第一，我們的各種實體概念僅僅只是一些簡單概念的集合體:還有假設(簡單概念)屬於一種東西，而且他們是存在的: 雖然這個假設的一種東西我們卻是沒有明白而清晰的概念。(First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas : with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist : though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.) (I.E. 這就是上一篇第二十三章起頭所舉的例子: 印度人所說的世界是被大象所支撐的，再問象立足在什麼上;對這提問的答案—是大龜:但再一次堅持要知道給寬背大龜支撐的是什麼，回答---一種東西，但他不知道是什麼。)

第二，各種簡單的概念，因而聯合為一個共同的基層，以形成我們的各種實體的複雜概念，沒有其他的(來源)依然只是從感覺或反省接收來的。因此，即使在那些我們認為我們最熟悉，並且以我們的最大化概念作用的達到最極致的理解，我們也不能超越那些簡單的概念。 (Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common substratum, make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. ) 甚至在那些看來是最遙遠似乎與我們全不相干，而且無限的超越我們憑我們自己的反省可以感知的任何事物;或經由感覺發現的其他事物，我們能獲得的也只有那些原始由感覺或反省得來的簡單概念；我們有的天使，特別是上帝自身的複雜概念便是很明顯的。(And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection ; or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or reflection ; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.)

第三，構成我們的實體複雜概念的那些簡單的概念，當真正的思考後，只是一些能力，但是我們往往認為他們(簡單的概念)是積極的性質; 例如，形成黃金複雜概念的絕大部分，如黃色、沉重、延展性、可熔性、王水中可溶性，等等，所有都聯合在一個不可知的基層中:所有這些概念都不是別的，只是同別的實體所發生的一些關係;並不真正在黃金中，是僅僅考量它的本身; 雖然他們(簡單概念)仍依靠于黃金內部結構中的第一性質，由此它(黃金)有不同的性質可起作用，並被其他的實體施以作用。(Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities ; v.g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in aqua regia, &c., all united together in an unknown substratum : all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances ; and are not really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.)

洛克論述 我們的非物質精神概念和物體概念的比較(Our complex idea of an immaterial spirit and our complex idea of body compared.)就是架構在一種東西的共同基層(common substratum)上，但我們不知道這是什麼，洛克給的理由是“上帝似乎不願意我們對各種事物具有一個完全的、清晰的、詳盡的概念…”，因而，我們發現的能力正同我們的生活狀態相稱，;”他對上帝 : 上帝在他自己不可被認知的本質中(God in his own essence incognisable.)。這有一系力很瑣碎將物體簡單概念”類比”到非物質精神概念的辯證----就不細述了，因為是架構在我們不知道這是什麼一種東西的共同基層(common substratum)上，是說不清的!!

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