第二卷  論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十四章 論實體的集合概念(Chapter XXIV: Of Collective Ideas of Substances)

·       集合概念是單一的概念(A collective idea is one idea.) ….例如許多人的集合體構成軍隊的概念，雖然是由許多數量的獨特實體所組成的，可是那個集合體的概念可以成功為”一個”(軍隊的)概念正如同許多“一個”人的概念一樣;而所有物體的大集合概念，以世界一詞為標誌，作為一個概念，正如在它(世界)之中所有許多的最微小事物的分子成為一個概念一樣; 它(集合概念)以任何概念的一致型式滿足需求，它(集合概念)當做一個表徵或圖畫，雖然經常是有如此許多的獨特個體組成的。(…..v.g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea as the idea of a man :and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever, signified by the name world, is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it ; it sufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars.)

·       是由心靈的組織能力所形成的(Made by the power of composing in the mind.)心靈組成的這些實體概念集合，經由它的(心靈的)組織能力，將各種簡單或複雜的概念結合成為一個(概念)，經由同一種天賦，就如它(心靈)組成特殊實體的複雜概念，將許多簡單概念聚集，聯合成為一個實體。(These collective ideas of substances the mind makes, by its power of composition, and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one, as it does, by the same faculty, make the complex ideas of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas, united in one substance. …)

·       一切人為的事物都是集合的概念(Artificial things that are made up of distinct substances are our collective ideas.) 

　　第二十五章論聯繫(Chapter XXV: Of Relation)

·       什麼是聯繫(Relation, what.)無論簡單或複雜的概念，除了心靈對這些事物本身形成外，還有的它是經由各種事物比較得來的。在考量任何事物，(形成的)理解，並不僅只限於那個客體，它(概念)能傳達像似超出它自身以外的概念，或者至少說，看來是超過它(概念本身)，察看它(概念)如何與別的(概念)處於一致。 (Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another.  The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object : it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.)  當心靈如此考量一個事物時，將它帶來，並將它與另一個安置一起，以它(事物)用來並進行它的分析區別彼此----這是，引入的單字，聯繫和細節區辨(respect);而且這些指涉給予那些積極的事物，明白表示細節區辨，和作為標記導引觀念超越主體它本身被命名為不同於它(事物)的”一種東西”，我們稱之為聯繫者(relatives)；而這些被聚集起來的事物，(稱之為)有聯繫的。(When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other – this is, as the words import, relation and respect ; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives ; and the things so brought together, related. ) 因此，當心靈考量凱烏斯做為確實的存在，它僅只是做為凱烏斯真實存在的概念；例如，當我考量他作為一個人，在我的心中僅只是物種，人，的複雜概念。因此同樣的，當我說凱烏斯是一個白人，則我所思考的亦僅是一個白膚色的人。但當我給凱烏斯以丈夫的名稱，我又明白表示著另一個人；然而當我說他是膚色較白的，則我明白表示著另一種別的東西:在這兩個事例，我的觀念被引導超越凱烏斯以外的”一種東西”，有兩個事物合在一起考量。 因為任何概念，不論其為簡單或複雜，心靈可能連結的原因將兩個事物合在一起考量，雖然仍能認為是有分別的，並且立刻將他們當做一個圖像:因此，我們的任何概念都可以作為聯繫的基礎。就如在上述的例證，色普隆尼的婚約和婚禮就是明白表示的連結與丈夫的聯繫;……(Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius ; v.g. when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person ; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing : in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct : therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband ;…...)

·      兩件事物，才能有聯繫(Relation only betwixt two things.)......所有事物都能有聯繫。一般聯繫方面，需考量這些事物：(......All things capable of relation. Concerning relation in general, these things may be considered :) 第一點，任何事物，不論它是簡單的概念、實體、型相、聯繫，或他們各自的名稱，都能夠相對與其他事物產生幾乎無數的考量:因此，這種情形就構成人類思想和言語的大部分:例如，一個人可以同時維持，持續下述的各種聯繫，以及更多的(聯繫)，可以是父親、兄弟、兒子、祖父、孫子、岳父、女婿、丈夫、朋友、敵人、臣民、將軍、法官、顧主、客戶、教授、歐洲人、英國人、島民、僕人、主人、物主、首領、長輩、晚輩、較大的、較小的、年老的、年幼的、同齡的、相似的、不相似的等等，有幾乎無限的數目:他能有許多的聯繫只要有機會，以任何約定，或非約定的方式，或是別的樣的方式，將他同其他的事物相比。因此，如我所說的，聯繫是一種比較或一起考量兩種事物，並且由那些比較給他們一個或兩個事物一種名稱;或給聯繫本身以一種名稱。 (......First, That there is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things : and therefore this makes no small part of men’s thoughts and words : v.g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c., to an almost infinite number : he being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, relation is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one or both of them some appellation from that comparison ; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.)

·       我們的聯繫概念通常比有聯繫的主體概念更為明白(Our ideas of relations often clearer than of the subjects related.) 第二點，關於聯繫可以更進一步考量，雖然它(聯繫)不是包含在事物內的真正存在，只是外面和附加的一些事物，然而那些聯繫者名詞所代表的概念，往往比他們所屬的實體概念，還更清晰、更明白。我們所有的父親或兄弟觀念，比我們對“人類”的概念更清晰、明白許多;或，是否你將，對“父子關係”會是比對“人類”更容易明白的事物;而且我領悟朋友(的聯繫概念)比上帝(的聯繫概念)會更容易的多;因為關於一種行動的知識，或一個簡單概念，就往往給我足夠的聯繫觀念;可是要瞭解任何實質的存在，各種各樣精確概念的搜集是必要的。(Secondly, This further may be considered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced, yet the ideas which relative words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man ; or, if you will, paternity is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea, than of humanity ; and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God ; because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation ; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary. ) 一個人，如果他在一起比較兩種事物，他幾乎是不知道他在進行他們(兩種事物)的比較:所以，只有當他進行任何事物的一起比較，他才會有那種清晰明白的聯繫概念。然後聯繫的概念，能在我們的心靈至少比那些物質(的概念)更完美、清晰。因為我們往常不容易知道存在於任何實體中全部真正的簡單概念，可是我們大部分卻容易知道，我們所想到的，或有名稱的所構成的那種聯繫的簡單概念:例如，我們比較有共同父母的兩個人，雖然沒有完全的 “人類” 概念，我們可以很容易形成“兄弟”的概念。 (A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them : so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas, then, of relations, are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds than those of substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for : v.g. comparing two men in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man.) 因為有意義的聯繫者名詞，以及其他的，僅代表著概念;而且無論那些簡單的，或是由簡單的概念所形成的，它足以明白知道這聯繫者名稱所代表的精確的概念，以形成聯繫基礎清晰的瞭解；能夠有清晰理解並不必先有所歸屬的那個事物完全和明白的概念。……( For significant relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas ; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation ; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. ……)

·       一切聯繫都歸結為簡單概念(Relations all terminate in simple ideas.) 第三點，雖有許多考量進行各種事物相互間的比較，並且由此產生許多的聯繫，無論是由感覺或反省而來的，然而他們歸結于相關的簡單概念，而我認為這些是我們知識的所有原料。 說明這點，我將在最重要的一些聯繫以我們所能得到的觀點演示它;在一些似乎最遠的感覺或反省: 將會分明看到由那時起得到他們的概念，而不必理會過去的懷疑----我們得來的各種觀點都只是簡單的概念，而且最初都只是由感覺或反省衍生出來的。 (Thirdly, Though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of ; and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection : which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas, and so originally derived from sense or reflection.)

·       名詞導致心靈超越所命名的主體，都是聯繫者(Terms leading the mind beyond the subject denominated, are relative.) 第四點，所謂聯繫就是一物與另外一物外在的的考量，很顯然，所有文字必須導致心靈得到真正事物存在的那些概念，而不是其它聯繫者文字(的那些概念):例如，“一個人”、“黑的”、“快樂的”、“親切的”、“渴的”、“怒的”、“廣延的”;則這些文字以及一切相似的字眼都是絕對的，因為他們既不暗示也不明白表示任何事物，只是被命名為“人”的名詞中所真正或假設存在的(外在);但是”父親”、”兄弟”、”國王”、”丈夫”、”較黑的”、”較快樂”的等等字眼，連同他們命名的事物，還指謂與這個事物實體相分離和外來的一些東西。( Fourthly, That relation being the considering of one thing with another which is extrinsical to it, it is evident that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the words are applied are relative words : v.g. a man, black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended ; these and the like are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated ; but father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c., are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.)

·       所有的聯繫者組成簡單的概念(All relatives made up of simple ideas.)前面已經奠定了關於聯繫概括的前提，我現在將舉一些例證，以顯示我們所有各種概念的各種聯繫，如何同別的概念一樣，是由簡單的概念所形成的;那些概念，不論他們看來如何精細或遠離感覺，最終結果歸結於簡單的概念。我現在要從最廣泛的一種聯繫說起，就是要從所謂因果聯繫說起。在這種聯繫中，一切現存的，或可能存在的事物，都可以包括進去。不過這個概念究竟是怎樣由一切知識的兩大來源，即感覺和反省來的，我將在下一章　，加以考察。( Having laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple ideas ; and that they all, how refined or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned, and that is the relation of cause and effect : the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection, I shall in the next place consider.)

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