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第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十一章 論能力(Chapter XXI: Of Power) 繼續再進一步討論:中立性的自由(liberty of indifferency.)---- 選擇行動或不行動的能力是自由的來源!!
- 概述—中立性的自由(Recapitulation – liberty of indifferency.) 結束對人類自由的探討，如同前面主張的，我自己由開始就擔憂，而且我的有見識的朋友，自從出版後，懷疑其中有些錯誤，雖然他不能特別的對我指出(錯誤)，我要仔細的檢視這一章。在其中發現一個我造成輕微而不易察覺的疏忽，將似乎無甚分別的一些字錯用，這個發現對我揭露現今的觀點，因此，在這第二版中，我提交學術界，簡單的說，就是：自由是一種，按照心靈指導行動或不行動的能力。(To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which, as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which, in short, is this : Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs. ) 在特殊的例證中，指導我們的運動官能運動或靜止的能力，我們稱之為意志。至於在一系列自願的運動中，能決定我們意志的任何改變是一些現實的不安，這種不安是，或至少經常伴隨著欲望。欲望多半是被邪惡驅動，使欲望高揚; 因為完全免於痛苦總是使我們幸福的必要部分; 但是每一個善， 不但如此，甚至於每一種較大的善，常常不能驅使我們的欲望，因為它(善)不是造成，或者不被認為是造成，我們幸福的成分。不過，儘管這種一般對幸福的渴望，經常而且不變的發生作用，然而，對任何(以後)屈從的行動，經由有決斷權的意志使任何特殊欲望的滿足可以被延緩，直到我們已經慎重的檢視我們當時特別明顯渴望的善是我們真正幸福的組成部分，或與之(真正幸福)符合或不符合。 (A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it : because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness : but every good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, part of our happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But, though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it.)依據我們檢視後的判斷結果，就是人類最終的決定;如果他的意志除了他自己的欲望外，不受任何別的事物決定，他不能是自由的，(除非)經由他自己的判斷指導(他的意志)。我知道自由，依據一些人，是寄託於人類的中立狀態;(自由是)他的意志前行的導向決定。我希望它們如此強調提出前行的中立狀態，如同他們稱呼的，已經明白的告訴我們，這種假設的中立狀態是不是前行的導向認識的思想和判斷，以及導向意志的宣言。 因為很難以描述它(中立狀態)是在他們中間，就是直接在認識的判斷之後，和意志的決定之前:因為意志的決定是緊接著認識的判斷:寄託自由在中立狀態，前行的導向認識的思想和判斷，對我而言寄託自由在黑暗的狀態，在那裡我們不能明白也不能表達它(自由)的任何事情;至少它(中立狀態)安置它(自由)在一個沒有能力行使它(自由)的主體---- it places it in a subject incapable of it，沒有行為者被允許有自由的能力，而僅是思想和判決的結果。 (The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man ; who could not be free if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty, by some, is placed in an indifferency of the man ; antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they who lay so much stress on such an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them, i.e. immediately after the judgment of the understanding, and before the determination of the will : because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding : and to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say anything of it ; at least it places it in a subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in consequence of thought and judgment.)我不在字詞上攪和，因此同意人們樂於主張的，自由寄託於中立狀態，但是它(自由)停留在理解的判斷後的中立狀態，不錯，甚至於是指意志的決定後的(中立狀態):而且那種中立狀態不屬於人（因為他一旦做了最好的決斷，也就是說，行動或克制，他便不再中立了），而是人的運作能力的中立狀態，這中立狀態(人的運作能力)同樣的能夠在在意志裁決之前或之後，可以進行或來停止各種動作，都是這種狀態，如果有人願意，可以被稱為中立狀態；而這中立狀態達到程度，就是人的自由(限度)，不能超過:很好， 我有能力驅動我的手，或讓它停止; 我的運動能力都是中立的不論驅動或靜止我的手。 (I am not nice about phrases, and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so, that liberty is placed in indifferency, but it is an indifferency which remains after the judgment of the understanding, yea, even after the determination of the will : and that is an indifferency not of the man, (for after he has once judged which is best, viz. to do or forbear, he is no longer indifferent,) but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate or to forbear operating after as before the decree of the will, are in a state, which, if one pleases, may be called indifferency ; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no further : v.g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it rest ; that operative power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand.) 然後，我在這方面(I.E. 行動層面)是完全的自由; 我的意志決定行動能力的靜止，我依然是自由的，因為我那種行動能力動作或不動作的中立狀態，還繼續存在; 雖然現存狀況是靜止，驅動我的手的能力並不會因我的意志決定而受損;動作或不動作能力的中立狀態，仍如以前一樣，當意志出現，如果意志交付它(行動能力)一個測試，依據相反的指令。(I am then, in that respect perfectly free ; my will determines that operative power to rest : I am yet free, because the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains ; the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at present orders rest ; the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before, as will appear, if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary.)但是，如果在我的手靜止的期間，它(行動能力)忽然受到癱瘓症的侵襲，行動能力的中立狀態就消失了，而且我的自由也一起(消失了)；因此，在那方面(I.E. 行動層面)，我不再有自由，而我是必然的讓我的手靜止。在另一方面，如果我的手由於痙攣導致的抽動，便經由這種抽動抽離了動作官能的中立性; 我的自由在這情況下也失去了，因為我是必然的使我的手運動。 我要附加這一點，以顯示這種自由中立狀態的本質我以為是組成，不是其他的，真正的或想像的(自由)。(But if, during the rest of my hand, it be seized with a sudden palsy, the indifferency of that operative power is gone, and with it my liberty ; I have no longer freedom in that respect, but am under a necessity of letting my hand rest. On the other side, if my hand be put into motion by a convulsion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion ; and my liberty in that case is lost, for I am under a necessity of having my hand move. I have added this, to show in what sort of indifferency liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or imaginary.)
- 在動作和在思量，主動和被動能力(Active and passive power, in motions and in thinking.) 關於自由的本質和範圍真正概念是非常的重要，我前面試圖解釋它(自由)時所導引的，這些題外話我希望我得到原諒。在邊時因為這種真正的意念的因為這種緣故，所以，不免有些枝蔓的議論。這一層，我希望人們會原諒我。在論能力的這一章中，意志、意欲、自由、必然性的概念，以我的方式自然的演繹顯示。這個論文的前一版基於我的認知我做成關於他們的論述，按照我那時的見識。不過現在，作為真理喜愛者，不是自己學說崇拜者，我承認我的觀點有些改變;我認為我已經發現了(改變)的依據。(True notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty are of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt to explain it has led me into. The ideas of will, volition, liberty, and necessity, in this Chapter of Power, came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this Treatise I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had. And now, as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrines, I own some change of my opinion ; which I think I have discovered ground for.) 在我第一次所寫的，我是不偏不倚的中立追求真理，我認為她(真理)引領我走向那裡。既不自負的幻想以為完全無錯誤，也不虛偽的掩飾我的錯誤因為害怕損害我的名譽，我已經，以同樣真誠尋求唯一真理的計畫，並不感覺羞恥的出版以回應較嚴格的指教質問。不是不可能，有些人認為我以前的意見是對的;有些人（我已經發現）認同後來的;也有都不認同的。我對人們的意見分歧一點都不會覺得驚訝 : 在有爭論的觀點上公正理性的演繹是如此的罕見，在精確的抽象概念不是那麼的容易，尤其是如此冗長的論述。因此，我覺得我自己應該感激任何人，根據這些或別的理由，將自由的主題依然存在的一些困難完全的釐清。(In what I first writ, I with an unbiased indifferency followed truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of blemishing my reputation, I have, with the same sincere design for truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a severer inquiry has suggested. It is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right ; and some (as I have already found) these latter ; and some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in men’s opinions : impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy, especially if of any length. And, therefore, I should think myself not a little beholden to any one, who would, upon these or any other grounds, fairly clear this subject of liberty from any difficulties that may yet remain.) 在我結束這一章前，如果我們運用我們的思想較精確的審視行動，可以幫助我們得到能力更清晰的觀念。我前面已經說過，我們只有兩種行動的概念，稱之為 : 動作和思考。(Before I close this chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our thoughts take a little more exact survey of action. I have said above, that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking.) 這個，說實話，雖然被稱為和被認為是行動，然而，如果密切的考察，(我們)將發現不全然如此。 因為，如果我沒有錯，有兩種情況，經適當的審察，將會發現是激情而非行動; 因此到目前為止在那些主體必然的作用幾乎沒有被動能力，然而在他們(動作和思考)的聯繫被認為是個行為者。 因為在這些例證，使產生動作和思考的本體是接收(外界)的印象，它(印象)被置入轉為行動，純粹是由外來的，所以行為僅是經由一些外部行為者接收這種印象的能力; 並且這種能力不應該是主動能力，僅僅只是主體具有的被動能力。(These, in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For, if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due consideration, will be found rather passions than actions ; and consequently so far the effects barely of passive powers in those subjects, which yet on their accounts are thought agents. For, in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought receives the impression, whereby it is put into that action, purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent ; and such power is not properly an active power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject.) 有時本體或行為者經由它自己的能力產生行動，這就應該是主動能力。只要一個本體變化，能產生任何的結果，稱之為行動：很好，一個固體物質，經由動作，施加或改變其他本體的可感覺概念，因此這種動作的變化我們稱之為一種行動。 但該固體物質的這個動作還是，當正確的考量，除激情之外，如果它(固體物質)接受了它(動作)只是從一些外部的行為者。所以動作的主動能力不存在本體中，它本身不能開始動作或在其它的靜止本體中。所以同樣在思想方面，接收任何來自外部本體運作的概念或思想的能力被稱之為思考的能力:，電源物質的想法或思想被稱為思維的力量： 但這只不過是被動能力或收容力。(Sometimes the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power, and this is properly active power. Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action : v.g. a solid substance, by motion, operates on or alters the sensible ideas of another substance, and therefore this modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in that solid substance is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only from some external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself or in another substance when at rest. So likewise in thinking, a power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking : but this is but a passive power, or capacity.)但能經自己的選擇將儲存的概念取出審查，並比較他們(選擇)自己認為適合的，這是一種主動能力。 這種反省或者有一些功用可以使我們免除了關於能力和行動的錯誤，因為文法上，和語言共同的框架上，易於引領我們進入 (錯誤)。 因為文法學者所謂主動動詞所表示的，並不永遠表示行動： 很好，這個命題：我看見月或星，或我感到太陽的熱，雖然是主動動詞的表示，在我不是表示任何行動，我對這些物質所起的作用，只是接受光、 圓度和熱的概念；由此我不是主動的，只是被動的，而且在那種情況下，我的眼或身，不能不接受它們。但當我將我的眼轉向別處，或移動我的身體離開日光，我當然是主動的; 因為我自己的選擇，經由我自身內在的能力，我使我自己產生動作。這種行動是由主動能力產生的。 (But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one’s own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions, which grammar, and the common frame of languages, may be apt to lead us into. Since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active, does not always signify action : v.g. this proposition : I see the moon, or a star, or I feel the heat of the sun, though expressed by a verb active, does not signify any action in me, whereby I operate on those substances, but only the reception of the ideas of light, roundness, and heat ; wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot, in that position of my eyes or body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the sunbeams, I am properly active ; because of my own choice, by a power within myself, I put myself into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.)
注意 : 這是約翰•洛克在第二卷論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)三十三章中極為重要的一章，在這裡討論了意志、自由、激情(passions)、善、惡和幸福等許多”形而上”的議題，必須和他的經驗主義認識論(Epistemology)----我們的任何知識不能先於經驗，的革命性創新主張相符合----對他這是蠻困難的論述，對讀者要精確”掌握他的邏輯思路”這也是蠻困難的，就是為什麼在這一章”長篇”引用原文的原因。 實際上，約翰•洛克也承認他在整理編修這篇論述時，也修正了他的某些觀點，因此，他不獨斷也經常在”邏輯演繹過程妥協”，留下”理性辯證的空間”，這個精神也開拓了自由主義(Liberalism)發展道路，在這種”基督教社會文化土壤”發展出宗教寬容、和議會民主政治。 倘若一個社會的文化內涵的集合中欠缺”理性、包容、妥協及文明態度(Civility)”等元素，那麼，民主法治的上層政治結構就不容易生根、萌芽、成長----可以對比當今世界各地所標榜的各式各樣的”民主政治”發展的現象。
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