第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十一章 論能力(Chapter XXI: Of Power) 是對前面第七章　論來自感覺和反省的簡單概念所提到能力概念的深入探討;前面討論了不安决定意志(Uneasiness determines the will.);接著約翰·洛克討論幸福和苦難、善和惡;延緩的能力(Power to suspend.)等相關的意涵及內部的聯繫----這一章有七十五個細項，約翰·洛克在論述中也凸顯了許多邏輯的矛盾，但無損這部經驗主義認識論(Epistemology)體系的開創性價值!!

• 所有的(人)渴望幸福(All desire happiness.) 驅迫欲望的是什麼? ，則我回答，幸福，而且只有幸福。 幸福和苦難，是兩個極端的名稱，它們邊界的極限我們不知道，那正如古人(歌林多前書 2:9)所說，“眼所未曾看到、耳所未曾聽到、人心也未曾想到的。”不過我們對兩者的某些程度，卻有一些鮮活的印象；經由若干在(幸福)一方的愉快和歡樂，在另(苦難)一方面，有苦惱和悲痛;所生起的印象;為了簡便的緣故，我總括的稱之為快樂和苦痛; 這快樂和苦痛是兼指身體、心靈兩者，(詩篇 16:11)“ 在你面前有滿足的喜樂；在你右手中有永遠的福樂。” 或者，正確的說，他們(快樂和苦痛)都是屬於心靈的; 儘管有些是由思想浮現於心靈，其他在身體的是由於某種運動的誘發變化。( What it is moves desire ? I answer, – happiness, and that alone. Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not ; it is what « eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. » But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions ; made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side, and torment and sorrow on the other ; which, for shortness’ sake, I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain ; there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body, « in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.» Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind ; though some have their rise in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.)
• 幸福和苦難、善和惡，它們是什麼(Happiness and misery, good and evil, what they are.) 幸福，它的極度，就是我們所能享受的最大的快樂，而苦難就是最大的痛苦；最低限度可以被稱為快樂的就是免除了多數的所有痛苦，然而如此多的當下快樂，卻沒有任何是滿意的。 現在，因為快樂和痛苦都是某些外物的作用，以不相同的程度;因此，凡適合為我們產生快樂的，我們便稱之為善，而容易為產生痛苦的我們稱之為惡;沒有其他的原因，只是因為它們適合為我們產生組成幸福的那種快樂及產生組成不幸的那種痛苦。 (Happiness, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain ; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees ; therefore, what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil ; for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery. ……)
• 什麼善是渴望的，什麼(善)卻不是(What good is desired, what not.)雖然這是普通所說的善、惡，而且所有善都是一般欲望的適當物件;然而所有善，縱然被認為和承認是如此的，不必然會改變每個特殊人類的欲望; …… (Though this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of desire in general ; yet all good, even seen and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man’s desire ;......);…… 我想，沒有人會愚蠢的否認知識中的樂趣:至於各種感官的樂趣，它們有太多的跟隨者，所以我們正不必再問人們是否可以由它們獲得(樂趣)。 現在，讓一個人因由感官快樂獲致滿足，另一個人的歡愉因由知識:雖然他們只能承認，對方所追求的有很大的樂趣; 然而，他們從不會將對方的歡愉作為自己幸福的一部分，他們的欲望並不能被推動，他們各自沒有對方享有的(樂趣)，但他們是滿足的；因此，他的意志不會被決定來追求它(對方的樂趣)。(…… There is nobody, I think, so senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge : and for the pleasures of sense, they have too many followers to let it be questioned whether men are taken with them or no. Now, let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge : though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pursues ; yet, neither of them making the other’s delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys ; and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it.) 但是，當這好學者的饑和渴使他感到不安，他的意志雖然從不曾被決定追尋，他曾發現豐盛的菜肴，有滋味的調味汁、美味的葡萄酒的品嘗樂趣，可是經由饑和渴的不安，現在決定吃和飲，雖然可能全然不在意，只要自然的食物以他的方式呈現。 (But yet, as soon as the studious man’s hunger and thirst make him uneasy, he, whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer, poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome food comes in his way.)
• 注意:這就是約翰·洛克”模糊感覺到”馬斯洛需求層次理論(Maslow's hierarchy of needs)的論述，隨後他提出許多的解釋 : 為什麼最大的善常常不是(人)所渴望的(Why the greatest good is not always desired.); 為什麼不被渴望，它就不能驅動意志(Why not being desired, it moves not the will.) ----他不清晰的”常識性”論述也描繪出了人類價值體系所存在的生理及心理需求，約翰·洛克由外而內的的滿足轉化”路徑圖”(Path Graph)導入經院哲學（scholasticism) 形而上(Metaphysics)的善" good"聯繫到我們感覺的"快樂經驗"，再聯繫到幸福(happiness)---- “眼所未曾看到、耳所未曾聽到、人心也未曾想到的。”(« eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. »)最大的快樂----他進一步論述推導適當的思量能引起渴望(Due consideration raises desire.); 有能力延緩欲望的實現是因為思量(The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire makes way for consideration.); 由我們自己的判斷做決定，不是對自由的限制 (To be determined by our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty.); 恒定不變追求幸福的決心，不是自由的削減(A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness no abridgment of liberty.); 追求真正幸福的必要性，是自由的基礎(The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation of liberty.)----至此，約翰·洛克將經院哲學形而上的自由(liberty)和幸福(happiness)聯繫起來，先前他已經論證的將善" good"和我們感覺的最大的快樂聯繫起來，這裡僅將結論論述的脈絡"串在一起"就不援引細節了，可自行利用操連結閱讀，節省的篇幅我們可仔細探討延緩的能力(Power to suspend.) 。
• 延緩的能力(Power to suspend.) 成為理性人類自由的關鍵，在於他們的持續努力追尋，穩定實現真正的福祉，--他們在特殊的情況下能延緩這個實現，直到他們已有前瞻的考量，然後使他們自己明白是不是可以在達成他們的主要目的路徑中得到計劃或希望的那些特殊事物，可以成為他們最大善的真正部分。(This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity, – That they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good.) 因為他們的本性有追求幸福的傾向和趨向，是他們的動機和驅使力，留意不要犯錯或錯失了它(幸福);因此他們的特定行動方向，必然會使他們小心謹慎，深思熟慮及慎重，這些都是獲得它(幸福)的方法。(For, the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to mistake or miss it ; and so necessarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it.) 這在我看來，這似乎是理性人類有限性的極大自由權; …… 他們能延緩他們的各種欲望，而且制止他們(欲望)決定他們的意志驅使任何行動，直到他們已經適當且清楚的察核了它(行動)的善和惡，作為權衡事物需要的程度。 (This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings ;  …… – That they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires.)

 
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