第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十一章 論能力(Chapter XXI: Of Power) 是對前面第七章　論來自感覺和反省的簡單概念所提到能力概念的深入探討;討論了自由、意志、必然性和行動實體( agents)等相關的意涵及內部的聯繫----是非常重要的一章，該討論詳細些!!

• 這個(能力)概念是如何穫得的(This idea how got) 心靈每天，經由感官，充滿了它(感官)所觀察到的外界各種事物(產生)簡單概念的變化;並且注意到如何在一個(概念)結束，而消失了，然後另一個不是先前的(概念)開始存在;同時也對應它(心靈)本身內流通(的各種感覺)生出反省，還觀察它(心靈)各種概念的不斷變化，有時經由外物在感官上的各種印象，有時經由它(心靈)自己的決定; 根據它(心靈)恒定不變的觀察推斷，在未來，同樣事物，相同樣的執行者和同樣途徑中也會發生類似的變化，-估量一件事物使它(心靈)的簡單概念有改變的可能性，另一種事物有會引起那種變化的可能性;因此，它(心靈)就得到所謂能力的概念。(The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without ; and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before ; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice ; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways, – considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change ; and so comes by that idea which we call power.)注意 : 這是描述”類比”能力的起源，”類比”是一種”不精確的歸納能力”，培根在1620年出版新工具(The Novum Organum)就是建立歸納推理(Inductive reasoning)系統，約翰·洛克是探討心靈這種”不精確的歸納能力”是如何建構的過程。
• 主動和被動的能力(Power, active and passive.) 能力被認為是兩種:有能力創作，或能接受任何變化。一種可叫做主動的能力，另一種可叫做被動的能力。(Power thus considered is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change. The one may be called active, and the other passive power.) 物質可能是全然沒有主動能力，就如同造物者,上帝,是真實的超越所有被動能力；然而那些可能被創造靈魂的居間的狀態不是單獨的(能力)，具有主動和被動兩種能力的，那是很值得考察的。(Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power, as its author, God, is truly above all passive power ; and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power, may be worth consideration.)
• 能力由各種聯繫所組成(Power includes relation.) 我承認，當仔細思考，就如我們的概念，任何的種類，在能力中含有一種聯繫(動作或變化的聯繫)，不是嗎? 對於，我們的廣延、存續和數目的概念，它們不都包括在它們之中各部分的一種秘密聯繫嗎?   形相和運動具有比更顯然可看見的某種內部關係。 又如各種可感，如顏色、氣味等性質，它們不也是各種物體的能力和我們知覺的聯繫嗎? 如果，在事物中考察它們自身，它們不是取決於各部分的體積、形相、組織和運動嗎？ 所有的這些在它們內部都包括一些聯繫。(I confess power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to action or change,) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not ? For, our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts ? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly. And sensible qualities, as colours and smells, &c., what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception, &c. ? And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts ? All which include some kind of relation in them.) 注意: 約翰·洛克這個物體第一性質、第二性質區分法的”內在矛盾”在第七章　論來自感覺和反省的簡單概念中有提到喬治·貝克萊(George Berkeley，1685年3月12日~1753年1月14日)以"存在就是被感覺”(“to be is to be perceived")的修正。
• 最明白的主動能力的概念來自於靈魂 (The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.) ……因為一切被觀察到的改變，心靈必須推測某處的能力能夠造成這種變化，以及在事物本身接受能力的可能性。 然而，我們仔細思考，各種實體，經由我們的感官，不能提供如同我們心靈運作的反省時，所得到的那樣明白和清晰的主動能力的概念。 對有關於行動的所有能力，只存在我們有的兩種行動概念，被稱之為: 思想和運動，讓我們思考我們何時獲得能產生這些行動最明白的能力概念。(……Since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have an idea, viz. thinking and motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions.) （一）討論思想，實體完全不能供概念給我們；只是經由反省那個(實體)，我們才有了那個(實體概念)。（二）我們全然不能從實體得到任何運動端點的概念。一個靜止的實體不能使我們得到任何自動能力產生運動的概念;當它(實體)被設定它本身的運動，這種運動只可以說是一個激動，不能說是它(內在)的行動。 ((1) Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all ; it is only from reflection that we have that. (2) Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move ; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion than an action in it.)……我們得到運動端點的概念，只能經由反省我們自己所有的(經驗);在那裡經由我們經驗發現，只要經意志驅使它(身體)，只要經我們的思想，我們就能運動，先前靜止的，我們身體的各部分。(……The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves ; where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest.)……(…… only I thought it worth while to consider here, by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation.)
• 意志和理解是心靈或靈魂的兩種能力(Will and understanding two powers in mind or spirit.) 心靈有這種指揮思考，或被動的考察任何概念的能力;或是對靜止的身體進行任何部分的活動，反之亦然，對任何特定的實例，我們稱之為意志。(…… This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the Will.) ……知覺的能力我們稱之謂理解。(……The power of perception is that which we call the Understanding.) 知覺，是我們能夠理解的技能，就是它可以分為三種：一是我們心靈中概念的知覺，二是表徵意義的知覺，三是我們對各種概念--聯繫或反對，同意或不同意的知覺。 所有這些都是屬於理解的性質，或屬於知覺的能力，雖然只有後兩種的應用讓我們斷定我們理解。(Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts : – 1. The perception of ideas in our minds. 2. The perception of the signification of signs. 3. The perception of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.)
• 天賦，不是真正的存在(Faculties, not real beings.) 這些心靈的能力，被稱之為知覺和喜愛選擇的能力，通常還有另一種名稱。 按照一般說法，理解和意志就是心靈的兩種天賦; 說到天賦一詞，則我們在用它時如果不假設它（我想人們是這樣假設它的）代表著心靈中一些真實的存在，而且假設那些存在又分別營理解和意願的作用，以至在心靈中產生了紛亂的思想，那麼，這個名詞亦是很恰當的。(These powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are usually called by another name. And the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind ; a word proper enough, if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men’s thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition.) 注意:這是約翰·洛克還不完備的經驗論對駁斥笛卡爾所主張的知識起源於所謂“天賦原則”以及萊布尼茲的所謂”天賦實踐原則”很”勉強”的論述，後來喬治·貝克萊(George Berkeley，1685年3月12日~1753年1月14日)以"存在就是被感覺”(“to be is to be perceived")的修正才補強了約翰·洛克在這個關鍵點的邏輯上矛盾，這裡只引述結論。
• 自由和必然性的概念何時(產生)(Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.) 我認為，每個人在他們自身都會發現，開始或節制，繼續或終止他們自身的各種動作的能力。(Every one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself.)每個人在他們自身發現，由心靈能力支配人類的行動範圍的考量，產生了自由和必然性的概念。(From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which everyone finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.)----I.E.這就是人類”主觀能動性”意涵集合的元素!!
• 自由是什麼(Liberty, what.) 我們任何概念所有的行動，如同已經討論的，自身簡化為兩種---稱之謂 : 思想和行動;只要一個人有能力思考或不思考，運動或不運動，按照他自己心靈的喜愛選擇或指導，那麼他是一個自由的人。(All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion ; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free.) 無論任何喜愛選擇或節制在人類的能力是不一致的;無論行動或不行動也是不一致的遵循著他心靈喜愛選擇的指導， 如果一種動作的施展和停頓不是平均地在一個人的能力以內，如果一種動作的實現和不實現不能相等地跟著選擇和指導，則那種動作縱是自願的，亦不是自由的。(Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power ; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. ) 因此，所謂自由概念就是，任何行動實體，按照心靈的決定或思想，實施或節制任何特殊行動的能力概念，由此它們(決定或思想)之一是其它(行動實體)的喜愛選擇: 在它們(決定或思想) 其中之一不是屬於行動實體，按照他的意願，產生的能力，他不在自由之中。 (So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other : where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty ; that agent is under necessity.)因此，沒有思考、沒有意願、沒有意志，所謂的自由就不存在;不過就算有思想、有意願、有意志，亦不必然就有自由。 (So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will ; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. ) 注意 :約翰·洛克舉例 : 一個人因橋塌了，跌入水中，這個過程他亦沒有自由，雖然他有有思想、有意願、有意志不想掉下去，但，他沒有能力制止掉落的運動，他不是一個自由的行動實體。他又舉了一些例子辯證了---客觀的存在不會因主觀的意願而改變，只有發揮主觀能動性的實踐力去改變客觀的存在才是擁有自由的必要且充分的條件!! 只有行動實體才能是擁有自由的主體----這裡已經隱含了卡爾馬克思(Karl Marx)在1848年發佈的共產黨宣言(The Communist Manifesto)主體實踐的革命觀!!  後面還會討論:"行動實體才能是擁有自由的主體"更細膩的意涵元素。

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