第二卷  論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十七章 論唯一性和差異性(Chapter XXVII: Of Identity and Diversity)----這一章涉及意識、物質實體、精神、獨立個人的原則(Principium Individuationis.)、時間和空間相關聯繫如何形成差異性等精細概念的辯證，也是如同二十一章，是非常的精彩---這一節是辯證植物、動物和人的唯一性”本質差異”!!

• 植物的唯一性(Identity of vegetables.) 因此，我們必須考察橡樹內部與批量物質的差異，對我看來這其中，一個(批量物質)僅是物質粒子如何凝聚的任一形式，另一個(橡樹內部) 他們的配置作為組成橡樹(內部)的各個部分;而如此那種組織各部分是適合以接收和分配營養，以致能則各物質分子的排列必須，而且那些部分的那種組織，必須足以接受養料、分配養料，以致於能續存並形成橡樹的木質、樹皮、葉子等等，這其中組成了植物的生命。（We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak ; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c., of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. ）這個存在然後成為一棵植物有這樣各部分連貫一致的軀幹組織，參與一個共同的生命，只要它參與一個相同的生命它就續存成為相同的植物，雖然這個生命被傳遞新的物質分子生氣勃勃的結合為有生命的植物，就像這樣續存的組織完全契合於那種植物。    (That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants. )  因為這種組織，存在於任何一瞬間中的任何物質集合，是與所有其他的(組織)有特殊具體的區別，而這就是特殊化的生命，是在這一瞬間之前和往後雙向穩定存在的，在不可覺察的各部分接續結合為植物有生命的軀幹是相同的續存性，它(組織)具有這種唯一性創作為相同的植物，而它的所有部分，相同的植物的各部分-----在他們結合成為一個續存的組織存在所有時期，這組織也妥適的傳遞共同的生命給這那樣結合的所有部分。 (For this organization, being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.）
• 動物的唯一性(Identity of animals.)在畜生的情況形沒有太大的差別而是任何人都會瞭解使創作為動物和持續維持它(動物的生命體)是相同的。（The case is not so much different in brutes but that any one may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same.）我們喜歡在機械中的一種東西，並可能有助於說明它(動物的生命體)。例如，鐘錶是什麼?  它很明顯只是一些妥適的組織或部件結構達成某種目的，當足夠的力量被添加到它(鐘錶)之中，這是可以獲得的。如果我們假設這個機器是一個續存實體，其組織的所有部分修復、 增加，或減少，連同一個共同的生命，以不斷的增加或減少其不可覺察的各部分，我們應該有很類似動物實體的一種東西;這其中的差異，就是，在動物組織的妥適性，和運動共存於內在生命，是一起開始的，運動是由內部發生的; 但在機器，這個力顯然是由外面來的，而且當機件正常運作(力)經常會耗盡，也備有完善的裝置接受它(外來的力)。 ( Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch ? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal ; with this difference, That, in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within ; but in machines the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.）
• 人的唯一性(The identity of man.) 這也表示了同一個人的唯一性組成; 就在於參與相同的續存生命，經由不斷轉瞬即逝的許多物質分子，接續的聯合成具有相同生命的有組織的身體。 …除此外，人的唯一性在各方面決不和其他的動物(唯一性)一樣…（This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists ; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. ……the identity of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, …）因為假設只有靈魂的唯一性單獨創作相同的人;而這在自然的物質而言是毫無可能的，為什麼相同的個別精神不能被聯合到不同的身體，它將是可能的那些，生活在遙遠時代的人，和不同脾性，都可能是相同的人: 這種方式的說法必須將“人”這個字用的太奇怪了，適用於將身體和形相排除在外的概念。而且這種方式的說法會更糟的契合那些哲學家承認的輪迴觀念，並且認為人的靈魂可能，因為他們的惡行被推入畜類的身體中，作為妥適的居所，所具備的器官適合滿足他們的獸性的嗜好。然而我覺得沒有人，他可以肯定埃拉加巴盧斯（I.E. Elagabalus，約203年－222年3月11日，他是卡那卡拉(Caracalla，公元211~217年在位）皇帝在敘利亞地區的私生子，被軍隊擁立成為第一個出生於東方的羅馬皇帝，主張太陽神崇拜，被暗殺後羅馬帝國進入所謂的羅馬三世紀危機時）的靈魂住在他的豬群之一的身體內，會說那個豬是一個人或是埃拉加巴盧斯。( For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man ; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man : which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.）
• 唯一性的概念適應於這概念的應用（指涉） (Idea of identity suited to the idea it is applied to.)  因此，追尋各種各樣唯一性不是的實體一致性並，並將在每種情況下決定它(唯一性);要想正確的理解合判斷它(唯一性)，我們必須考慮這名詞它所代表的概念是什麼: 它(這名詞)是一個事物將是相同的實體，另一個是相同的人，第三個是相同的人格者，是否人格者，人，實體，是三個名稱代表著三個不同的概念; –因此，像這樣屬於名稱的概念，必須是這樣(名稱)的唯一性;這些，若它(唯一性)已經被些微更仔細的注意到，則或將可以防止許多通常由這類事物造成的混亂，於是(成為)明顯的大困難，特別是關於人格的唯一性，因此，我們後面要略加考究。（It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case ; but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for : it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for three different ideas ; – for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity ; which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning personal identity, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.）

 
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