第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十七章 論唯一性和差異性(Chapter XXVII: Of Identity and Diversity)----這一節辯證自我與覺識和肉體聯繫關係;回到宗教的觀點辯證人格唯一性的組成及人的唯一性和人格唯一性的差異~~~

• 自我是基於覺識，不是基於實體(Self depends on consciousness, not on substance.) 自我就是能思考事物的意識，--無論是什麼實體組成的，（無論是精神、物質、簡單或複雜，都沒關係）--是能感覺或意識到快樂和痛苦、能導致幸福或悲慘，因此和它本身有關，是覺識的擴延範圍。因此每個人發現，當在覺識控制的時候，小指也如同他本身絕大部分一樣都是(自我)的一部分。將小指割離後，如果這個覺識是伴隨著小指，而離棄了身體的其餘部分，很顯然這小指會成了人格者，就是相同的人格者;然後這個自我與其餘部分的肉體就全無關聯了。在這個例子和實體相聯繫的是覺識，當一個部分從另一個，組成相同的人格者，並建構成不可分離的自我(部分)分離: 關於時間久遠的實體就是如此。（Self is that conscious thinking thing, – whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) – which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person ; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self : so it is in reference to substances remote in time.）它本身帶有現在能思考事物的覺識能和什麼(實體)結合，組成相同的人格者，就是一個帶有它(覺識)的自我，而不是帶有其他任何東西；因而認為是它本身的並如它自己的，擁有，以不超出覺識所及的所有(能思考)事物的行動;當每一個人能反省就將能感覺到。 (That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else ; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further ; as every one who reflects will perceive.）
• 人格者，不是實體，是賞罰的客體(Persons, not substances, the objects of reward and punishment.) 在這個人格的唯一性中架構所有懲罰和獎賞的正義及公平; 幸福和苦難是每個人他本身所關心的，而和任何實體的變化無關，不和覺識相連，或受(覺識)影響。 因為，我所舉的例子是很顯然的，但是現在，假設覺識和小指在一起當它(小指)被割去時，會是昨天關心於全部肉體的相同自我，作為它本身的一部分，(在割斷手指)行動然後它(小指同在的覺識) 不再能夠(關心其它的肉體)只得認同現在它自己的(小指)。 縱然，假設相同的肉體，繼續活著，在與小指分離後立刻有了它的一種特殊的覺識，那個小指是不知道的，它(小指的覺識)將不再關心它(不含小指的肉體)，作為它本身(小指)的一部分，或可以擁有(不含小指的肉體)任何的行動，或他們(不含小指的肉體)任何(行動)可歸因于他(小指)。（In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment ; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For, as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.）
• 其中顯示人格唯一性的組成(Which shows wherein personal identity consists.) 這就向我們顯示人格唯一性的組成 : 不在於實體的唯一性，只在於，如我先前說的，是在於意識的唯一性，假設蘇格拉底和皇后市（Queinborough）現任的市長同意，他們是相同的人格者:如果相同的蘇格拉底在醒時和睡眠時不參與相同的覺識，則蘇格拉底在醒時和睡眠時不是相同的人格者。(I.E. 為何會牽扯現任的皇后市市長? 因為此人是約翰洛克在前文提到的那個朋友，自稱他的前世就是” 蘇格拉底的靈魂” 。) (This may show us wherein personal identity consists : not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queinborough agree, they are the same person : if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person.) 然後因為蘇格拉底睡眠時的思想，而懲罰在醒時不曾意識到的蘇格拉底，如同由於兩個孿生子，只不過由於他們外貌的相似，不易辯識，這個人的行為而懲罰全然不知情的另一個，那將是不正確的; 這類孿生子 (我們都)曾經見過的。 ( And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished ; for such twins have been seen. ）

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