第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十七章 論唯一性和差異性(Chapter XXVII: Of Identity and Diversity)----這一節是很細膩的辯證能思考實體的不改變是否會改變人格者的唯一性; 靈魂和肉體如何組成一個人;覺識如何結合過往的行動組成人格者~~

·        是否，非物質實體保持相同，能是兩個人格者(Whether, the same immaterial substance remaining, there can be two persons.) 至於第二個問題，是否相同的非物質實體保持不變，可能有兩個性質不同的人格者;這問題在我看來是建立在這,--- 是否相同的非物質生物，正意識到它的(非物質實體)過去存在期間的行動，可能完全剝奪了它的(非物質實體)過去存在的所有覺識，並失去它(覺識)再也沒有能力回復它(覺識):因而它(覺識)開始一個新時期的新紀錄，使這覺識不能超出這個新的狀態。 所有那些主張前世存在的人們很明顯的是這樣的想法;因為他們承認靈魂不保有到前世存在的境況所構建的覺識，是全然脫離肉體，或是注入任一別的肉體;如果他們不這樣主張，很明顯的經驗會反駁他們。 因此人格的唯一性，既不能超越覺識所及的範圍，而且一個前世存在的精神既然沒有在蟄伏的狀態繼續存在許多年代，一定需要成為許多不同的人格者。…..（As to the second part of the question, Whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons ; which question seems to me to be built on this, – Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again : and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state. All those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind ; since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body ; and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them. So that personal identity, reaching no further than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, must needs make different persons……） …. 相同的非物質實體，沒有相同的覺識，縱然經由與任何肉體相連合，不再形成相同的人格者。….. (…..the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person, by being united to any body. ….)）

·        肉體，以及靈魂，共同組合成一個人(The body, as well as the soul, goes to the making of a man.) 因而我們就能夠，沒有任何困難，理解在復活後的是相同人格者，雖然在一個他(靈魂)曾擁有不完全一樣組成或部份相同的肉體，---相同的覺識伴同居住在它(肉體)之中的靈魂。然而單獨的靈魂，在肉體的交換後，任何人不會以為---只有主張靈魂就能組成人的他除外---是充分的可組成相同的人。(And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, – the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man.) .......我知道，在一般的敘述方法，相同的人格者，和相同的人，代表合而為一的相同事物。事實上每一個人總是可以隨他高興的自由談論，運用他認為式當的清晰聲音表示各種概念，並且隨他高興的經常改變他們(人格者和人的概念)。然而，當我們探討是什麼組成相同的靈魂、 人、或人格者，我們必須在心中固定靈魂、 人、或人格者的概念;這樣我們自己就解決了我們所說的他們(靈魂、 人、或人格者)是什麼意涵，它(靈魂、 人、或人格者) ，是他們(靈魂、 人、或人格者)之中的那一個，諸如此類，何時它(靈魂、 人、或人格者)是相同的，和何時不相同。(I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds ; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.）

·        覺識僅結合各種行動造成相同的人格者(Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person.)儘管相同的非物質實體或靈魂，不論它在哪裡，和什麼狀態，不能單獨的組成相同的人;然而它是很明顯的，覺識，只要它(覺識)能被盡量擴及—假設它(覺識)回到很遠的過去--能把時間很久遠的各種存在或行動聯絡起來，成為相同的人格者，就如它能把方才過去的存在和行動聯絡起來一樣: 所以，只要有現在的覺識和過去的各種行動，他們兩者(覺識、行動)就是相同的人格者。（But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man ; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended – should it be to ages past – unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment : so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.）假設我以相同的覺識看到諾亞方舟和洪水，如同去年冬天看到泰晤士河的氾濫，或如同我現在寫作，我不能懷疑現在寫作的我，經歷去冬觀察泰晤士河氾濫，和以前觀察大洪水，是相同的自我，--將自我按置於你喜歡的實體--正是現在寫這個論文的我現正在寫作的相同的我本身(就是) 昨天的我（不論我是否是由全部相同的物質或非物質實體所組成）。 ( Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw’ the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, – place that self in what substance you please – than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday.) 因為關於這個相同自我存在的觀點，它(自我)無關於現在的自我是否由相同的或其他的實體組成—我存在所最有關聯的，和可正確論述是對任何千年前以來所實施的行動，經由這個自我覺識切合於現在的我，因為我是代表我前一瞬間我的行動作為。 (For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances – I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.）

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