第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十一章 論能力(Chapter XXI: Of Power) 是對前面第七章　論來自感覺和反省的簡單概念所提到能力概念的深入探討;討論了自由、意志、必然性和行動實體( agents)等相關的意涵及內部的聯繫----是非常重要的一章，該討論詳細些!!

• 什麼是必然性(Necessity, what.) 完全缺乏思想、或行動能力，或按思想的指導進行節制，那就產生必然性。這就是，在一個意願的行動實體，當任何行動的開始或繼續，與他的心靈喜愛選擇相反，就叫做強迫;當阻礙或停頓任何行動和他的意願相反，那就叫做約束。完全沒有思想、沒有意願的行動實體，任何事情都是必然的行動實體。(Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called compulsion ; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called restraint. Agents that have no thought, no volition at all, are in everything necessary agents.)注意: 約翰·洛克對必然性的定義，是”負面表列”的定義---正面的意涵 : 受自然律或他律所產生的結果,是被決定的結果!!
• 自由不屬於意志(Liberty belongs not to the will.)自由只是一種能力，只能屬於行動實體，而不是意志的一種屬性或變體，因此意志本身只是一種能力。(…… Liberty is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.)
• 意願(Volition) ……我在這裡必須警告讀者，我雖然應用“訓令”、“指導”、“挑選”、“喜愛選擇”等等，我所使用的這些字詞，並不能清晰地把意願表示出來，除非他將反映他自己意志作用。舉例來說，偏愛一詞雖似乎最能表示意願的動作，可是它亦並不能精確地表示出來。……(……that I must here warn my reader, that ordering, directing, choosing, preferring, &c., which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. ……)
• 能力是屬於行動實體(Powers, belonging to agents.) ……意志只是一種能力或技能，自由乃是另一種能力或技能，因此，如果問:意志是否自由，那無異是問，一種能力是否有另一種能力，或一種技能是否有另一種技能;……。(……that the will is nothing but one power or ability, and freedom another power or ability so that, to ask, whether the will has freedom, is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability another ability ;……)
• 能力是一種聯繫，不是行動實體(Powers are relations, not agents.) 我承認，或此或彼的現實思想，可能是意志的原因，或人類實施必須選擇的能力;或心靈的真實選擇，真實的思及此物或彼物的原因:正如現實地歌唱某調時，能促動人舞某種舞似的，亦正如現實舞某種舞時，能促動人唱某種調似的。 不過所有的這些，並不是一種能力操作另一種(能力):而是心靈的操作，行使這些能力;是人從事這行為;是行動實體具備能力，能夠施展。因為各種能力只是各種聯繫，並不是各種行動實體:而且只有具有或不具有操作能力(的行動實體)，才可以說是自由的，或不自由的，因此不是能力本身。 對自由，或不自由，只屬於有能力或沒有能力施展(的行動實體)。 (I grant, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition, or exercising the power a man has to choose ; or the actual choice of the mind, the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing : as the actual singing of such a tune may be the cause of dancing such a dance, and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune. But in all these it is not one power that operates on another : but it is the mind that operates, and exerts these powers ; it is the man that does the action ; it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents : and that which has the power or not the power to operate, is that alone which is or is not free, and not the power itself. For freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act.)
• (自由)只是屬於行動實體，或人(But to the agent, or man.) 因此，我想：
• （一）只要任何一個人能，經由他的心靈的選擇或指導，樂於選擇由任何行動到其他的不行動，反之亦然，使它(行動)存在或不存在，這樣他是自由的。(Thus, I think, First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free.)…… 我們如何能認為任何人，超過所擁有的能力完成他所意願的，是更自由? 因此，一個人如果在願意動作時，就能動作，願意靜止時，就能靜止，則他在那種範圍內，就能做他自己所意欲的。(…… For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will ? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will.)…… 對於行動意願選擇的欠缺，雖是意欲它(行動): 我們不知如何還能想像其為更自由，超過遂行他意欲的能力。 (I.E. 失去雙腿的人，雖有跑的意欲，但他卻是”行動意願選擇的欠缺”。)對於在他能力所能及的動作，一個人似乎是自由的，因為，他完全可以自由的行動。(……For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it : and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.); 就意願方面來說，人並不是自由的(In respect of willing, a man is not free.)
• 人如何對意志不是自由的(How a man cannot be free to will.)----(二）意志或意欲，是一個行動，而且自由是以行動或不行動的能力所組成的，關於一個人的意志或意欲的行動，當他有能力實踐的任何行動在他思想中出現時，作為目前要完成(的工作)，便不能說是自由的。( Secondly, That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free.) 這個理由是很明顯的。因為不可避免的行動是依靠他意志的存在或不存在，而且它的(行動的)存在或不存在，是完全遵循於他意志的決定和選擇的，他不能避免意願那個行動的存在或不存在;他絕對必需意決或此或彼;樂於選擇此或彼:因為兩者之一必須要遵循;…… (The reason whereof is very manifest. For, it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action ; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other ; i.e. prefer the one to the other : since one of them must necessarily follow ;……)自由(Liberty)是執行意志的自由(freedom)。(Liberty is freedom to execute what is willed.) 因此，這是很明顯的，人對意志或不意志是沒有自由的，他的能力只不過曾經考慮:自由是由行動的能力或制止行動的能力所組成，僅此而已。(This, then, is evident, That a man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, anything in his power that he once considers of : liberty consisting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only.) (I.E. 這一大段的說明可以說是約翰·洛克在”詮釋”笛卡爾(René Descartes)1641年出版的第一哲學沉思集( Meditations on First Philosophy)中第六個沉思：論各種物質的存在；論心靈和肉體之間的實在區別(Meditation VI: Concerning the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body)二元認識論(Cartesian Dualism)的觀點----他認為機械的世界及精神世界是同時存在的，心靈能思維而不占空間；物質占有空間而不思維；心靈”指揮”著肉體各種行動----如果身體和精神是兩個獨立的實體，那麼他們互相間如何交流？ 笛卡爾從來沒有這個問題提供一個滿意的答案。   約翰·洛克在建立他的經驗主義認識論(Epistemology)體系以:經驗是全部的推理材料和知識唯一來源---作為基礎的，經由這一大段的說明，可以見到二元認識論的概念這是他思想體系的”重大矛盾”，他將”自由”和”意志”都歸類為”能力”迴避了這個矛盾。)
• 自由(Freedom.) 第一，我們應當仔細記住，自由的組成依存於我們意欲的行動存在或不存在;並不是依存於任何行動，或和它的(能力)相反，由於我們的喜愛選擇。(First, then, it is carefully to be remembered, That freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it ; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference.) 一個站在懸岩的人，自由往下跳二十碼，落入海中，不是因為他有實現相反行動的能力，往上跳二十碼，因為他做不到;但是他之所以自由，是因為他有跳或不跳的能力。(A man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do ; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap.)(I.E. 這個選擇行動或不行動的能力是自由的來源!!)
• 意願和行動的意涵是什麼(What volition and action mean.) 第二，我們必須記住，意欲或意願乃是心靈的一種活動引導他的(行動實體)思想得到行動的產生，並因此施展他的(行動實體)能力來產生它(行動)。(Secondly, we must remember, that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it.)
• 是什麼決定意志(What determines the will.) 第三，意志只是心靈的能力---指導人的各種運作器官運動或靜止，它們依存於這種指令;至於這個問題，“是什麼決定意志？”真實而妥當的答案就是，心靈。(Thirdly, the will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction ; to the question, “What is it determines the will ? “ the true and proper answer is, The mind.) ……什麼能促使心靈----在各種特殊的例證中，決定它的(心靈的)一般指導能力----趨向此或彼的特定運動或靜止呢？ 對這(問題)我的答覆，--對於繼續其狀態或行動作的動機，就在於當下在它(心靈)之內的滿足; 動機總是因某種不安而改變: 會使我們改變狀況，或採取任何新的行動，只因有某種不安。(……is this, – What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest ? And to this I answer, – The motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction in it ; the motive to change is always some uneasiness : nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness.)
• 不安决定意志(Uneasiness determines the will.)…… 這(不安)連續不斷地決定我們的意志，使我們”想法子”實踐各種行動。這種不安，我們可以稱為欲望;欲望是心靈欠缺一種佚失的善的不安。 所有身體的痛苦，無類何種類型，以及心靈的煩惱，就是不安: 經常和這(不安)聯繫在一起的欲望，就等同痛苦或不安的感覺;而且它們(欲望和痛苦)是很難區別的。 (…… This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire ; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness : and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt ; and is scarce distinguishable from it.) ……除了解除痛苦的欲望外，還有一個積極善的欠缺;在這裡，欲望與不安是相等的。我們對善的欠缺欲望有多大，相應而生的痛苦就有多大。 …… (……Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good ; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. ……);因此:欲望就是不安(Desire is uneasiness.)
• 欲望中的不安能决定意志(The uneasiness of desire determines the will.)……;(不安)是行動的泉源(This is the spring of action.) 當人完全的滿意他的現狀—當他是完美的沒有任何的不安—除了想著繼續在那種狀態，什麼勤奮，什麼行動，什麼意志會存留嗎? 那麼他下過活而外，還有別的勤勞、別的動作和別的意志呢？ 依據每個人的判斷他都會同意的。(When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in – which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness – what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it ? Of this every man’s observation will satisfy him.) 由此我們領悟全知的造物主，適當的(賦予)我們的素質及體格，而且知道什麼決定意志，已經將饑和渴的不安，以及其他自然的各種欲望交給人類，按他們的週期去來，推動並決定他們的各種意志，為了他們自己的保存，和他們種屬的延續。(And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitably to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their species.) 因為我想我們可以推論，如果僅默想我們所達成的這些好的結果---經由這些足以決定意志的不安，驅使我們工作，那麼我們應該完全沒有這些自然的痛苦，或許在世界上根本就沒有任何或僅有些許的痛苦。 聖保羅說：“與其慾火攻心、倒不如嫁娶為妙。”，在此我們看到，它(不安)是主要的動力驅使人們進入可享受的婚姻生活。 些許急切的感受，比一些描繪的有較大快樂的情景或誘惑，能更為有力驅使我們。 ( For I think we may conclude, that, if the bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all. « It is better to marry than to burn, » says St. Paul, where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.);因此，最大積極的善不能決定意志，只有現實的不安(能夠決定意志) (The greatest positive good determines not the will, but present uneasiness alone.)(I.E. 這一大段恰恰是詮釋了孟子‧告子下篇的名言"生於憂患，死於安樂"的內涵!!)

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