日本「中國通」自欺欺人

郭都人

《中時電子報》日前刊載了關於日本首席妄人安倍晉三的專欄文章，全文如下：

張瑞昌專欄－安倍參拜大失算

         2014-01-07 01:54
         中國時報
         【張瑞昌】

「他是想逼美國表態吧！」日本首相安倍晉三參拜靖國神社那一天（右圖左，歐新社），正好有位朋友自東京來訪，在這場早已排定的午餐約會中，拜網路無遠弗屆之賜，我們幾乎在第一時間即獲知安倍突如其來的政治動作，並且適時交換意見，而他也下了這樣的結論。

「安倍一直想參拜靖國神社，這是他公開說過的話，以彌補第1任沒有參拜的遺憾。但，你確定他已經去參拜了嗎？」友人一臉狐疑地問我。「確定啊！這是外電剛剛發布的訊息，就在上午11點半，扣掉台日的時差，不過是兩個鐘頭前的事而已。」

友人聞言，一副不可置信的詫異表情，「那事態嚴重了。」「喔，願聞其詳。」我才跟他分析過馬英九未來一年內外交迫的嚴厲挑戰，倒是很想聽聽他怎麼評論安倍參拜靖國神社的舉動，尤其是在情報有限之下，作為一個行家對此事的解讀。

安倍算盤 逼美國表態

「過去一年，安倍政府一再採取低姿態，希望能改善好日中、日韓關係，但都得不到正面回應。撇開中國對東海問題的態度強硬不說，就連韓國更是以二戰道歉為前提，總統朴槿惠連見面都不肯，保守姿態完全超乎外界想像，日本與中、韓的首腦會議也因此遲遲無法舉行。」

「安倍因而有既然如此那就走自己路的打算，畢竟關係最壞就是這樣。」友人認為，安倍做此決定勢必已考量過，日本與中、韓的關係短期內不會有所改善。「那是因為與其『真心換絕情』，不如『堅持做自己』嗎？」我質疑，安倍此舉必然引起中韓強烈抗議，對東亞安定毫無助益，難道安倍也不考慮可能點燃的反日怒火，以及對日資企業在中國市場的衝擊？

「共產黨應不至於去發動各地反日遊行，一來這攸關中國大陸內部的社會維穩，二來反日甚至仇日的示威遊行，也可能嚇跑其他的外資企業，對中國形象造成負面影響。」友人是日本學界年輕一輩的「中國通」，根據他的研判，顯然習近平也不會輕易地讓中國再回到2006年爆發激烈反日抗爭的年代，因為那意味著「失控」。

「那麼日資企業在中國的發展呢？」我追問，安倍最引以為傲的政績是「安倍經濟學」，要擺脫長達20多年的通貨緊縮，豈能不去正視有龐大商機的中國市場？儘管安倍政府未雨綢繆，無論經貿或外交，皆已將重心轉向東協。

「基本上，日本經濟是屬於內需型的，1億2千萬多人，足以自給自足。」他做此回答。言下之意，日本經濟靠外銷的比例不高，何況要擺脫通縮也不會仰仗中國。我很好奇，那麼安倍究竟在盤算什麼？是為了安撫保守勢力，或者實踐內在認同？

東京友人的回答認為，安倍近來許多動作的關鍵在測試美國，甚至要華府作出抉擇。我們對話當下，中韓等周邊國家尚未反應，遑論同盟的美國，但友人分析：日本對美國在中國劃定東海防空識別區的「曖昧」頗不以為然，副總統拜登分別赴日、中訪問的表現，就讓日本感受深刻，然而日、美是有同盟關係的，美國必須在中、日之間清楚表態，「到底你站在哪一邊？」

日本「團結」了所有敵人

不過，這個假設性的問題很快就有了答案，原本以為美國會藉著參拜靖國神社是日本家務事為由，抬出「不予置評」的外交辭令，詎料美方旋即表達「失望」、「遺憾」的立場，美國的亞洲問題專家批評四起，有人甚至直指是嚴重的外交政策失誤。

美日同盟常被以夫妻關係做比喻，處處仰賴山姆大叔鼻息的日本，像個小媳婦般跟在後頭。或許，安倍真的對一年來毫無進展的日中、日韓關係感到不耐，遂有參拜靖國神社以得償夙願的率性之舉，只不過這回他沒料到華府的反應竟出乎意料之外，且其表態速度與強度，都更勝以往。

如此看來，安倍若非呷緊弄破碗，就是聰明反被聰明誤。好不容易在解決美軍普天間基地搬遷問題上的民意調查扳回一城，如今逞一時之快不但作繭自縛，讓日本與中、韓的冰凍期繼續，其對美國回應過於一廂情願，更陷入進退維谷。

「未來一年，東亞地區不會太平靜，日本會比以往都要來得辛苦。」臨去前，友人感嘆地說。參拜靖國神社顯然替日本「團結」了所有敵人，而且能夠讓華府和北京站在一起，也代表安倍這下子麻煩大了。  

無論上述專欄文章提到的日本友人是否包藏禍心或者居心叵測，他顯然不是什麼中國通。

說實在話，該日本友人似乎連自己國家的處境與遠景都毫無頭緒。他的論述不但充滿主觀願望，而且難堪推敲。

例如安倍晉三測試美國態度或者底線之說便十分牽強，嚴重缺乏說服力。理由很簡單，日本不是主權獨立國家，不能與美國平起平坐進行平等談判，根本不具備測試美方情勢的客觀條件。

至於逼美方表態之說，更是日本極端高估己方實力與潛力的典型病徵。須知道，日本的一舉一動無不在美方監控之下，何來逼迫美方在心不甘情不願之下表態的能耐？ 

要對目前東海危機有最起碼的了解，必須先認識安倍晉三本人的智力與整個去中國化之後的日本民眾的心智。

按智力，安倍晉三極可能是典型的「十二歲男孩」。事實上，他號稱美國南加州大學學生，其英文水平卻十分低下。考慮到該大學是有名的派對學校，可以推測安倍晉三連參加派對也不能從心所欲，其民族自卑感的烙印早已硬化。安倍晉三沒有測試美方的能力與底氣，殆可斷言。

至於，「安倍因而有既然如此那就走自己路的打算，畢竟關係最壞就是這樣。」友人認為，安倍做此決定勢必已考量過，日本與中、韓的關係短期內不會有所改善。「那是因為與其『真心換絕情』，不如『堅持做自己』嗎？」  之說，跡近夢囈，不必多論。

也許更駭人聽聞的是這樣的怪論：「共產黨應不至於去發動各地反日遊行，一來這攸關中國大陸內部的社會維穩，二來反日甚至仇日的示威遊行，也可能嚇跑其他的外資企業，對中國形象造成負面影響。」

在甲午戰爭與日俄戰爭期間，美國與英國竭力支撐日本。可是，日本朝野卻自以為已經靠自己的力量擊敗大清與俄國，於是驕橫不可一世。

到上世紀三十年代，美英兩國開始悔禍，而蘇聯分別在中華民國二十七年與二十八年重挫盤踞中國東北的日本關東軍，六年之後，在美國投擲第一枚原子彈之後，在美國投擲第二枚原子彈之前，蘇聯對日本所竊據的領土，包括偽滿洲國、庫頁島南部、千島群島、朝鮮半島北部，發動狂風掃落葉式的進攻。

過去六十九年至今，日本歷屆領導人無不回首恨依依。這就是日本二戰翻案運動的起源。世上除了日本，並無其他國家從事二戰翻案運動。

因此，反日示威遊行，不可能嚇跑其他的外資企業，不可能對中國形象造成負面影響。恰恰相反，中國大陸民眾越是反日，恐怕韓國就越高興。

總之，上述日本「中國通」所言，自欺欺人，慎不可聽。要認真探討安倍晉三的猖獗，任何能看懂英文的有識之士都應該考慮下列的文章：

By Senan Fox

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's surprise visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on December 26, 2013 is certain to exacerbate already fraught relations between Japan and some of its neighbors, in particular China and South Korea.

Abe, leader of the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), entered office in December 2012 on a platform of economic revitalization ("Abenomics"), the revision of Japan's pacifist post-war constitution, and a strong defense posture against China and North Korea.

His attendance at Yasukuni marked his first year in office, and has drawn strong condemnation from Beijing, Seoul, and Taipei. Russia has also expressed concern. The United States, Japan's most important ally, has taken the unprecedented step of criticizing the visit, stating that it is "disappointed" by Abe's action because it is likely to "exacerbate tensions".

As such, the issue has become a potential source of friction between Tokyo and Washington which Beijing could benefit from.

The affair has also strengthened the arguments of nationalistic hardliners in China and South Korea, who have advocated a strong line against Japan vis-a-vis their respective bilateral disagreements including the Senkaku Islands (the Diaoyu in Chinese) and the Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) disputes. In addition, Abe's visit has also, at least temporarily, deadlocked already frustrated regional efforts to encourage high-level talks and summits between the three countries in 2014.

Calls for a joint South Korea-Japan approach to China's unilateral demarcation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November have likewise been jettisoned.

The last time the Yasukuni shrine hit the headlines in a big way was in the 2001 to 2006 period when Japan's relations with Beijing and Seoul experienced a deep freeze as a result of the then prime minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated trips to the shrine.

Abe's recent action marks a worrying departure from a tacit understanding with neighboring states that Japanese leaders would not visit Yasukuni in the interest of stable and mutually beneficial ties. He has claimed that his December 26 attendance was in a personal capacity and was for the purpose of commemorating the country's war dead and promoting peace.

Well-known for his conservative and nationalistic views, Abe had previously served as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. At that time, his ambiguous assurance to handle the shrine issue "appropriately" by ultimately not visiting Yasukuni played an instrumental role in improving severely damaged ties with China and South Korea.

Given the outcry and foreign policy fall-out regarding his recent action, one may wonder what he had to benefit from December's shrine visit. At the very least, it indicated the seriousness of Abe's stated public regret in 2012 over his earlier abstentions some six years earlier.

Most pertinently, his decision to go to the Yasukuni shrine on December 26 was a calculated political gamble. In a period of already stagnant ties with Beijing and Seoul, the Japanese PM must have reasoned that there was little to lose externally and much to gain on the domestic front.

If one accepts this argument then Abe's visit was aimed at winning political support within the Japanese Diet (parliament) and amongst the Japanese public as he attempts to push through controversial economic and defense reforms.

While damaging to the country's regional relationships, the trip could strengthen Abe's domestic political position, especially amongst conservatives and hardliners. Heretofore, the prime minister has faced criticism from nationalists for being too focused on "Abenomics", and on being too soft on China and South Korea.

For nationalists, formal attendance at the shrine symbolizes a patriotic defiance against outside interference in a matter, which many Japanese regard as private and religious. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan leader has probably calculated that the political opprobrium on the world stage surrounding the visit will be temporary but with longer lasting domestic benefits one year into office.

Respected Asia scholar professor Jeff Kingston has suggested, in an interview with the BBC, that Abe's actions were a deliberate provocation of China aimed at goading Beijing into an angry response. Such an outcome would heighten the Japanese public's sense of threat, and consequently enhance support for the nationalistic leader's plans to revise his country's constitution.

If this appraisal is correct then the Chinese have not, as yet, taken the bait. In ways similar to when former PM Koizumi first visited Yasukuni in August 2001, Beijing has confined its protests to harsh condemnations via its diplomats and the state media. As noted in the international media by security expert, Zhang Baohui, on domestic and strategic grounds, the Chinese authorities have opted to stick to a public denunciation of Abe with the possibility of stepping up patrols around the disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Responding too harshly could pressure the US to make public commitments to its ally in Tokyo while permitting public demonstrations in China could undermine public order and stability within the country. For these reasons, Beijing may take a wait and see approach, and hope that Abe's visit was a one-off miscalculated gesture. In order to prevent a recurrence of potentially destabilizing mass protests in Chinese cities, the communist authorities have placed restrictions on public demonstrations in the country's urban centers and around Japan's embassy and consulates.

Repeated visits and perceived humiliations by Abe however could further marginalize the pragmatists and moderates in China and South Korea. This would increase the chances of a more serious diplomatic and public downturn with security ramifications for the incendiary East China Sea and Takeshima (Dokdo) disputes, as well as implications for the tremendous business ties between the world's second- and third-largest economies. While drawing domestic political rewards for Abe, it is difficult to see how the Yasukuni visit has strengthened his country's security or enhanced its reputation.

With the East China Sea tensions now more volatile and intractable than ever, the US and Russia angered, and the peoples of China, South Korea, and Taiwan deploring the LDP leader's actions, the possibilities of a much-needed public rapprochement between the neighbors looks more remote than ever.

Politicians advocating a hardline are likely to benefit while moderates are likely to suffer in terms of public approval. As such, 2014 looks set to be yet another year where the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia remains hostage to history and domestic politics.

Senan Fox has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Saint Andrews. He is currently an Associate Professor in the fields of Modern History and International Relations at Kanazawa University in Japan.

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