第二卷 論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;

第一章概念通論以及概念的起源(Chapter I: Of Ideas in general, and their Original)這一章有許多值得注意的觀點:

• 概念是思維的客體。(Idea is the object of thinking.);
• 一切概念都是來至於感覺或反省。(All ideas come from sensation or reflection.)，“那麼我們假定人的心靈比如白紙，全然不帶標記、沒有任何概念﹔心靈是如何備置了這些東西呢﹖人類忙碌而廣大無際的想像力以幾乎無窮的變化描繪在那張如白紙的心靈，這麼龐大的原物料是從何處得來的﹖心靈從那裡獲取全部的推理材料和知識﹖對此我用一語回答，從經驗﹕我們的一切知識都在經驗裡扎根，歸根究底源自於經驗。” ( ...... To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. In that all our knowledge is founded ; and from that it ultimately derives itself.)
• 感覺的客體是概念的一個來源(The objects of sensation one source of ideas.) 首先，我們的感官，在熟悉了特殊的可感的客體以後，能按照那些客體刺激感官的各種方式，把各種事物的清晰知覺傳達到心靈。(First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them.) 因此，我們就得到了黃、白、熱、冷、軟、硬、苦、甜，以及一切所謂可感物的概念…(And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities ;…)
• 我們心靈活動是概念的另一個來源(The operations of our minds, the other source of them.) 第二點，經驗在以概念備置理解時，還有另一個源泉，因為我們在運用理解以考察它所獲得的那些概念時，-我們還知覺到自己有各種心靈活動;-我們的心靈在反省這些心理作用，考究這些心理作用時，它們便備置理解以另一套概念，而且所供給的那些概念是不能由外面得到的。(Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is, – the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got ; – which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without.) 屬於這一類的概念，有知覺、思考、懷疑、信仰、推理、認識、意願，以及所有我們自己心靈不同的表現;(And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds ; )-這些概念都是我們所意識到，都是我們在自身中所觀察到的，可以由這些接受轉換為我們的理解作為清晰的概念如同我們可以由物體影響的感官。(– which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. ) 每個人的這種概念的來源完全是他自身的；它雖然不是感官，因為與外部客體沒有關係，然而它和感官極相似，應該也可以稱為內在感官。(This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself ; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.)

注意: 約翰·洛克認為人的概念出於兩個來源﹕﹙一﹚感覺作用;﹙二﹚對自己的心靈活動的知覺，這可以稱作“內感”。 既然我們只能借助概念進行思考，而所有概念都是從經驗來的，所以顯然我們的任何知識不能先於經驗，這是約翰·洛克經驗主義認識論(Epistemology)的革命性創新。

他又以兒童為例進行辯證 : 兒童們初入世，被嶄新的世界所圍繞，各種事物不斷牽動他們的感官，長期的誘使心靈注意外界事物，而且有喜歡各種客體多樣變化的傾向。因此，第一年往往專心而且樂於觀察外面的事物上。……因此，生長於長期關注外界的感覺，在他們成年以前，很少對已經移轉進入他們(的感覺)進行重要的反省，有些人們根本就從沒有過這種反省。(Children when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them ; forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. ……and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years ; and some scarce ever at all.)

• 當心靈在開始有知覺時，就開始有概念(The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to perceive.)

約翰·洛克認為心靈並不永遠在思想(The soul thinks not always)，就好像人的身體不必永遠動作的的情況；”我沒有因為他在睡眠覺察不到心靈，說人沒有心靈;我只是說，無論是睡眠時或清醒時，如果覺察不到心靈，他就不能思考。我們覺察到心靈不一定是必要的，但對我們的思考活動除外;對思考活動心靈是存在的;而且，對思考活動心靈永遠是必要的,直到我們能思考而不意識到心靈的存在。”(I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep ; but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping : without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts ; and to them it is ; and to them it always will be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.);心靈存在不是經常被意識到(It is not always conscious of it.);接著他舉睡眠的例子批判由柏拉圖時代以來“心靈是恒常思考的”那個教條。

如果人在睡眠中的心靈能思考，卻不能意識到(這思考)，則我可以問，它在那樣思考時，是否有任何快樂或痛苦，是否能感到幸福或苦難？(If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery ?); 如果人在睡眠中思考而卻不知道自己思考，則人在睡時和醒時，便成了兩個人(If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.); 不可能說服人們在睡時不是做夢，他們是在思考。因此，我想，一場昏沈的微睡，就能搖撼教導“心靈是恒常思考的”那個教條。 (Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach that the soul is always thinking.);

　第二章 論簡單概念（Chapter II: Of Simple Ideas）

• 不混雜的表像(Uncompounded appearances.)約翰·洛克舉例說明，人的感覺到物體的性質(qualities) 是混雜的，冰塊的”冷和硬”;百合的”白和香”……，但在我們的心裡所形成的概念是單純而不混雜的;
• 心靈既不能創造，亦不能摧毀概念(The mind can neither make nor destroy them)---- 這些簡單概念，是我們一切知識的材料，只是經由先前所說的兩條途徑：感覺和反省，而浮現並備置於心中。(These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection.)
• 只有影響感官的性質是可以想像(Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable)---- 憑什麼能注意到聲音、味覺、香氣、視覺和觸覺的性質?不管怎樣的物體成分，除了上帝所給人的那五個感官而外，任何人都不可能想象物體中任何其他的性質。

第三章　論感官的簡單概念(Chapter III: Of Simple Ideas of Sense)

• 簡單概念的分類 :通過一種感官，進入心靈形成概念;通過兩個以上感官，進入心靈形成概念; 經由反省形成的概念;經由感覺和反省兩種途徑而浮現並備置於心中的概念。
• 只有少數的簡單概念有名稱 (Few simple ideas have names)---- ……各種氣味，縱然不比世界上各種物體多，也接近，亦可以說是一樣多，它們多半都沒有名稱。(……The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names.)

第四章　堅實性概念(Chapter IV: Idea of Solidity)

• 我們經由觸覺得到堅實性概念----當一個物體進入另一個物體原先所佔有的空間時，堅實性概念因阻力而形成，一物離開後才消失。 由感覺最常得到的概念，就是堅實性。(…and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity.)
• 堅實性填充空間(Solidity fills space)---- 堅實性概念是屬於物體的，因此，我們理解它是能填充空間。(This is the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill space.)   填充空間的概念就是，-我們想像任何空間被堅實物質占據，則我們理解堅實物質擁有空間，這個空間排斥所有其他堅實物質;任何兩個物體在一直線互相接近時，將永遠相阻礙，免於相互接觸，除非將其中一個物體以非平行運動方向移開。(The idea of which filling of space is, – that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances ; and will for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards one another in a straight line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a line not parallel to that which they move in.)
• .......(略)

第五章　各種感官的簡單概念(Chapter V: Of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses)----我們由一個以上感官所得到，有空間性或廣延性、形相、靜止和運動的概念。因為這些概念在眼睛上和觸覺上都留有可覺察的印象。而且我們所以能把物體的廣度、形相、運動和靜止等等的形相傳達到心中，亦是憑藉視覺和感覺。(The ideas we get by more than one sense are, of space or extension, figure, rest, and motion. For these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch ; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling.)

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