中亞美妙新世界？

郭都人

《中時電子報》昨天刊載了關於中亞的署名評論，全文如下：  

時論─中國西向 造福中亞

         2013-11-07 01:22
         中國時報
         謝劍

當美國聯合日本，正在東亞以「再平衡」對中國大陸施加壓力時，北京頂住美日壓力之際，卻沒忽視西向發展。除了開發資源豐富的大西北，更把眼光投向西鄰哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、土庫曼。最近美國《大西洋》月刊刊出作者彼德森（A. Petersen）的長篇報告，以美國人立場，認為北京在中亞的外交出擊大展拳腳，有損美國利益。

自美軍撤出阿富汗，北約（NATO）諸國亦退出後，北京立即在中亞投資，從事諸如網路通訊和探勘油氣等建設工作，在外交上發生正面影響力。習近平一連訪問土庫曼、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、烏茲別克四國，簽下數十億美元買賣合同，反之美國總統歐巴馬從未踏足該區。對比強烈，當然也引起世界各地觀察家注意。其實北京的影響力在中亞早已存在，非習近平訪問後才發生。

事情可上溯2001年的「上海合作組織」（「上合組織」），當時除土庫曼，蘇聯解體後的中亞盟邦均曾參加，包括俄羅斯自身亦有不得不加入的苦衷，此舉可視為中國西向發展的開始。儘管「上合組織」在本區以外並非重要玩家，但俄羅斯的願意參與，等於接受了中國在中亞地區形成的一種平衡力量。

由於「上合組織」的成立，中國西部大省新疆就能以參與中亞事務為優先。「上合組織」關心的要務之一是「三反」，即反恐怖主義、反分離主義及反極端主義（主要指伊斯蘭教）。

美國出兵阿富汗之後，塔里班的暴力極端主義已「外流」中亞，因而有此「三反」的必要。特別是北京關切新疆境內的維吾爾族問題，從而與中亞諸國訂立雙邊條約，遣返維族恐怖分子，並在是區塔什干（Tashkent）成立「區域反恐結構中心」（RATS），蒐集可疑分子（特別是維族恐怖分子）的情報送回中國。「上合組織」諸國亦經常舉行聯合軍事演習，以防不測事件發生。

中國在該區決定性的經濟影響力，多少與其策略上新疆優先有關。「發展大西北」戰略，目的在經由經濟發展帶來安定，其效果已「溢出」到中亞，包括阿富汗在內。新疆重鎮烏魯木齊及喀什等，作為交通樞紐，有鐵道、公路乃至機場等擴展貿易，並將新疆製造之日用品運至中亞各地。此外，前蘇聯中亞各加盟國內部結構經已放鬆，大陸的國有企業如中國石油公司（CNPC）及中國道路與橋梁建設公司（CRBC）等都得跨境經營，這表示新疆的鄰居也跟著在改變。

這部分意味著：中國的開發大西北戰略對新疆鄰居也會帶來發展和安定，以減少伊斯蘭教極端份子可能對新疆境內人民形成危害。就因為中亞這些國家人口少，國家預算不大，易於感受到中國經濟發展帶來的影響。

這引來一連串問題，如在不留意間，這一發展何以竟使中國成了所謂的「中亞帝國」；前此習近平在該區的訪問只是執行早已擬定的計畫，為何竟未引起注意；這一系列的發展，何以竟讓中國扮演了決定該區未來數十年命運的角色。筆者認為西方人有前述看法並不令人奇怪，問題的癥結是否過於誇大了？

中國大陸西向中亞發展，帶給當地人民的畢竟是多方面的福利，這較國家恐怖主義者藉反恐為名，帶給阿富汗和伊拉克遍地血腥，死人無數，在人道立場上豈可相提並論！（作者為礁溪佛光大學名譽教授）

上述署名文章有明顯的謬誤。

例如：「自美軍撤出阿富汗，北約（NATO）諸國亦退出後，北京立即在中亞投資」云云。

其實，美軍尚未「撤出阿富汗」，北約（NATO）亦然。北京在中亞投資與歐美軍隊在阿富汗的存在也沒有必然的關連。

又例如：「美國出兵阿富汗之後，塔里班的暴力極端主義已『外流』中亞」云云。

其實，歐美出兵阿富汗之後，塔里班面對極嚴峻的局面：備受阿富汗的北盟三族的武裝壓力。須知道，北盟三族就是烏茲別克族、塔吉克族、哈扎拉族、而塔利班是單一的民族成份、即普什圖族。塔利班大都只能操單一的語文。連伊朗語文都無法掌握，遑論阿拉伯文。所謂「塔里班的暴力極端主義『外流』中亞」之說，實在強人之難，或者是天方夜譚式的幻想。

謝姓作者所謂「塔里班」恐怕是「基地組織」之誤。

又例如：「習近平一連訪問土庫曼、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、烏茲別克四國，簽下數十億美元買賣合同」云云。

其實，「數十億美元買賣合同」是「數百億美元買賣合同」之誤。理由很簡單：上述署名文章的來源是「最近美國《大西洋》月刊刊出作者彼德森（A. Petersen）的長篇報告」，而後者的原文是「signing tens of billions of dollars worth of deals 」，數額是數百億美元，不是「數十億美元」而已。

談到《大西洋》月刊刊出的報告，必須指出上述署名文章所謂「（彼德森）以美國人立場，認為北京在中亞的外交出擊大展拳腳，有損美國利益」云云，也許事出有因，卻查無實據，恐怕只是謝姓作者發揮想像力的結果。 

事實上，《大西洋》月刊刊出的原文全文如下： 

Due to Xi’s visit, people are beginning to notice. Martha Olcott at the Carnegie Endowment observed that China’s influence in Central Asia is “unmatched,” noting the glaring contrast between China’s multiple high-level visits over the years and the fact that a U.S. president has never set foot in the region. Publications by Brookings, the German Marshall Fund and Stratfor all highlighted the geopolitical implications of Washington supposedly being blindsided by Xi’s trip to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. An event in Washington, D.C. with China’s foremost Eurasia scholar, Pan Guang of the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, drew a large crowd of non-Central Asia watchers, all eager to make sense of a development that seemed to carry global implications. But, China’s influence in the region is not new.

President Xi’s trip was symbolic of the growth of what can be called China’s “inadvertent empire” in Central Asia. Contrary to implications in the Western press, the visit was much more about cashing in China’s chips than a bet, one that was actually placed back in 2001 when Beijing launched a regional organization led by China and including every post-Soviet Central Asian country but Turkmenistan: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Though barely noticed at the time, China’s formation of the SCO was a clear signal that Beijing’s pivot had begun. And while the SCO is not a major player in beyond the region, it is notable that China sought to build such an institution in Central Asia and not the Asia-Pacific and especially that, when it comes to the balance of power in the region, Russia accepted “second-tier” status in the enterprise. Subsequently, Moscow’s neo-Soviet “Customs Union” and stated aspirations for a so-called “Eurasian Union” represent a rearguard action to stem the influence of China.

What does this mean for U.S. policy? First of all, even if the Central Asian region remains a low priority, it is simply irresponsible not to have full information about developments there, most prominently China’s steadily growing influence.

Since the founding of the SCO, China’s priorities for its own westernmost province, Xinjiang, has colored its engagement in Central Asia. Much of the SCO’s activities are concerned with fighting the co-called “three evils”: terrorism, separatism and extremism. In the wake of the September 11th attacks and the subsequent American-led intervention in Afghanistan, these priorities were misunderstood in Washington to refer to potential violent extremism in Central Asia, or the potential “spillover” of Afghan Taliban. But in hindsight, it seems that the “three evils” focus is almost entirely about the perceived threat of the Uighurs, the minority ethnic group native to Xinjiang. This focus is reflected in bilateral security deals between China and the Central Asian states, which provide for extradition of ethnic Uighurs to China and in the unfortunately acronymed Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) Center in Tashkent, which maintains a database of “undesirables” throughout the region, mainly Uighur separatists. SCO joint military exercises often feature war simulations involving separatists or operations against irregular forces.

China’s disjointed but nonetheless overwhelming economic influence in the region also has largely to do with Beijing’s priorities in Xinjiang. The “Develop the West” strategy to bring stability to the region through economic development has had a number of spillover effects into Central Asia, including Afghanistan, both intended and inadvertent. By turning China’s Western urban centers of Urumqi, Kashgar and even tiny Tashkurgan into regional overland trading hubs, connected to China’s western neighbors by road, rail, air, and pipeline, Beijing’s objective is to provide trade and transportation opportunities for new businesses and manufacturers in Xinjiang. But, given the ramshackle infrastructure in much of post-Soviet Central Asia, the major cross-border projects of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), mean that China is also transforming Xinjiang’s neighbors.

This is partly intentional: the Develop the West strategy includes bringing development and stability to Xinjiang’s neighbors in order to lessen the likelihood of Islamic extremism “infecting” China’s Uighur population. However, much of the spillover growth results from the sheer momentum of China’s behemoth economy being felt in countries with populations of a few million and state budgets that compare to those of medium-sized Chinese municipalities.

This development is why China’s so-called empire in Central Asia is inadvertent, and why Xi’s recent trip through the region was the affirmation of a process that has been ongoing without much central direction for about a decade. This is also why China’s role in Central Asia will likely shape the future of the region for decades to come. As opposed to a strategy that might change with a new Five-Year Plan the growth of China’s inadvertent empire in Eurasia is an organic process, involving multiple actors, many of whom care little about Beijing’s geopolitical goals.

These actors include Chinese owners of market stalls in Central Asia’s largest bazaars. One I spoke to had lived for years in a shipping container he shared with four other men at the back of a clothes market in Kazakhstan’s largest bazaar. A multi-millionaire, he provided for his children’s Western education, multiple apartments in Shanghai, and even overseas property investments. To him, Central Asia is the land of opportunity. These actors also include Chinese teachers sent to staff the many Confucius Institutes sprouting up around the region. Some I spoke with missed home, but many said they preferred the exciting “frontier life.” CNPC engineers across the region know that they are in for the long haul, as their company and its many subsidiaries build imposing structures in every Eurasian capital. The immense pipeline network CNPC is threading through the region consists of infrastructure set to last half a century.

What does this mean for U.S. policy? First of all, even if the Central Asian region remains a low priority, it is simply irresponsible not to have full information about developments there, most prominently China’s steadily growing influence. Also, because American policy towards Central Asia has, for over a decade, been almost exclusively geared toward providing for the effort in Afghanistan after the 2014 pullout, Washington risks being caught without an approach to the region at all. Any policy that is developed cannot come from the traditional Russia-oriented Central Asia shops in Washington.

Going forward, China experts—in conjunction with an emerging cohort of genuine Central Asianists—should shape U.S. engagement in Eurasia. They will have to contend with the central conundrum that the U.S. is pivoting to China's east while China is pivoting to its west. Finally, the Central Asian space that constitutes China's inadvertent empire is adjacent to most of Washington's ongoing areas of concern: China, Russia, Iran, South Asia, Turkey, the wider Middle East, and European NATO allies. It is also a major center of energy security concerns. If nothing else, this means that the U.S. should be more aware of China's actions there going forward.

可見，彼德森並未將美國將來可能遭遇的狀況提前歸咎於北京。他充其量只是提出警告，要求美方的有關負責人提高警惕以免將來徒呼荷荷。

至於在北京援助之下，中亞前景是否如斯美妙，以至「中亞這些國家人口少，國家預算不大，易於感受到中國經濟發展帶來的影響」之說的可靠性，限於篇幅，只好暫時按下不提。

但是，孟子曰：「盡信《書》，則不如無《書》；吾於《武成》，取二三策而已矣」，應該是有識之士的座右銘。

作 者 是 旅 居 北 美 的 業 餘 文 化 工 作 者

圖一，上海合作組織領導人
圖二，上海合作組織會徽 
圖三，上海合作組織成員國與觀察員國