日本既無能力也缺良知

郭都人

韓國《朝鮮日報》中文網今天刊載關於日本的持續核電危機的署名報導，全文如下：

[世間萬象]今天的福島核電站

朝鮮日報評論員 韓三熙 (2013.09.04 16:39)

日本政府決定在福島核電站廠房周圍設立「冰牆」。具體方法是，每隔1米向地下30米插入冷卻管，然後注入零下50度的冷卻劑，冷卻劑迴圈使土壤凍結。1.4公里長的擋水牆壁可以阻止核電站周圍地下水滲入核電站廠房。東京電力公司目前正在收集流入核電站廠房後被放射性物質污染的地下水，並轉移到1000個儲存罐中。但上月發生了污水從儲存罐中洩漏的情況，而且放置儲存罐的空間也不足。

從日本政府今年6月公佈的福島核洩漏事故善後日程表來看，會在今年之內整理好倒塌建築的殘骸。明年將清除廠房內部的放射性物質並焊接核反應爐的破損部位。2020年至2035年提取核反應爐底部熔化的核燃料。此後的15年用來拆除廠房和核反應爐。這一計畫一共需要40年。

福島核電站的核反應爐雖然暫時冷卻，但隨著核燃料衰變，還在不斷釋放放射性物質和熱量。因此，這些工作都是無人調節的設備和機器人在距離核反應爐500米遠的遠端操縱室內進行。由於很多工作都是第一次進行，所以需要新造設備。用於拆除鋼筋的600噸起重機本是日本企業用來出口的產品。在狹窄空間內拾取、剪切殘骸的機器也是把概念圖交給企業委託製造。

日本政府6月份公佈日程表時曾表示要集結研究機構和核反應爐生產企業的專家，成立一個研發組織。對壽終正寢的核反應爐進行廢堆處理的技術是存在的，但對發生爆炸的核電站進行除染（去除污染）、廢堆和拆除處理卻是世界首例。現在能做的只有開發新技術。因為人無法靠近核反應爐，所以主要工作必須由機器人來完成。

雖然公佈的時間是8月19日，但污染水很有可能在7月9日前後就開始洩漏。據說，當時在儲存罐附近工作的工作人員受到的核輻射量大幅提高。日本媒體懷疑，當時即將舉行參議院選舉（7月21日），所以很有可能推遲了公佈污染水洩漏的時間。有言論稱，日本政府昨天公佈治理污染水的對策也是針對8日國際奧會（IOC）全體會議的一種宣傳手段，因為屆時將確定2020年奧運會舉辦地。如果屬實，那日本確實是既沒能力保障核電站安全也沒有良知的國家。

其實這種「冰牆」方案的風險不容忽視。

首先，維持「冰牆」需要龐大的電量。「冰牆」的電源有發生故障的風險。一旦停電，冰就可能融化。如果來不及搶救勢將大量 規模遠超目前。理由很簡單， 存在不倒的時間越長它所圍堵的就越多到不管用的時候，後果的災難性就越不堪設想。「冰牆」就可能「瓦解冰泮，風飛電散」。

即使「冰牆」能夠避免全線崩潰，放射性污水勢將大量流入海洋，規模極可能遠超目前。理由很簡單「冰牆」存在不倒的時間越長，它所圍堵的放射性污水就越多，到「冰牆」不管用的時候，災難性後果就越不堪設想。

其實，關於「冰牆」以及其他相關問題，美國《公共電視網（PBS）》日前就有專題報導：

JEFFREY BROWN: And we check in again with two people who've helped us keep up with the continuing crisis. Arjun Makhijani is an engineer special -- engineer specializing in nuclear fusion. He's the president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. Kenji Kushida specializes in Japanese studies at Stanford University.

Welcome back to both of you.

ARJUN MAKHIJANI, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research: Well, the last time we spoke, there were -- we talked about the leak and the radiation levels that could give a worker an annual radiation dose in 12 minutes.

Well, more recently, there have been reports that the radiation levels near another tank are 1,800 millisieverts per hour. This is an extremely high level of radiation. A few hours basically constitutes a lethal dose. So now we're talking about radioactive contamination in these tanks, the liquid stored in these tanks, that are very highly radioactive. And so these leaks are extremely problematic for the workers and for management.

JEFFREY BROWN: And is this something they just discovered, or what suddenly causes that much more serious amount of levels?

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: Well, the best I can understand from all the confusing information that is out there is the first measurement was done with an instrument that only went up to a hundred millisieverts and maxed out.

JEFFREY BROWN: Yes.

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: So, now they're making more measurements and they're finding there are more contaminated spots and apparently more leaks.

So I'm not quite clear what the company knows when. But the information is kind of dribbling out. And the government is clearly concerned that the situation is getting more out of control.

JEFFREY BROWN: Well, Kenji Kushida, you pick up on that, because there's the company and then there's the government. Clearly, the government is stepping in with much more force now, right?

KENJI KUSHIDA, Stanford University: Yes, absolutely, because the next election in three years is going to definitely reflect their response on this nuclear issue, because they're essentially a pro-nuclear party that just won a landslide election.

And so if they can't credibly manage the operator's rescue efforts -- and the operator which clearly seems to be unable to deal with the worst parts of the situation -- then the government is on the hook.

JEFFREY BROWN: But, from the outside, it looks like this is taking a long time to get to even the kind of understanding of the contamination levels that -- never mind getting to a lot of the more serious work that still needs to be done. What is the sense in Japan as far as you can tell about the levels of, I don't know, desperation or urgency there?

KENJI KUSHIDA: Yes.

Well, similar to what we said last time, the operator's reputation and people's confidence in it, which was already at an all-time low, is now even lower. And after the government essentially de facto nationalized the operator about a year ago and replaced top management, people hoped that the ability of the operator to deal with some of these problems would have been enhanced.

But some of the media reports coming from Japan are saying things like subcontractors are leaking information that -- literally leaking information that the tanks, thousand or tanks that they put together, in great haste, under severe cost pressure from TEPCO, which was -- before it was nationalized right after the disaster -- they were put together with bolts, but not welded together.

And so some of these subcontractors are saying, well, in the long run, even medium run, you would expect them to start springing leaks. So, clearly, the operator hasn't been on top of the situation and people are getting fairly nervous about that.

JEFFREY BROWN: So, Arjun Makhijani, explain this idea of the ice wall. It sounds strange. How exactly would it work, and how much has it been tried before?

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: Well, I don't know that an ice wall like this has been tried before.

It's like building a dam underground, but with ice, by freezing all the poor water in the soil, all soil has -- so there's water coming in from uphill, through the side and going into the ocean, all underground. It's an aquifer. Some of that water contacts the molten fuel and is becoming contaminated.

And they hope to build -- to freeze the soil, basically, with a giant freezing machine, just like your freezer at home, put cooling coils in the soil, lots and lots of them. It takes an enormous amount of electricity and they would freeze it. Of course, it contains the water behind it like a dam, but eventually it's going to overtop the dam, as it did before.

They had another wall that they built. They chemically impregnated the soil to kind of solidify it. And that is what is overflowing into the sea 300 tons a day. So...

JEFFREY BROWN: Well, so it has been done before, but not on this scale, you think? So is it an -- how would you describe it? Is it an experiment? Is it a kind of stab at something?

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: It is an experiment.

JEFFREY BROWN: Yes.

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: And I think it's a risky experiment, because if the power fails, you know, just like if your -- when the power goes out with your refrigerator, everything will de-freeze in -- defrost in the freezer.

So, if this ice melts suddenly and it's blocking an enormous amount of contaminated water behind it, then you have got a problem. At the same time, you know, the tanks are themselves something of a threat, if there's another earthquake and this highly contaminated water gets into the ocean. And so they have a got a very -- couple of very, very serious problems of containing the water.

JEFFREY BROWN: And then, Kenji Kushida, there is still, as we said, the long term here, which I heard talk about decades to decommission the plant, for example.

KENJI KUSHIDA: Yes.

Some of the estimates are a minimum of 40 years to decommission the plant. So this idea of frozen underground walls, a massive spending into innovative infrastructure projects can be a good thing. But when it's the last line of defense designed as a permanent solution to an almost seemingly intractable problem, I think the general public would be more comforted if they saw several options out there, rather than all the eggs being put into this potentially risky, unknown, and untested solution that may or may not work.

JEFFREY BROWN: You were talking about the politics earlier. Is there any uncertainty as to the will to stay with this for the decades that you're talking about?

KENJI KUSHIDA: Well, there's no choice.

Given that the party is pro-nuclear and that they do not face elections for three years, their interest is definitely to do whatever possible, because if this gets truly out of hand in a greater sense than now, then they will be -- and their heads will be on the chopping block in the next election, but they would like to avoid that.

That being said, it's not like there's a set of technical solutions that are easily possible here that can be chosen from. So, in the very long term, they do need to try to stay in power, so you would expect them to put as many resources as possible. And, as we do see, they are moving, but they need to much more quickly, as most general public would agree.

JEFFREY BROWN: All right, Kenji Kushida, Arjun Makhijani, thank you both again very much.

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: Thank you very much.

KENJI KUSHIDA: Thank you.

可見，技術問題的風險可能達到不可承受之高，而日本各黨派、各利益集團之間的衝突幾乎可以保證，「冰牆」並非化解福島核危機之道。日本既無能力化解福島核危機，也缺良知，只能成為國際涉核大災難的製造國，進一步禍延近鄰，也是時間問題而已。

國際社會不應再次姑息日本。起碼，國際奧委會應該否決東京申奧，並聲明否決理由包括福島核危機可能造成對奧運會運動員及外國觀眾的危害。

參考文章：服從國際監督 日本責無旁貸

日本必須洗心革面、實事求是，努力先化解目前的福島核危機，然後再談申奧未晚，這樣才能減輕國際社會的焦慮。否則，福島下一次發生地震、海嘯之後，美軍可能避日本唯恐不及，迅速撤離。試問，到時日本何以自處於世? 

如果不幸，日本此番紅包攻勢奏效，東京申奧得逞，也許就是更大慘禍的開端。

作 者 是 旅 居 北 美 的 業 餘 文 化 工 作 者

圖一，韓國《朝鮮日報》原文插圖
圖二，Jeffrey Brown
圖三，Arjun Makhijani 
圖四，Kenji Kushida