China’s evolving foreign policy

The Libyan dilemma

A rising power starts to knock against the limits of its hallowed “non-interference”

Sep 10th 2011 | BEIJING | from the print edition

ALONE of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has yet to recognise the new government in Tripoli, a clue as to how the recent upheaval in the Arab world has put unusual stress on the country’s much-vaunted hands-off policy when it comes to others’ affairs. With growing economic interests and ever more citizens to worry about in far-flung regions, Chinese policymakers are tweaking their strategy. A more normal—that is to say, less reactive—big-power approach could be slowly in the making.

Rhetorically, the principle of “non-interference” remains sacred. On September 6th China issued a white paper on its “peaceful development” (ie, rise), its first on the topic since 2005, well before financial crisis crushed Western economic confidence and propelled China even more to the fore in international terms. The document said China still upheld the principle and that it respected the right of others to “independently choose their own social system and path of development”. Usually this has meant supporting whoever is in power no matter how thuggish or unpopular. In Libya, though, China wavered.

It could have done as it did in earlier Arab uprisings: wait on the sidelines and recognise the legitimacy of opposition movements only after dictators had fallen. But Libya presented an unusual combination of challenges for China. These included demand at home for prompt action to ensure the safety of more than 35,000 Chinese working in the country; widespread support among (China-friendly) Arab countries for tough action against Muammar Qaddafi; and economic interestsin Libya that might be threatened by supporting the wrong side.

China’s response at the start of the year to the upheaval in Egypt was typical of the old style. The state-owned media were quick to portray Cairo’s anti-government demonstrators as lawless troublemakers and played down their impact. The Communist Party did not want citizens at home to get any ideas. After President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in February, and with calls for a Chinese “jasmine revolution” circulating on the internet, many police were deployed in the centres of big cities to prevent any copycat unrest. China appeared defensive and insecure.

But its approach to the Libyan unrest proved somewhat different. First came its decision to vote in favour of UN sanctions against Colonel Qaddafi. Then it mounted a big operation to fly out its citizens on chartered flights and four military aircraft (China also sent a frigate from its duties off the Horn of Africa to provide protection for vessels transporting refugees across the Mediterranean). The official media called this the largest such operation China had mounted abroad since the Communist takeover in 1949. In a recent paper, the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, said these moves seemed to reflect China’s realisation that a posture of non-interference was “increasingly at odds with its global economic presence”.

In March China retreated somewhat by abstaining in the vote on the UN Security Council resolution that authorised “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya. But it knew what the outcome would be: a NATO-led operation (the very words fill Chinese nationalists with anti-imperialist loathing) aimed at hastening Colonel Qaddafi’s downfall. To protect itself from the nationalists’ venom, the Chinese government condemned the NATO air strikes and avoided any hint of support for the rebels’ cause.

But then in June the government dipped its toes into the conflict, first by meeting the rebels in Qatar and then by sending a diplomat to meet them in Benghazi itself (ostensibly to discuss the humanitarian situation and the security of Chinese businesses). In late June a senior official of the rebels’ National Transitional Council (NTC) held talks in Beijing with China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi. This was followed in July by another visit to Benghazi by a senior Chinese diplomat. Although China has not officially recognised the NTC’s late-August assumption of power in Tripoli, on September 1st it sent a deputy foreign minister to the Paris summit on Libya, where he met the NTC’s chairman, Mahmoud Jibril.

Yet China did not abandon Colonel Q

addafi. In June it received his foreign minister in Beijing. This week it confirmed that his representatives had also visited Beijing in July on a weapons-buying mission (reports of this having appeared in a Canadian newspaper based on documents found in Tripoli). China’s foreign ministry denied, however, that any arms were shipped and said the visit took place without the government’s knowledge. NTC officials say they believe some countries including China supplied weapons to Colonel Qaddafi’s government after the Security Council’s approval in February of a ban on such assistance.

Now China worries that Libya’s new authorities will make it pay for its support for the old regime by discriminating against it in business deals, including potentially lucrative ones related to the oil industry. During Colonel Qaddafi’s rule, China had big interests in Libya’s economy. Chinese media say it was involved in projects worth more than $18 billion when the conflict broke out, mostly in construction. Libyan oil last year accounted for just 3% of China’s crude imports, but Chinese oil companies are keen to get bigger stakes.

A need for oil and other resources greatly shapes Chinese foreign policy in Africa. Having long supported the government of Sudan (a big supplier of oil) in its fight against secessionist rebels, China eventually swung into line with Western governments. It was quick to recognise oil-rich South Sudan when it seceded in July, having sent observers to monitor its referendum on independence.

China will remain extremely cautious, however. It does not want to send signals at home that rebellion can ever be justified. Despite the police crackdown earlier this year, which involved a sweeping round-up of dissidents, occasional articles still appear online and even in the official media urging the government to learn lessons from the Arab world’s upheavals. Before the authorities rushed to delete it, a Shanghai newspaper managed to publish a commentary on its website giving warning that unless it “gradually but resolutely” gave its people more political choice, every developing country faced the same “nightmare” of violent upheaval.

from the print edition | Asia

·         Recommend

·         2

The Libyan dilemma

Sep 8th 2011, 17:06

About one week ago SETTV morning news in Taiwan reported one news saying Beijing would sell weapons to Colonel Qaddafi, at that moment confusing me because China’s President Hu Jing-Tao once saw Muammar al-Qadhafi as a dart target whom many countries should denounced but Beijing customarily might protect this colonel from any attack and I still feel embarrassed about why this deal is put off too strangely. In addtion to China, al-Qaddafi made a oil deal with New Delhi. From foreign minister Yang Jie-Chi’s notice of Libya’s concern which I recently received, Yang said the representative to Benghazi told him that the NYC was difficult for Beijing to trust.

For China, so many figures and scenes are turning into disapperance and growing events are emerging too quickly in North Africa and Middle East, especially in the near one year. I remember that at the first day when the Libyan rebel started this civil war, I looked back to the photos posted by msnbc.com. Among these photos, the British’s ex-prime minister Tony Blair’s visit to al-Qaddafi is the most impressive one of me. On the other side, I thought of his son Saif al-Qadaffi as Taiwan’s good friends (and one of my friends) and still thank Saif for his official visit to Taiwan’s Chen Shui-Bian in 2005 (the expedition of cause contained my factors). This was one reason why Taipei could keep theirselves until May 2008 and expand the friendship between Taipei’s Democratic Progressive Party and the Middle East’s Arabian like Dubai and Jordan, even including Iran. In fact, al-Qadaffi intends to mistrust Hu Jing-Tao. Now I just use my weak words that al-Qaddafi and his son might avoid the international judge.

    Recommended

    46

    Report

    Permalink

中國和利比亞的關係在江澤民的勢力鞏固後就式微了，比較是傾向獨立發展及和附近阿拉伯國家團結相處。2005年後格達費很積極，先和英國前首相布萊爾會面，決心經濟改革，此前之年賽義夫，於去年六年已被聯軍釋放，隔年(2006年)阿扁前總統興揚專案繼阿拉斯加之恥後，跑去的黎波里會見格達費稱兄道弟，及和前伊朗總統阿瑪丹嘉德通信，很成功讓台灣的聲音打入阿拉伯世界。這時開放的氣息雖然有，但民眾渴望民主及反對柏柏人少數壟斷政治利益，讓格達費的軍隊沒有辦法成功打贏，撐了半年還是解散了。中國和印度著眼於石油利益，仍然在最後一刻實質上和格達費政權往來。曾經筆者覺得叛軍的適法性有問題，不建議新政權被承認月餘過，但是國際形勢如此，中國這次算偏主動，雖然一開始不知道找哪個主帥接洽建交。有一陣子利比亞無政府狀態，甚至美國大使被莫名其妙暗殺，顯示美國歐巴馬政府當年沒有任何邏輯外交，是很可惡的帝國主義行為。

下面是相關文章，而這篇回文的原文筆者忘了是哪一篇。

·         The fall of Tripoli

·         With a rebel yell

·         Aug 22nd 2011, 6:22 by The Economist online | BENGHAZI

·         This blog post has been updated

·         THE noose tightened and tightened and on Saturday night it cinched fast. Through Sunday, August 21st and into early Monday morning, the world watched through scratchy video feeds as Libya’s rebels—now in the heart of Tripoli and with the run of the country—searched for the trap door through which to drop their sworn enemy, Muammar Qaddafi.

·         At the same time, celebrations broke out in Green Square, at the centre of the capital. The scenes of jubilation recalled those from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, on February 11th. But the rebels who came pouring into Tripoli, and the beleaguered citizens who cheered them on, have won their day of victory by war. As in Cairo, flags are waved and God is praised, but tracer fire is also seen, criss-crossing the early-morning sky. Snipers from both sides hold rooftops around the city. In Benghazi, the origin of the February 17th uprising and the seat of the rebel government, residents were euphoric, parading through the streets in their cars and firing weapons into the sky late into the night.

·         After six months of fighting and with five months of aerial support from NATO, the rebels had brought Colonel Qaddafi’s capital into what was effectively a state of siege. Under the command of the National Transitional Council (NTC), they had captured Zawiya, a strategically vital port to the west of Tripoli, not ten days earlier. To the south, they held Gharyan, on the road to Algeria and the route to the colonel’s main supply of arms. With Misrata to the east in the rebels’ hands, Colonel Qaddafi and his loyalists had no way to flee Tripoli but into the sea.

·         When the final push came, it seemed to evince an admirable degree of orchestration. The NTC’s forces surged into Tripoli from three fronts, joining a general outpouring into the streets that began with several imams’ call for the evening prayer on Saturday. Rebel cells inside the city were co-ordinated to come out at their signal. In the fighting that followed, a government official said, 376 people on both sides died: an accurate number may take weeks to emerge, if ever it does.

·         In the confusion of the final battles, still ongoing in some pockets of the city, the certainty provided by the physical capture of a pair of Qaddafi sons has come as a relief. Saif al-Islam Qaddafi was taken first, Saif of the LSE degree who had once seemed like a liberal, modernising face of the Qaddafi regime, before declaring on television that the rebels were imminently to be turned into a “river of blood”. The International Criminal Court, which has an interest in prosecuting him, says that he is alive and in Libya. Then another son, Mohammed Qaddafi, was surrounded at home by armed rebels. He happened to be giving a radio interview at the time, in which he stressed his personal commitment to charity and aversion to violence. He was interrupted by gunfire (at 01.40) and then, it seems, taken into custody. For the time being, his last-heard words are “I’m being attacked right now. This is gunfire—inside my house. Theyre inside my house. There is no God but Allah.”

·         It might have been more prudent for the rebel forces to have delayed their assault on Tripoli to allow the forces from the western mountains and those from Misrata time to work together on a plan of action and also to allow the blockade to impact on the remnants the pro-Qaddafi forces both psychologically and materially. On the other hand, momentum in any campaign is valuable and the rebels are right to make the most of it. NATOs assessment (in this weeks Economist) was that Colonel Qaddafi had lost all operational capacity. The rebels may also have known much more than outsiders about the likelihood of an armed uprising within Tripoli activated by sleeper cells once their forces were on the outskirts of the city. If so, it was probably sensible to push on.

·         The resistance of forces still loyal to Colonel Qaddafi may be quite stiff (and lethal) for a while. They still appear to have tanks in Tripoli and probably have little situational awareness. They may also believe that they are going to be killed no matter what so might as well go down fighting. NATO will be reluctant to strike at tanks within the city for fear of collateral damage. The last thing NATO wants now is to kill a lot of civilians or rebel fighters when the outcome is no longer in any doubt.

·         Where is the colonel?

·         There are many questions at this hour but, as usual for the past 40 years, the self-appointed colonel dominates. There are rumours that Qaddafi père has already fled Tripoli for the south—or that he is in hospital—and there is also speculation that he has stuck to his fortified compound at the Bab al-Aziziya. Fighting continues around the compound.

·         Whatever Colonel Qaddafi’s whereabouts, most are concerned with what will follow him. Members of the transitional council are sharply aware of the experience of Iraq, and are determined not to repeat its mistakes. Benghazi experienced a comparatively smooth transition to rebel control in February, thanks largely to the policy of the rebel interim government, the NTC, of keeping key technocrats in their posts. There is no ruling party akin to the Baath party in Iraq, and so less pressure to get rid of policemen, power-plant managers, and others who may have been linked with the fallen regime but who are also key to running a modern city. NTC officials have also warned rebel fighters against reprisal attacks and looting: "The world is watching us... Do not avenge yourselves, dont pillage, dont insult foreigners and respect the prisoners," senior council member Mahmoud Jibril declared on national television.

·         But the NTC has limited legitimacy, particularly beyond the east. The council has vowed to relocate to the capital as quickly as possible, and members say that they can easily expand its ranks to ensure that Tripoli’s million inhabitants are represented. Even then, it is unclear how much authority they will wield over the disparate group of commanders who now control Tripolis streets. Even in the east, the NTC has had difficulty exerting its control over the privately-organised brigades of “thewar”–volunteer militiamen–who have refused integration into a more formal military. Fighters in the west, who have born the brunt of the fighting since March, have griped about a lack of support from the better-supplied east, and may not inclined to submit to the NTCs authority.

·         Even more challenging are isolated regime strongholds like Sirte, dominated by the Colonel Qaddafis own Qadadfa tribe, or the oasis town of Sebha, where the Qadadfa preside over a coalition of other clans. Some fear that the colonel may slip away to a remote corner of the desert, relying on longstanding tribal pledges of protection. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the Libyan leader will be capable of organising an Iraq-style armed insurgency nor is there any political traction for one.

·         The NTC has promised elections within the next eight months to establish some kind of ruling authority as soon as possible. Critics of the council say that this is too soon for a country that has almost no experience of party politics. Still, though tribally diverse, Libya is fairly homogenously Sunni and conservative. Its Islamists seem satisfied with constitutional provisions calling for sharia to be the main source of legislation, a fairly common staple of Arab constitutions.

·         However, cracks have emerged in the NTCs authority before, particularly after the assassination in July of General Abdelfattah Younis, allegedly by rogue militiamen. That threatened to lead to a showdown between the central rebel command and autonomous militias. That crisis was averted by the successful rebel offensives which followed a week later, and now has been all but forgotten in the euphoria of victory. But when that euphoria wears off, and with the immediate external threat posed by the colonels forces removed, the rebel movements so-far impressive display of unity may begin to falter.

·         (Photo credit: AFP)