﹝不幸誤闖‧枯燥乏味‧恕不負責﹞

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上圖：Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar(Incumbent)

Assumed office:  20 July 2011

Acting: 13 February 2011 – 20 July 2011

Born: 19th January 1977

﹝研讀枯燥乏味的文章，貼一張美女圖片，自尋樂趣吧，並藉此引發對南亞國際政治的關注與興趣。觀察家戲稱：巴基斯坦對印度打起美女牌啦！呵呵呵﹞

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President Ma’s Cross-Strait Strategy: The Tiger’s New Posture

By Eric S. Morse

Introduction
    This year marks the 100th anniversary of the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC). With the victory of the Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan. Since then Taiwan has transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a genuine multi-party democracy, experiencing its first full-cycle transition of power between the Kuomintang (KMT) party and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2008, when Ma Ying-Jeou of the KMT defeated Chen Shui-bian of the DPP to become president. President Ma adopted a different strategy from Chen’s administration regarding Cross-Strait negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This new strategy bodes well for the future, but also brings new challenges and opportunities for the region.

    Against this backdrop, President Ma delivered a speech1 on May 12, 2011, by videoconference to a National Strategy Forum (NSF) audience in Chicago and a Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) audience in Washington, DC. The focus of the speech was the evolution of Taiwan’s national security strategy and its implications for Taiwan-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The following is a summary of the speech and the implications for U.S. strategy. 

Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Strategy

    Managing relations with the PRC is Taiwan’s primary national security concern. While this issue has been managed peacefully for more than a decade, progress on Cross-Strait negotiations had been slow until President Ma took office in 2008. Notably, national strategy shifted from an overt drive for independence—favored under the rival DPP party—to a strategy that preserves the status quo (no unification, no independence) while pursuing negotiations on issues that can be achieved in the short term. For the first three years of his administration, President Ma’s national strategy has been successful in building Taiwan’s economy, strengthening international relationships, and managing Cross-Strait negotiations. These successes, as outlined in the speech, are predicated on a three-pronged national security strategy:

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• Institutionalizing the Cross-Strait Rapprochement
• Enhancing Taiwan’s Contributions to International Development
• Aligning Taiwan’s Defense with Diplomacy
      

      The first pillar, “Institutionalizing the Cross-Strait Rapprochement,” adheres to the idea that “one must have a change of thought before one can have a change of action.” 2 While Ma’s policy is grounded in the “Three No’s Policy”—No Unification, No Independence, No Use of Force—implemented in 2008, he promotes institutionalized methods of bilateral interaction with the PRC. Ma’s belief is that the essence of good governance includes building the necessary diplomatic structures to encourage conditions of growth, both economically and politically. Positive examples of progress included an influx of over three million Chinese visitors since 2008, a record high increase in Cross-Strait trade totaling $526 billion in 2010, the stability of Taiwan’s 23 international allies, and the inclusion of Taiwan as an observer in the World Health Assembly and the Government Procurement Agreement.

      The Economic Free Trade Agreement (ECFA), signed by the PRC and Taiwan in June 2010, is an example of this strategy, with implications for both parties.3 For the PRC, greater economic integration is a form of soft-power diplomacy that may whittle away Taiwan’s predisposition for independence; by giving Taiwanese a taste of economic integration with the mainland, the PRC hopes that they may develop stronger preferences for reunification. For Taiwan, economic integration is a form of institutionalizing the Cross-Strait relationship. By creating norms, principles, and procedures around which the PRC and Taiwan repetitively interact, this leads to a level of predictability and mutual understanding between both sides, thus minimizing the possibility for conflict. In addition, Ma’s institutionalization strategy increases the costs of reversing the positive trends that have materialized.

      The second pillar, “Enhancing Taiwan’s Contributions to International Development,” makes use of Taiwan’s soft-power economic and foreign policy strengths. As an advanced democracy with a skilled workforce, modern infrastructure, democracy, and rule of law, Taiwan is well positioned in the Pacific to be a hub of economic activity. Harnessing its economic leverage and geographic position has made it an attractive destination for foreign investment and economic partnership. For example, Taiwan has built a large trade position with Japan and other regional economies. With respect to foreign policy, Taiwan recognizes that its national security is tied to its role as a responsible stakeholder in international affairs, and thus pursues humanitarian aid and disaster relief as a form of foreign policy outreach. For instance, when the 2011 earthquake struck Japan, Taiwan was one of the first responders, offering both financial and material aid. Taiwan’s strategy of maintaining international visibility through soft-power approaches achieves international recognition without overtly antagonizing mainland China.

      The third pillar, “Aligning Taiwan’s Defense with Diplomacy,” has two priorities: building Taiwan’s credibility and trust with its closest allies, and ensuring that Taiwan has the means to defend itself. Taiwan remains aware of how its actions affect its allies, and has sought a foreign policy position that minimizes consequences to its closest allies, such as the U.S. Nevertheless, Taiwan is adamant to maintain a level playing field in its negotiations with China, 

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a goal that requires a strong military and diplomatic backing for Cross-Strait negotiations. To this end, President Ma exhorted the U.S. to continue to provide Taiwan with the necessary weapons for self-defense.

      The U.S. has expanded military support to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and more recently in response to the missile crisis in 1995-1996. U.S. military assistance to Taiwan currently consists of arms sales and joint military exchanges. Major arms sales include diesel submarines, Kidd-class destroyers, P-3 anti-submarine aircraft, AH-64D Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, F-16 fighter aircraft, and PAC-3 Patriot missile defense systems. Pending since 2006 is a request for new F-16 C/D advanced fighter aircrafts. Total transfers of U.S. military aid to Taiwan totals $7.5billion from 2002-2009, and ranks fourth in U.S. global arms sales from 2006-2009.4 While these aid transfers have helped strengthen Taiwan’s defenses, President Ma believes that more U.S. aid will be needed to keep pace with the PRC’s military growth and to successfully execute peaceful Cross-Strait negotiations.

     Overall, President Ma’s three-pronged strategy is a blend of soft power (diplomacy, economics, humanitarianism, and institutionalization) and hard power, with an objective of maintaining the status quo while continuing negotiations with the PRC on readily achievable issues of Cross-Strait negotiations.

The U.S. Perspective 

    As the importance of the PRC to the U.S. has grown, Taiwan’s strategic importance to the U.S. has received much less public attention lately. This is due, in no small part, to Taiwan’s peaceful management of its relationship with the PRC. While some Americans recognize the importance of Taiwan to U.S. strategic objectives in East Asia, it is unclear whether these opinions are strong enough to motivate intervention if a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan occurs.5 Consequently, most public perceptions of Taiwan are sentimentally oriented towards a fellow democracy but pragmatically constrained by domestic fiscal and foreign policy concerns. As a new generation of young leaders emerge, it is important to remind them of this unique relationship and the U.S. interests linked to Taiwan in East Asia.

    Are U.S. policymakers likely to commit American resources and risk American interests should a broader conflict develop between the PRC and Taiwan? In the past, the U.S. intervened militarily when Taiwan has been threatened, most notably in the 1995-1996 crisis when President Clinton dispatched two carrier battle groups in response to the PRC’s missile firings over Taiwan. Rhetoric pertaining to Taiwan’s defense is also evident, such as in April 2001, when President Bush said that he would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” in the event of a Chinese attack. President Bush later clarified this statement in 2005 by saying that “If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. If Taiwan

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were to declare independence unilaterally, it would be a unilateral decision, that would then change the U.S. equation…”6

      Since 2005, U.S. policy regarding intervention in a Taiwan-PRC conflict has weakened in substance. This may partly be due to former DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s antagonistic policies towards China. Nevertheless, President Ma’s awareness of U.S. preferences were made clear on April 30, 2010, when he acknowledged that the U.S. is unlikely to deploy military assets to defend Taiwan.7 While this may have been meant to alleviate political pressure on the U.S.- PRC relationship and to remove obstacles to American military aid to Taiwan, it also indicates that Taiwan believes that it is responsible for its own security.

     In the post-speech discussion, many NSF observers commented that the U.S. relationship with the PRC is more important to U.S. interests than defending Taiwan. It was said that while Taiwan is not abandoned, it has lost its prominence in the minds of the U.S. public and in Congress.8 The primary U.S. objective is to maintain the status quo relationship between Taiwan and the PRC because a declaration of independence would create political consequences counter to American interests. While some argue that the U.S. and the PRC are too interconnected economically to risk a rupture in the relationship, the U.S. feels at risk by its nearly one trillion dollars of outstanding debt held by the PRC’s central bank. Fortunately, integration of economies, trade, and politics compels both sides to not overreact and establishes clearly defined political boundaries for U.S.-PRC relations that agree on no independence for Taiwan and limited U.S. military assistance.

     Defense Secretary Robert Gates once argued that the U.S. can best help itself by “helping others defend themselves.” 9 Despite priority for U.S.-PRC relations, a strong, independent Taiwan is in U.S.’s interest for three reasons. First, a strong Taiwan is a deterrent to unnecessary aggression from the PRC and contributes to regional stability in general. Second, Taiwan’s strategic geographic location off the mainland holds the PRC’s aspirations for a blue water navy in check, a boon to both U.S. and Japanese strategy. Third, because Taiwan is a model for what the U.S. hopes will develop in the PRC (a friendly, multi-party democracy), supporting Taiwan is a form of U.S. soft-power diplomacy towards mainland China, and ensures that Taiwan is perceived as a more reputable and credible bargaining partner during Cross-Strait negotiations. Educating the public and Members of Congress about the importance of these issues will be necessary for building stronger U.S.-Taiwan relations in the future.

Conclusion 

    There are a number of strategic interests to balance in the U.S.-PRC-ROC triangle: the U.S. favors its relationship with the PRC and wants to manage its peaceful rise; the U.S. wants to support strong democracies in East Asia; Taiwan requires U.S. military aid to maintain an equal

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negotiating position with the PRC; too much U.S. military aid to Taiwan upsets the PRC, and may also be unfavorably viewed by the U.S. domestic public in an era of budget austerity; and domestic U.S. support for Taiwan is waning, both among the public and in Congress.

     For the U.S. to achieve its objectives in the region, five forward-looking strategies are worth consideration:

1. The U.S., Taiwan, and Japan should strengthen their bilateral and trilateral relations with one another. All three countries have complementary interests towards balancing China’s rise. It behooves them to continue mutual policy coordination and to deepen their relationships with one another.
2. The U.S. should continue to provide some military aid to Taiwan. Helping Taiwan to defend itself is in America’s interests from both a soft power and hard power perspective.
3. The U.S. and Taiwan should work to increase American domestic understanding of U.S.- Taiwan relations and their relevance to U.S. objectives in the region. As a new generation of young Americans grow up, and a new influx of Congressional leaders emerge, continued relations with Taiwan depend critically on the ability of a domestic American audience to understand the importance of this relationship.
4. U.S. policymakers must be competent in defining U.S. aid to Taiwan in terms of achieving U.S. interests in the region; this will be key to avoid domestic political backlash in an environment of tight fiscal and budgetary constraints.
5. The U.S. should take action to limit its reliance on foreign creditors to allow for increased flexibility in foreign relations.10

    To date, the U.S.-PRC-ROC relationship has been relatively stable. With open consultation and mutual respect, one can be hopeful this trend will continue.