The Economist explains

The meaning of conservatism

There are few grand theories of conservatism, but there are core principles

The Economist explains

Aug 13th 2018

by A.W.

ANYBODY trying to explain the meaning of conservatism is immediately confronted by a paradox. Most conservatives eschew grand theories in favour of practice. Marxists may devote their lives to producing definitions of Marxism; conservatives prefer to get on with the business of government. In that sense conservatism is what conservatives do. Yet the term “conservative” is not infinitely elastic: there is a core of principles that guides conservatives in the practice of government.

Conservatives like to stick to ancient ways of doing things out of a combination of sentiment and pragmatism. Sentiment because they like the poetry of the past and pragmatism because they worry that abstract blueprints may produce disasters. Otto von Bismarck defined politics as “the art of the possible”, a phrase that was later revived by R.A. Butler, a British grandee. Winston Churchill said ruefully that he “preferred the past to the present and the present to the future”. Michael Oakeshott, a philosopher, said that to be a conservative “is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to Utopian bliss”. 

Therein lies the first principle: opposition to pie-in-the-sky schemes. The second principle is the importance of elitism. Some conservatives (particularly in Europe) believe in the importance of preserving a role for the traditional ruling class. Others believe in the importance of creating an educated minority—Samuel Taylor Coleridge called it a “clerisy”—that can preserve high civilisation in a democratic society. Most conservatives believe in the importance of disciplining democracy through various constitutional constraints such as representative democracy, powerful revising chambers, Supreme Courts and bills of rights. The third principle is a belief in “belonging”. Modern liberalism is the philosophy of the airport hotel: liberals believe that nothing should be allowed to interfere in the efficiency-maximising power of free exchange. Conservatism is the philosophy of the comfortable country house; conservatives believe above all in having a place that you can call home. They put a high value on the importance of patriotism because the nation-state is a collection of like-minded people. They have a soft spot for old-fashioned country squires who are the linchpins of local societies. The basic reason why conservatives are worried about free movement of people is that free movement turns society into a nexus of contracts rather than a “homeland” that is occupied by people who share a common history.

This definition of conservatism points to one of the great oddities of our times: that many people who go by the name of conservatives are anything but. The British Conservative Party—or a dominant faction within it—has pursued its dream of leaving the European Union despite the fact that doing so has involved breaking with 45 years of history, embracing a referendum and throwing the country into turmoil. The American Republican Party is dominated by a man who has no conservative qualities whatsoever: he’s personally uncouth, feasts on television and fast food, makes policy by Twitter and is bent on overturning the establishment.

筆者因為經濟學者雜誌一次只能貼5000個字元的限制，分三部份貼出

As the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 11th: Main Entry: conservatism (Date: 1835) 1 capitalized a : the principles and policies of a Conservative party b : the Conservative party 2 a : disposition in politics to preserve what is established b : a political philosophy based on tradition and social stability, stressing established institutions, and preferring gradual development to abrupt change 3 : the tendency to prefer an existing or traditional situation to change

Conservatism (CON) was originally a reaction against the Age of Enlightenment. Since its birth of tangible form during French (FR) Revolution (RE), the CON is always referred to as the opposition (OP) to the progressive trend, or the consequence of rationalist-oriented political (PO’s) wings whilst CON spirits its ideas’ reorganization in defensive motion. For instance, CON advocated belief in faith over reason, tradition over free inquiry, hierarchy over equality, collective values over individualism, and divine or natural law over secular law. The rationalist PO embraced a broad segment of the PO’s spectrum often in contrast to CON, including central-right liberal (LIB’s) reformism, central-left trade-union socialism (or social democracy), and ultimately heavy-left Marxism.

In humanitarian view, the concern of how liberalists (LIBists) and egalitarian respectively demand the GOV’s manner demonstrates each value’s orientation. Conservatives (CONists) thus favour institutions (INSs) and practices that have evolved gradually and are manifestations of continuity and stability. GOV’s responsibility is to be the servant, not the master, of existing ways of life, and politicians must therefore resist the temptation to transform society and PO. CON always make CONists judge and jury on every PO affairs and the ally or enemy in PO arena. CONists always think what their motion is keen to the public interest.

The term “CON” was introduced after 1815 by supporters of the restored Bourbon monarchy in France, including the author and diplomat Franƈois-Auguste-René, vicomte de Chateaubriand. In fact, the initially modern, articulated concept of CON (though he never used the term) is generally acknowledged to be the British (BR) parliamentarian and PO’s writer Edmund Burke, whose “Reflections on the Revolution in France” (1790) was a forceful expression of CON’s rejection of the French Revolution and a major inspiration for counterrevolutionary theorists in the 19th century (CE). Burke said the decorous government (GOV) is what could work the best.

The embodiment of 19th CE’s Europe’s ecumenical world view was indeed the English MC in the Victoria Age who hold confidence of the prospective. The dawn of the present West’s association was built by the social development from static form to the dynamic regularity, as well as the rapid progress on commercial, manufacturers’ upgrading and the fervent scientific hope. Thus, a convergence of these fervid ideas, involving nationalism (NATism), democratic puissance in a mix of LIBism and scientific view of development, gathered momentum of the multifariously splendid leap in the fluctuation at historic largest scale. The tug-of-war between CON and the antithesis had yet got a result of the dominance until MET went exile in 1848.

Overall, during the 19th CE, the ramification of Europe’s history is associated to the contrast between the RE and its reactionary, also referring to the conflict between LIBism and CON. For instance, these CONists who guarded New Classics Economy and those constitutionalists who adored LIB economy (EC) usually argued for the public policy as well.

At the initial stage of CON’s prevalence, also called the period of “Classic CON”, CON’s supporters were mainly comprised of theocratists and monarchism, both of whom gave the divine right of Gods and kings accolade ordinary people absolutely abide by. Otherwise, the infraction was as a guilty as sin that brought about the stern punishment. Both kinds of eminently stricter advocators were obdurate and said the coeval INS satisfied the demand of order’s maintenance, from the late 18th to the early 19th CE and from the BR Sir William Blackstone to the newly-born democratic nation US’s President (PR) James Monroe and to the Austria Empire prime minister (PM) Fürst von Klemens Metternich (MET) who hosted the Congress of Vienna (COV) in 1814–15. In the face of numerous turmoil, RE, coup d’état and the likes of PO change, the CONists often took rancorous anxiety toward headway of social environment evading the adaptation of aged INS in terms of public interest. The idea of CON gradually transformed to the purely passive reaction to the contemporary innovative puissance rather than the dormancy of INS while keeping the reminiscence of the old imperial golden age. The CONists always bear the decorum’s insistence against any rapid vicissitude.

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The 19th CE’s Europe’s transformation of social hierarchy and the increment of population (POP) that resulted in the fastest-ever urbanization were 2 major causes of ideological advancement. Until 1900, the POP in Europe rose over 0.4bn and the industrial RE cultivate the impetus of capitalists, middle class (MC) and labor that individually divers active attitude toward public affairs in a diversity. The fortune’s re-distribution breeds the PO right reshufflings and an initiation of numerous kinds of ideas that inspires modern universal value and philosophy in the main.

From the COV in 1815’s Vienna to the Napoleon III’s (NIII) inauguration in 1848’s Paris, the RE movement was mostly frustrated except for the Belgium’s independence. While celebrating the 300th Anniversary of “95 Theses”, a large scale of German college students rallied support for an enchantment of liberty and discarded any passive reaction to PO. In Britain, the CON integrated into the NATism mirrored on the Reform Bills of 1831-32 directed by the Palmerston Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount (PAL, PM 1855-58, 59-65, Whig-Liberal epitome of BR NATist). He made a compromise between CON and LIBism who assisted to form a solid NATism in 19^th CE, debuting the brilliant history of BR Empire. But for the bill passing, the state-level rebellion could heavily happen. My favourite BR historic politician Benjamin Disraeli (CON Party’s PM, 1868, 74-80) developed “Tory democracy” since he rectified the Reform Bill in 1867, that mitigated the unrestrained capitalism imposed labour union by encomium of the Queen Victoria’s monarchy and the church. Thus, BR could solicitously strengthen its hold onto the global colonial expansion.

The FR first civil PR and the last emperor NIII’s sufferings and thoughts reflected the first half of 19^th CE Europe’s ideological mainstream’s change. NIII did the likes of what PAL did in terms of new ideology. When he was jailed for the OP to the Louis-Philippe I, he asserted that only an emperor could give FR both glory and LIB in his pamphlet “Rêveries politiques” (1832) with thick Progressivism (PRO), one branch of socialism mixed to LIBism. Before then, he once participated in the LIBism-inclined activity Carbonari launched with Louis II of Holland, and the experience affected his future NAT’s LIB’s principle concerned of his tenure’s diplomacy. Yet his FR monarchy accompanied the balance between CONists and LIBists. The FR domestic LIB’s EC’s prosperity depended on his CON-first approach that modernize the industry and consolidate the regime. Meanwhile, he supported Saint-simonisme and disobeyed reactionary MET established as international diplomatic principle.

Since Otto von Bismarck directed the German Empire’s unity, the LIBism and scientific attainment turned affiliated to the NATism while the Europe Power’s arms race went intensive. The labor and MC’s awareness were also devoted to the nation’s progress that helped form a new concept of PRO like the rather leftist New LIBism and welfare nation, derived of the 19^th CE’s LIBism the students and workers brandished.

In US, Andrew Jackson’s Presidential (PR’s) inauguration marked the “ordinary” ’s first domination in PO rather than the “Gentry” George Washington and the founders of US. Neoliberalism and the Economic LIBism (EL) in the 20^th CE’s US got closer to the CON in accord to the advocator’s claim. After WWII, the CON turns to stem from the Logic Incrementalistic PO’s and EC motion. Superficially, the CON and LIBists recently both march on the right wings’ road, but both have discrepancy of orientation to a degree.

Today’s CON in US is the result from the 20^th CE’s Great Depression, the Cold War’s anti-Communism and the deregulation after Ronald Reagan. The US CON’s core value is to ensure the INS’s stable exercise and the traditional value. Most of the CON’s PO’s believers are now Republican (GOP) members that hold the CONism somehow different from the 19^th CE’s traditional CONism or EL. The GOP’s CONism sprang from the F. A. Hayek whose ideas were oriented to the 19^th CE’s LIBism, mainly around constitutionalism and universal suffrage’s expansion. That is, the CONists yield to the LIBism due to a clear run of the solid mechanism lasting for decades. Yet in the present GOP CONism remains the Minarchism, LIB trading without GOV meddling in the market. So did the due process of legitimate promulgation, family’s morality and LGBT bill.

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Since Reagan, CON in US was comprised of racists, those who hated anti-war movement and who disappointed US PR’s Lyndon B. Johnson “the Great Society” that beforehand supported LIBism – owing to the LIBism’s interest groups’ noxious monopolization. US PR George W. Bush who had less interest in foreign travel after WWII claimed the Compassionate CONism, based on his votes’ source in religious group, is the critical drive to the cosmopolitan movement like anti-terrorism and free trade. These are far away from the ideas Burke put forward CEs ago.

Yet now PR Donald J. Trump’s characteristic of motion in PO are inclined to Social LIBism; GOV needs to moderately intervene in firm’s business, negating the conventional GOP’s PO ideas of how to reply market (the EC approach). Trump’s “perfidious” idea compared to the GOP seniors’ is perhaps related to his sense in youth closer to the Democrats who reveres State LIBism including a large scale of welfare, protectionism and attained the whole civilians LIB, although he continued the GOP’s traditional sense regarding domestic bill’s framework. In other words, Trump tries to have his sayings of CONism’s value on society and GOV. Trump emphasized the importance of working right and the parity of EC opportunities who win over half of US support rate. Besides, Trump a bit alienates the GOP traditionalist elder like John S. McCain who carries out a bold and delicious nationalism.

In UK, the CONists turns the policies’ orientation from the middle- and upper-class privilege and later appeasement before WWII to the welfare nation’s improving efficiency. The achievement of executive agency’s reorganization, privatization and public-private partnerships, in line to the Libertarianism, brought the Margaret Thatcher and the successors another BR CONists’ glory. She deciphers and integrates the CONism into the concept developed by John Locke and John Stuart Mill, the Scottish economist Adam Smith, and then US PR Thomas Jefferson. She thought the pursuit of ones own conception of happiness, or the “good life” is the morality to define and justify the legitimate powers of GOV in terms of certain natural or God-given individual rights. That made the right CONism resemble today’s leftist LIBism, and the INS got naturally opt for the civil society, between the rational and the utilitarian status. Thus, the common sense, owing to the later PM Sir John Major’s ambiguous attitude of Europe Union, turned to support the PM Tony Blair who believe in the Third Way created by Anthony Giddens, “Geddens Structuration Theory” (Taiwan’s then PR Chen Shui-bian also follows the approach). The incumbent PM Theresa May has identified herself with the one-nation CON position within her party who chooses to do Brexit. Her liberal CON’s image Financial Times described as “non-ideological” one consolidated the nation while no discrepancy of society is always welcomed by the whole civilians. This PM is called “Red Tory” who has a tendency towards leftist.

China’s Marxist GOV has some predilection for today’s CON’s development. When the modernization proceeds, the CON penetrated PO’s consensus of Communists (COMists) in modern version influencing the bureaucracy and the highest cadre’s standard of supervision on policies and interior tissues. Owing to the CON self-disciplinary matter, CON’s ideas of civic law and custom, even if some of that derived of West’s civilization, are taken to stimulate the regime’s progress, help rationalize the COMist GOV, and eliminates opposition. For instance, in Taiwan Affairs Office is An Fang-shan who serves as spokesman that often evinces the preferences of conventionally legitimate insistence, contrary to the deranged colleague Ma Shiou-guang. On one hand, Xi Jin-ping, China’s PR and COMist Party Secretary, has less thoughts of COM but “tolerate” the COM spreading, whose earlier time vehement Marxism depends on the ascendency of his princeling ally. On other hand, Li Ke-qiang, my faction’s leader now yet effete and now PM, deals with PO affairs having inclination to COM, but his LIBism, due to his thicker rationalism, is unique to the policies’ promulgation like his sophisticated welfare issues and economic control. For instance, Li takes more care of the share price in stock market always more than the audit of industries and big firms. CON is yet the China’s main ideas, or CON’s prevalence with domestic market suffering the Sino-US trade war is a befuddled matter for COMist GOV.

Mostly, statesmen tend to seek the largest self-efficient approach of PO solution that in general involve more limited attention on such a composite public policy and less insight into public opinion. CONism helps them play defensive role in win of public trust that solves a dispute but concede in the innovative prospective. If the PO players bets the prestige on the strategy of public interest, transaction meets the dilemma of risk and compromise, and I seldom say “You betcha”.

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筆者大概看了Blog區的幾個還有在運作的區塊文章，選了這篇比較熟悉而且是政治學基本原理，與有關世界史上的一段很重要意識型態驅動政治運動的因果小說明。一時興起覺得從美國春田市韋氏辭典的原理來探求保守主義在現代社會及政治之沒有特色的出路。筆者在寫這篇時參考Britannica 2013版、Microsoft Encarta Premium 2009，及以已故馮作民先生委託葉龍彥教授的西洋全史的第14本「自由主義與保守主義」乙書的架構寫成本篇，有時候根本直接從中文翻成英語貼上去真好用。文章中間以歐陸德法和英美的保守主義，從18世紀到20世紀的走向及特徵變與不變，以信奉者堅持什麼、探求及態度來作區分。筆者最後評論現任英國梅伊首相保守黨、美國共和黨川普總統和中國習近平領導的中共行政官僚的保守主義濃厚與否、特徵和對公共利益的影響作結。

「保守主義」Conservatism一詞最早公推是1815年時，由支持法國波旁王朝的外交家Franƈois-Auguste-René, vicomte de Chateaubriand所提出的醒目標題，其概念最早是Eduard Burke 在1790年所出版的“Reflections on the Revolution in France” （對法國大革命的反思），為了推崇英國既有憲政制度以避免受法國大革命的影響而對君主國國體制度有所更動，所提的讚頌英國當時政體國會制度，任何變動都不如在同意有穩定的制度及程序上來提出意見。這兩股反動的勢力算是揭序了歐洲十九世紀之後近一百年，保守主義和以自由主義領銜的反保守主義，兩股的對抗。

筆者對於十九世紀保守主義的反動及自由主義的對抗歸納從1814-15年的奧地利帝國的梅特捏首相維也納會議、德國的勞工及學生運動、英國的數代保守黨首相改革法案（筆者舉兩次，在帕馬斯敦和狄斯累利首相時期）及階級妥協與導正資本主義問題、美國第一位西部平民出生的傑克遜總統當選、法國的王室復辟失敗與拿破崙三世第二帝國的興起啟示、德國俾斯麥首相主導的統一搞了民族主義混合入自由主義。二十世紀的保守主義也是試圖拉住原有制度的改革變化，這時有一定程度的上，為漸近地接受十九世紀自由主義者的提倡，算是同意作為政治慣例，也有從別的主義思想借用，而獲得新的啟發，也有因為大時代背景而被驅動的想法所致，或是思想的集合。保守主義不變的，是感覺上自己很想站穩馬步，站在固定不變的機構與制度上來審視政治及行政變化，有時顯得孤傲，特徵上希望不確定性低的前題來作漸近自然的變化。包括美國共和黨為主的保守主義及反映在政策演變、英國保守黨在二戰後接受工黨福利政策的作為，和現今中國共產黨強烈馬列思想但實際上帶有保守主義的官僚，而有政權延續的吊詭。

筆者簡要歸納保守主義指的是喜歡靜態、消極維持體制的意識型態，說穿了不一定是要哪種絕對標準的體制或體系，但是一定是不喜歡、不希望有突發變革，也不是不想作任何改變，會照著制度設定程序來作變化，法規化一切的味道很濃，重政策延續性及制度穩定性，並認為如此是增進公共利益的，如同柏克所述最適合的政府是運作最好的政府。從十八世紀末形成的靜態觀念，到了十九世紀1815年之後的世局變遷，不變的變，也就是拿來實踐時是作一再強調原有生活和工作的明確性重者，主要給舊制度的權力人士提供合理化自己的鎮壓的藉口。意識型態大部份而言，保守主義也是，反應了這個時代、社會系統和個別發展者的特殊歷史環境。當面對自由主義的民權的高漲，有學生和勞工的意識抬頭（十九世紀前半葉原普魯士王國），抗議群眾要求憲政的建立（比利時、希臘的獨立和義大利的統一）、比較和緩的參政權的擴大及政治回應（英國保守黨的改革法案），在接近二十世紀初葉時，在歐美各國大部份自由主義已和民族主義合而為一（帝俄有一些），配合工業革命的科學發展觀的觀念普及，體現於德國統一後各國的軍備競賽和經濟上產業結構的快速轉變，與民主觀的潮流匯及為一股歐美政治現代化的重要路程。若講精確一點的，經濟變遷引起的社會階級的變化，即流動快速，及有史以來最和平的人口倍增，所造成的都市化，為反保守主義的各股勢力增長快速的原因。這些包括有中間偏右的自由改革者（即今天台灣的中國國民黨在解嚴的1990年代後的政治光譜區塊相倣），中間偏左支持貿易商會的社會民主主義者（十九世紀英國首富羅伯特歐文、雖然稱帝後保守但仍帶聖西門主義的法皇拿破崙三世、列寧在建立蘇俄後於實務方面和陳水扁前總統是這類），及極左的馬克思主義者，這三者在十九世紀都是保守主義的主要敵人。

在經濟觀點上，保守主義者推崇古典經濟學（應該指的是一般的英國古典經濟學，由「資本主義之父」亞當斯密Adam Smith在1776年從「國富論」一書所開創的資本主義觀念及理論架構，及其後新古典經濟學，Neoclassical Economics，因為是從Britannica 直接摘錄照寫New開頭的名詞，百科全書文中真的好像不分新不新的），亦及國家體系應該自一種持，在沒有更動體制也不需要的前提下，要知道有市場機制自由競爭會輔助國家發展，同時加入第二個前提為政府的確是一隻「看不見的手」，反對國家干預而提出自由放任原則。而自由主義者，多為憲政及民族主義者則是要求市場經濟，和弭平因工業革命以來的發展所致的不平等，要求政府進行意圖平等，如世界第一本有完整民權論述，彌勒(John S. Mill)所著的「自由論」內所闡釋，他所代表的十九世紀自由主義者相信民權是絕不可少的，需要藉憲政來維護，他們站在功利的立場，認為民權不僅能給個人自尊和參與社會事務的欲望，而且能推動社會進步。雖然彌勒與其他提倡者都重視洛克(John Locke)的基本人權，但主張參與的自由比自主的權利更值得珍惜。洛克強調的僅是個人的自主，他們認為不夠的，所以，人權觀念應加以補充與擴大。

筆者在第三段以人權觀點來看保守主義和自由主義。這也可以說明因為當今要作自由和平等觀念的平衡，因此保守主義偏向稍盛行回來了一些，即為探討經濟上較大平等，就須限制若干人處份財產自由之難。其實到了二十世紀時，見筆者第二大段最後一小段之第三大段，今天的美國的保守主義是反對「福利國家」(Welfare State)而來，在二戰之後的美國，最具代表性的政黨就是美國共和黨，但為今日川普總統所壓制的非主流，以剛過世的資深參議員麥肯(John Sydney McCain)，和筆者曾經也討論過的高華德(Barry Morris Goldwater)為首的保守派。最具代表性的為奧國經濟學者海耶克(F. von Hayek)，在其名著「到奴役之路」中，海氏反對政府干預私人的經濟活動，反對社會福利施政，認為此必導致行政官署權力之膨脹，而後人民就能失去自主之權。現在，像哈氏這樣不遺餘力反對福利國家的人，已甚稀少了。

算起來自由主義在二十世紀很像經過緩慢演化的保守主義，除了都是美國的右派，乃至於新右派及新治理的想法都算是其後的新保守主義，以及保守者接受了經過數十年來的自由民主憲政觀念，變成了認知上傳統的價值，海氏在論述時反對政府擴大職能，亦稱「保守的自由主義觀點」，對於保守者要求系統平衡和制度的維持，及對於自由主義者為要求經濟機會和生活條件上的平等之要求，兩者均有所滿足。海氏認為政府擴大職能的結果必會減低了人民的經濟自由，政府遂可透過控制人民的經濟而來控制人民的思想，迫使人民走向「奴役之路」。於是他特別強調競爭的重要性，主張政府以合法的手續訂定各種常規，以利國民的自由競爭才是為政之道。這程序的強調就指涉保守的起源，作支撐自由主義在民主社會運作的原則。

筆者舉的除了英國之外，法國的拿破崙三世從年青時加入過燒炭黨，信奉過自由主義和進步主義，後者筆者視為是社會主義和自由主義的混合。之後其中一次流亡英國時，拿氏稍微保守了點，選擇站在建制這邊加入相當於特種憲兵的行列作監控反對派的傭兵。到了掌權時，拿氏不忘年青時的政治信仰，推行聖西門主義，融合國族主義強制改造巴黎城。拿氏的政府是法國史上，也是世界史上第一個經濟掛帥的政府，一切的政策導向先以國內經濟建設和工商業發展為前提，而且是世界史上第一個大幅降低關稅的國家領導人。雖然上述內政方面拿氏稍嫌保守，但是在外交上，拿氏明確反對自梅特捏以來的以反動勢力為主流的國際外交架構。在俾斯麥於普法戰爭贏了也滅亡了拿氏的法國第二帝國之後，統一後的德國成為了新興工業強權，加緊了與歐洲其他各國合縱連橫的軍備競賽。這是自十八世紀工業革命以來的小小的新的格局，這時候的年輕學生、工人和中產階級隨著都市化加速而有了意識抬頭，進步主義帶動稍微左派的新自由主義及福利國家的概念興起。

在二次大戰之後，在鐵幕以外的歐洲國家，尤其是英國保守黨接受了這個觀念，從反對福利國家到願意以維持原有制度和社會階層，作福利國家法制化的融合，促進福利政策的效率而不悖離國家經濟發展，亦即仍不違背新古典經濟理論來作政務。在稱為「折衷主義的年代」的1960年代之後，於是有了1979年保守黨柴契爾夫人(Margaret Thatcher)的當選和新自由主義政體的「小而美政府」內容如「效率團隊」及執行機構的設立。英國在之後梅傑(Sir John Major)的續階計畫及公民憲章內曾經有更進一步的政策，但因為其為歐洲懷疑論者，因此內閣不穩定，數次選舉又履履敗退，民眾轉而支持內政及外交態度較明確，信奉紀思道(Anthony Giddens)的 “Geddens Structuration Theory”的布萊爾首相(Anthony Charles L. Blair)出線進駐唐寧街，即台灣俗稱的第三條路及新中間路線，尋求社會民主主義路線，也使英國政壇的保守派沉寂了至少十五年。

美國民主黨和共和黨都有類似的觀念及保守主義的發展，柯林頓總統(Bill Clinton)的REGO厲革實驗室，和副總統高爾(Al Gore)一同採用新公共管理概念，由奧斯本(David Osborne)與蓋柏勒(Ted Gaebler)的新政府運動與企業型政府的概念-企業型官僚及企業精神組成，和共和黨保守派的小政府主義、減少干預市場、程序正義、家庭倫理和LGBT問題的法案。很類似的概念發生在小泉純一郎(Koizumi Junichiro)執政時的日本，作經濟結構改革的同時，厲行企業化政府的解制措施，有郵便局的支部縮編、小而美政府和民營化事業開展。這些都是著名的政府改造的例子。有的是行政系統的穩定中求變，但更多的是市場競爭機制和公民權的尊重。

整合來說，保守主義在美國是指傳統價值的維持，而更近一點的說，現代的保守主義在美國，主要是因為詹森總統(Lyndon B. Johnson)的大社會計畫破滅，以社會自由主義為主的想法在政策實行上，為寡頭利益團體領導所瓜分，並沒有真正落實在要求社會衡平的大眾，因此原來的主張者及原提倡的政客，轉而成為新保守主義的主流，在政策上，之後沒有再要求多大的改革幅度，造成雷根(Ronald Reagan)總統的8年執政和共和黨12年高支持度。到了2000年小布希總統(George W. Bush)執政時，不太出國訪問的他採用悲憫保守主義，走中間偏右路線，本質上保留了傳統保守主義的基因，其主張反墮胎、反禁管槍械、反同性戀平權、支持死刑、支持減稅、支持建構飛彈防禦系統，這些菜單內容，滿足了保守主義復辟思潮最高期，精神飢渴民眾。

現今的川普總統(Donald J. Trump)總統與黨內的資深黨員中的主流不睦，並與其保守派成員的意見相左，在內閣名單及政策上，與眾議院共和黨的主流並沒有一致，除了其繼續反墮胎，支持水刑和死刑、支持傳統家庭倫理概念、LGBT法案精神延續及支持全球及太空防禦系統，川普因國內校園槍擊案頻傳轉而支持管制槍枝，及保護國內大企業而降富人稅及企業稅，與鼓勵外國企業投資給予免稅優惠，進而降低本國失業率及增加經濟成長率，這筆者是認為和川普有一陣子是民主黨員有點關係。他也建立關稅和移民政策上的堡壘，國際外交上採極右派國家主義，就國家發展上公共利益迅速提升，但是國際外交上不利於美國的威信及國際交流的擴大，稅收變少恐有國債高築的隱憂。這段在筆者正在(2018,9,2)寫的Graphic detail的「Trump country is confident and growing again」會作更詳細的說明川普如何帶動美國國內經濟復甦顯著、共和黨及自己支持率回穩，及使共和黨支持者的本來惡劣的經濟生活水平回升。

經濟學者雜誌把現代自由主義和現今的保守主義主流比喻為居住型態的問題，來說住房政策觀點的人生哲學。前者為機場旅館，一直租房過就好的，後者為有固定信念的自用住家，前提均為愛國主義的重要。在中國大陸的官僚保守主義有些盛行，對於現今強烈馬列主義的習近平而言算是個窘境，但短時間來說並不危害政權的問題。保守主義在中國各界，有助於穩定現今的政府和社會的系統穩定，但是長時間而言，馬列主義會被淡化，而顯得僵硬，又兩者多是感性訴求為主的意識及政治觀點，就算仍然在中國有穩定的政治現代化，但也因經濟和社會發展帶來的新的環境變化，新生代的政治成員加入時不可避免的有政治變遷的產生，同時發生緩慢的系統過渡問題，而使官僚和共黨的高層偏消極運作而偏向保守的態度，或偏重用拔擢保守派人士或執政派親信擔任要職，存在一定程度隱憂。而目前的中共政治系統偏向威權行政為主的政體，以和市場以調節機制維持一定程度的社會主義指導資本市場，即國家資本主義的路線，有限度的保守政策不錯，就比如說共黨中央在對台發言上，重用安峰山比用馬曉光好，還要能應付反對勢力和傳達正面的思考; 但如果保守主義框住了一定的創意思考，很難在風險高的時候挺過危機。

最後一段筆者提醒在聊保守或自由主義的時候，政治層面是涉及政治交易問題的，很典型的例子就是法國拿破崙三世的內政外交制定的取捨，又要有作選票的考量。保守的選舉政見大部份而言會安定民心士氣，但是政策的缺乏活力也是一個很大的問題。很多選民也有希望自由主義的盛行，以調節政策如勞工、衛生福利及移民政策，但是選上的政治人物又不一定會很爽快的作所謂社會衡平的問題，歸納世界主要國家例子，一方面固及反對者，另一方面有財閥政治的問題比如日本，因此這兩勢力的消長在二十一世紀不只政治層面及出現在已開發國家，開發中國家的政治、行政和社會系統都要作個思考以增進公共利益。