The Economist explains

What is the Hong Kong National Party?

The government wants to ban it

ALONG with terrorism and extremism, separatism rounds off “the three evil forces” that Xi Jinping, China’s president, frequently invokes in speeches and has vowed to stamp out. Regions with large ethnic-minority populations, such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, have long been regarded as breeding grounds for separatists. In recent years, however, Mr Xi has grown increasingly anxious about pro-independence sentiment in Hong Kong, a special administrative region where hardly any residents were calling for outright separation from China just five years ago.

The Hong Kong National Party (HKNP), founded in 2016, is the territory’s first separatist political party. Its leader Andy Chan, a 28-year-old interior designer, describes himself as a democracy advocate. The failure of the pro-democracy “umbrella movement” of 2014, itself triggered by a Chinese decision that candidates for the post of Hong Kong’s chief executive should be selected by a committee stacked with Communist Party supporters, convinced him that Hong Kongers will not get full democracy so long as their city is part of China. This is all the more galling given that China promised Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy” from 1997 until at least 2047 under the “one country, two systems” arrangement. To achieve real democracy, including direct elections of the chief executive and all members of the Legislative Council, Hong Kong will need first to throw off China’s yoke, says Mr Chan.

HKNP is light on policy specifics. It has not announced a target date for independence, nor suggested a means of achieving it. Its website offers no concrete proposals for what a defence, economic or social policy might look like after independence. Most Hong Kongers reckon the party is advocating a course of action that is unrealistic. The party does not hold a single elected seat at any level. In fact, it is estimated to have just a few hundred members. 

Still, that is enough to worry China’s top brass, who fear that Mr Chan’s party could be the start of a bigger political movement. In July Hong Kong’s Security Bureau, almost certainly under instruction from its masters in Beijing, initiated proceedings to ban the party on grounds of “national security”, among other vague charges. Mr Chan was given until 5pm on September 14th to explain to the bureau why his party should not be banned. Conveniently for the government, Mr Chan filed his supporting documents nearly four hours late owing to a last-minute mix-up (though he had considered the ban to be a foregone conclusion). Hong Kong’s security minister is likely to announce the verdict in the coming days. Mr Xi will not be waiting with bated breath.

筆者是這樣回答的：

Founded in Mar 28, 2016, Hong Kong National Party (HKNP), the first party claiming the “independence” from China (CH), said the deportation of “colonist” CHese is their obligatory of HK sovereignty keeping. The founder Andy Chan Ho-tin, since he studied in PolyU near the duration of umbrella revolution, contrasts his and the supporters’ ideology with that of the extant pro-Beijing (PB) and pro-democratic faction (PD) (including the indigenous grass-root faction, led by Demosisto (DE)). Although Andy Chan began his political career in a bit dilatory way, who remains baffled by the supine disregard of the democratic awareness he thinks of as sloth of responsibility, he and Jason Chow Ho-fai lead the array of HKNP to arrogate the public hearings and resource.

Chan and Chow’s movement is similar to the beforehand PD’s in terms of the opposition to Beijing’s (BE’s) irrational inhumane intervene, but there is still disparity in the why they respectively have discontent of BE authority and what pathway each ensue (or PB thinks of the verb as “extort”) Hong Kong’s “dignity” of development. Chan’s distinct idea, reflected on his claim on the interaction with foreign journalists and the specific professionals, is inclined to vagary. They take advantage of how to flash in the public occupations and produce the commotion, that claim they do anything good for HK, but the means of political practice is licentious chaos. The only any people could know about them is to “donate” to them, which couldn’t be transformed into the public interest and the reward for the HK social progress in the short time.

In general, the traditional PD memberships and supporters rely on the Western rationalism and the multifarious community’s activities with the regular communication. Their presumption of action and ideas are oriented to the autonomous living environment, that take approach of the public appeal and the consolidatory solution to the HK’s eternal development.

It sounds as if PD gets absolute domination in HK common sense. The answer to the ramification drives many foreigners to distraction. PB sounds out the varied business and financial elders’ supporting vote and sponsorship, that promotes the HK’s prosperity and the use of the loyalty to the China Communist Party’s (CCP’s) settings of “One China, Two Systems” (OCTS) by the intense connection to the inland’s officials and entrepreneurs. For the West, PB’s principle of rally isn’t all accord to the universal value but it usually keeps the HK superficially economic advantage of liberal investment helping set up the positive metropolitan image. They own the sense of economic liberalism but less take care of the lower strata’s welfare than PD. PB held the conservatism that meet the local entrepreneurs’ interest; however, with the larger investment CH’s inland’s people are engrossed in, the HK-born proprietors are harder to attract business forced to support PD. Therefore, since 2017 election, the local businesspeople gave PB less support whilst the more HK youth, most of whom have feeble economic ability and intend to develop themselves in CH with carrying an element of risk, gets closer to PB.

When it comes to the association to the neighbor Taiwan, PB few concerns Taiwan’s both major parties, KMT and DPP, that nearly became the attorney of BE’s central government. Yet PB’s relation gets longer distance from the present princeling party, that supported and got accustomed to the Youth League’s higher rung in CCP (CCYL). Since PD is associated to the KMT and DPP while Civic Party’s founder Alan Leong Kit-kat and DE have intensive relation with independence-minded DPP, BE and PB bear a skepticism on PD and the pro-West media in HK.

The fluctuation of both faction’s supportive source infers the HKNP’s hereafter. Most of PD’s claim is pertinent to the practical response to the HK civilians’ demand. Its movement is dynamic-oriented approach of the social and the metropolitan evolvement. What both sides could own sustainable upholders locates on the aspect of policy debating and the fervent sense of public management. The HKNP is maverick in HK politics, that rented a room for the regularity in ordinary time and mustered the rally only for the raid on the HK authority and the PB-inclined community. The appeal involves no HK interior policy’s content except for the separation from BE’s control.

PD for several times during the last year evinces the enormous hostility against BE’s authority concerned of HK affairs. The fundament of PD’s appeal keeps staying at the orientation of the “domestic” spat with BE and PB instead of the overall conflict, which yet or few worsens into the stage of civil war. The HKNP nevertheless launches nuisance, disseminating the separatism and laceration on the extant HK social order and hierarchy. The irrational manner brought about neither self-enraptured result nor HK civilians widespread sense of recognition HKNP had ever had a desire to win. (1 of 2)

Under the present HK SAR’s article or rule of political party’s administer, HKNP couldn’t achieve the certification of legal status, or it disobey the principle of Sino-HK closer tie. By the way, DE’s strand of autonomous mind, also comprised of the own ideas of how to secure their living and work environment through thick and thins, is to put the emphasis on the “self-determination” and the “referendum”, but neither the premise of “self-determination” nor the limitation of “political participation”, or “suffrage” is in HK’s now institution. The rather obvious matter is the BE’s “operative” and “meddlesome” approach of the try that perhaps means BE one-sided demonstrates the newer model of Sino-HK intimate ties. Comparably, Beijing indeed has a certain level of “legitimate right and access” to “demand” the HK SAR or chief executive to meet the creditable association between central BE and HK SAR. These relative arguments constitute an “essential” irritability and the strict rumination for BE’s authority and the both PB and PD with DE and the likes. That is, PD yet pinpoint their position outside the OCTS that mostly speak out in favour of the democratic system’s reservation. However, there is little doubt that HKNP’s idea of fretful attack on the institution incapacitates their qualification of economic and political position.

The big voices of reason to make OCTS divide into larger resolutions’ 2 parts, CH and HK results from the call of slander HK’s PD refers to BE as. In general, since the British colonial era, HK’s indigenous statesmen and celebrities is comparable to show their facet of pugnacious and boldness in confrontation with the West culture and Power; thus, the fantastic Cantonese Pop and impulsive and outgoing political style are in a mix of the rationalism and the practice of customary thoroughness and care. During the last decade of British rule in HK, CHese internationally cultural reputation was hugely reliant on Cantonese form’s output. Owing to the dominant status in CH’s fashion those time, HK felt free of integration with CH, but the recently Chinese large scale of investment on movie-making surpass the HK and the rest of Asia’s counterparts. In the face of inland’s latest cool trend and the financial ingress, the HK’s PD in a reminiscence of the past time sometimes became mistaken as the separatism.

In fact, the so-called “universal value” is not all compatible to the BE’s Communist rule, whilst the legitimate source of OCTS, Sino-British Joint Declaration, was the claim to merely show the ownership with other parts of “murkiness” in the institutional association to central BE. The contention of the matter of BE’s tangible influence is related to the political entity’s definition and to whether HK’s political status is given wrong assessment. If the “2 system” ’s coexisting principle is the prevalence of enculturation rather than assimilation set during half a century since 1997, this March’s CPPCC that crossed out the “OCTS”, “HK civilians’ autonomy” “high degree of autonomy” 3 crucial slogans told the HK and the world how BE got the dominance that inexorably make HK reticent of the minimizing ground. The grumble of the CH-skeptic lingers in HK but the atmosphere of incoherent rally hardly menaces BE until CH President Xi Jin-ping has willingness to hand over to the successor no one could find out the mechanism to figure out. (2 of 2)

「香港民族黨」通說是第一個要求香港絕對脫離母國中國的政治性團體。2016年由香港理工學院畢業的陳浩天成立。據他自己所稱，在2014年雨傘革命的時候還沒有完全形成系統性的政治邏輯思考，他說只是參與者其中一名，但是之後看到公民黨為首的泛民主派及學民思潮起源的本土派政團兩方並沒有直接的訴求香港的自我及自尊獨立地位，所以租了辦公室想搞革命，但非常極右，黨員們沒有常態性活動，只有核心人士說在辦公，但平常該商辦大門口警衛說，還有時深鎖沒有例行辦公時間，大多以快閃方式和街頭巷戰來搞活動。活動和營運以募款方式取得。

這個組織就香港基本法的規範中並不是政黨，但筆者還是勉強當作一個社團來說，美其名於國際有影響力，但充其量來說，就和社會及法律上的互動，陳浩天只是小混混一個，沒有泛民派大老李柱銘、建制派新民黨的葉劉淑儀、現任公民黨的泛民共主梁家傑的學問涵養，或是其同盟長毛梁國雄、羅冠聰與黃之鋒的本土街頭運動的拼勁，也沒有建制派的民建聯或工建聯的曾鈺成、周融和李慧琼的與社會及企業各層面的良好互動，更沒有明顯政策取向、願景和固定票源支持，漫天胡作非為，顧著上鏡頭穿西服兼豪華排場，為一極右陰謀顛覆社會團體。

今年香港舉行了兩次補選，三月和十一月各有一次補選，三月時的2017宣誓風波少掉的立法會四席，建制派和泛民派各拿了兩席，也就是泛民比去年少了兩席，今年十一月在九龍西區要再補選一席，雖然所謂融入西方及國際社會的風氣稍盛，聽起來泛民派佔優勢，但是傾向配合中共對港政策的建制派的支持稍回升，這會使內地和香港的同化速度加快。也許真如泛民派所言，基本的人權民主的價值被稍微沖淡了一些，而反中和親中的情緒衝突又會再一次高漲。若說民眾有獨立自主的決心一定是脫離母國，叫作不能支持建制派，那這種看法也是一種不自由，或是玩掛羊頭賣狗肉的戲法，搞得民眾對公共政策的方向混亂。另一方面，港府的高層官員的效率不彰，於是也有一看法為這偏向在野的泛民派的能力太弱，支持度又少於五成萎縮回來了。但是泛民派大抵上還沒有喊出完全脫離母國的說法，而是說實踐基本法的路線，提出中國和香港的並行想法。溫和一些的泛民派也許在十一月有拿回一席的成功能量。

筆者補充半年前所聽的問題，因為數月後有發生美國駐北京大使館的爆炸案，就是在案子前數月，有所謂陳浩天和「南蒙古共和國」的會盟，被稱為「香港省長」，果然有內蒙古自治區的人，雖說是私人上的事，但是筆者仍然毛毛的，也聽過繪聲繪影的說法。好像陳某還有能耐在內地搞更大的事出來。