《Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev》

Stalin died without naming an heir, and none of his associates had the power to make an immediate claim to supreme leadership. At first the deceased dictator's colleagues tried to rule jointly, with Malenkov holding the top position of prime minister. The first challenge to this arrangement occurred in 1953, when the powerful Beria plotted a coup. However, Beria, who had made many enemies during his bloody term as security chief, was arrested and executed by order of the Presidium. His death reduced the inordinate power of the secret police, although the party's strict control over the state security organs ended only with the demise of the Soviet Union itself (see Internal Security Before 1991, ch. 10).

After the elimination of Beria, the succession struggle became more subtle. Malenkov found a formidable rival in Khrushchev, whom the Presidium elected first secretary (Stalin's title of general secretary was abolished after his death) in September 1953. Of peasant background, Khrushchev had served as head of the Ukrainian party organization during and after World War II, and he was a member of the Soviet political elite during the late Stalin period. The rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev manifested itself publicly in the contrast between Malenkov's support for increased production of consumer goods and Khrushchev's stand-pat backing for continued development of heavy industry. After a poor showing by light industry and agriculture, Malenkov resigned as prime minister in February 1955. Because the new prime minister, Nikolay Bulganin, had little influence or real power, the departure of Malenkov made Khrushchev the most important figure within the collective leadership.

At the Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956, Khrushchev further advanced his position within the party by denouncing Stalin's crimes in a dramatic "secret speech." Khrushchev revealed that Stalin had arbitrarily liquidated thousands of party members and military leaders, thereby contributing to the initial Soviet defeats in World War II, and had established what Khrushchev characterized as a pernicious cult of personality. With this speech, Khrushchev not only distanced himself from Stalin and from Stalin's close associates, Molotov, Malenkov, and Lazar Kaganovich, but he also abjured the dictator's use of terror as an instrument of policy. As a direct result of the "de-Stalinization" campaign launched by Khrushchev's speech, the release of political prisoners, which had begun in 1953, was stepped up, and some of Stalin's victims were posthumously rehabilitated. Khrushchev intensified his campaign against Stalin at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, winning approval to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum, where it had originally been interred. De-Stalinization encouraged many in artistic and intellectual circles to speak out against the abuses of the former regime. Although Khrushchev's tolerance for critical creative works varied during his tenure, the new cultural period--known as the "thaw"--represented a clear break with the repression of the arts under Stalin.

After the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev continued to expand his influence, although he still faced opposition. His rivals in the Presidium, spurred by reversals in Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe in 1956, potentially threatening economic reforms, and the de-Stalinization campaign, united to vote him out of office in June 1957. Khrushchev, however, demanded that the matter be put to the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he enjoyed strong support. The Central Committee overturned the Presidium's decision and expelled Khrushchev's opponents (Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich), whom Khrushchev labeled the "antiparty group." In a departure from Stalinist procedure, Khrushchev did not order the imprisonment or execution of his defeated rivals but instead placed them in relatively minor offices.

Khrushchev moved to consolidate his power further in the ensuing months. In October he removed Marshal Zhukov (who had helped Khrushchev squelch the "antiparty group") from the office of defense minister, presumably because he feared Zhukov's influence in the armed forces. Khrushchev became prime minister in March 1958 when Bulganin resigned, thus formally confirming his predominant position in the state as well as in the party.

Despite his rank, Khrushchev never exercised the dictatorial authority of Stalin, nor did he ever completely control the party, even at the peak of his power. His attacks on members of the "antiparty group" at the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 and the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 suggest that his opponents retained support within the party. Khrushchev's relative political insecurity probably accounted for some of his grandiose pronouncements, for example his 1961 promise that the Soviet Union would attain communism by 1980. His desire to undermine opposition and mollify critics explained the nature of many of his domestic reforms and the vacillations in his foreign policy toward the West.   Data as of July 1996

NOTE: The information regarding Russia on this page is re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Russia Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Russia Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev should be addressed to the Library of Congress.

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中華人民共和國是『中國共產黨黨內集體領導、由共產黨一黨專政』的國家；

中華民國則是『非集體領導、非一黨專政、目前由中國國民黨執政』的國家………

★(3). China's Leadership, Fifth Generation

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/12_china_li.aspx

《China's 17th Party Congress, China, Politics》

Cheng Li, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center

Caijing Magazine   December 2007 

In the often-contradictory foreign analyses of China’s 17th Party Congress, there was a surprising level of consensus that the composition of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC), especially its Standing Committee, is a crucial factor in determining the political trajectory of the country. This explains why considerable media attention has been given to personnel changes in these leadership institutions. In fact, one notable phenomenon at the Congress is Chinese authorities’ growing emphasis on “collective leadership.” As General-Secretary Hu Jintao stated in his report to the Party Congress, the CPC should improve the system of “collective leadership with division of responsibilities among individuals” in an effort to “prevent arbitrary decision-making by an individual or a minority of people in the Party.”

The most important development coming out of the 17th Party Congress is the new succession model with two candidates rather than one designated “heir apparent.” Two front-runners in the so-called fifth generation of leaders, 54-year-old Xi Jinping and 52-year-old Li Keqiang, were elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee. Meanwhile, another six members in their 50s obtained seats on the Politburo and/or the Secretariat. These eight rising stars collectively have formed a “succession team” set to take over from the fourth generation of leaders in 2012-2013. All of these developments seem to indicate that the country has entered a new era of collective leadership. Consequently, the rules and norms of Chinese elite politics are likely to change profoundly. What does collective leadership mean for China’s future? Is it a cause for celebration or anxiety?

The transition in China from an all-powerful single leader to collective leadership has been a gradual process. Mao Zedong wielded enormous power as a god-like figure, especially during the Cultural Revolution, treating succession as if it was his private matter. During the Deng Era, political succession and generational change in the Chinese leadership became a matter of public concern. Yet, because of his legendary political career and his formidable patron-client ties, Deng Xiaoping maintained his role as China’s paramount leader even when he did not hold any important leadership position following the Tiananmen incident. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are technocrats who lack the charisma and revolutionary credentials of Deng, but both have had broad administrative experiences and are good at coalition-building and political compromise. Nevertheless, both Jiang and Hu had the endorsement of Deng. The evolution of the four generations of Chinese leaders illustrates a consistent trend towards a more collective leadership, and away from “strong-man” politics.

The profound shift in the source and legitimacy of leadership becomes even more salient for the emerging fifth generation of leaders. Many of the rising stars of the new generation share similarities in terms of leadership credentials, but differ significantly with respect to socio-political backgrounds and career paths. For instance, frontrunners Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang both joined the CPC in the mid-1970s, hold Ph.D. degrees, have been on the Central Committee of the CPC for ten years, and have served as Party secretaries for two provincial level administrations. Yet, Xi was born into the family of a prominent Communist veteran leader whereas Li comes from a humble family background. Xi made giant strides in his career through urban economic administration while Li advanced his political career largely through the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL). While Xi ran some of the most advanced economic regions in the country such as Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, Li’s provincial experiences were spent first in poor and agricultural Henan and then in rustbelt industrial-base Liaoning.

The characteristics – and the contrasts – ­of Xi and Li are quite representative of their age cohorts in the new leadership. A majority of the first-timers in the Politburo have substantial leadership experience in provincial administration. The number of the Politburo members with experience as provincial chiefs increased from 10 (50%) in the 14th Politburo to 13 (59%) in the 15th Politburo, 16 (67%) in the 16th Politburo and 19 (76%) in the 17th Politburo. These statistics reflect dynamic changes in the relationship between the central and local governments in present-day China and the growing importance of provincial leadership in Chinese politics.

Among the eight rising stars in the Politburo and the Secretariat, four advanced their careers through the ranks of the CCYL and four – referred to as “princelings” – come from high-ranking family backgrounds. On the 371-member Central Committee, a total of 86 leaders previously served in the provincial or national leadership of the CCYL. Most of them began their careers through grassroots CPC branches and climbed step-by-step through rural administration, Party organization, or propaganda work in inland provinces. Meanwhile, 32 leaders are princelings, and they usually have substantial experience in urban economic development, finance, foreign trade, diplomacy, science and technology, and/or military affairs.

With respect to their educational backgrounds, leaders from the fifth generation are much more diverse than those from the third and fourth generations, who were predominantly technocrats. The eight rising stars have very diverse academic training: Xi Jinping and Li Yuanchao in law, Li Keqiang in economics, Wang Qishan in history, Wang Yang in management, Bo Xilai in journalism, Ling Jihua in business administration, and Wang Huning in political science. This is in sharp contrast to the previous Politburo Standing Committee, where all nine members were engineers by training. In addition, the number of foreign-educated returnees increased from 20 on the 16th Central Committee to 36 on the 17th Central Committee. For example, Minister of Education Zhou Ji received his Ph.D. in engineering at the State University of New York at Albany in 1984. Two leaders currently in charge of the CPC organization and propaganda affairs, Li Yuanchao and Wang Huning, both studied in the United States as visiting scholars.

Entrepreneurs, another emerging elite group, have also increased from nine on the 16th Central Committee to eighteen on the 17th Central Committee. Most of these entrepreneurs currently hold positions as CEOs of China’s flagship state firms, but a few actually head joint ventures and private companies. Most of these entrepreneurs are quite young, including Su Shulin (45-year-old CEO of SINOPEC), Zhu Yanfeng (46-year-old CEO of China First Auto Works), and Wang Xiaochu (49-year-old CEO of China Telecom). The rapid increase of relatively young entrepreneurs on the Central Committee suggests that these leaders will likely play an increasingly prominent role in Chinese elite politics in the years to come.

Paralleling the diverse political career paths and the growing diversity of educational and professional backgrounds of the fifth generation of leaders is the broad transformation in Chinese society after three decades of market reform. On one hand, China has a fast-growing entrepreneurial class and a very dynamic private sector. According to one official Chinese source, there are around 50 million entrepreneurs in China who control a total of 10 trillion yuan in assets and contribute one-third of the country's revenue. China’s major state-owned enterprises also have a huge stake in the country’s economic development, foreign trade, and global expansion. On the other hand, many socio-economic groups such as farmers, migrant laborers, the urban poor, and retired workers, who have lagged behind or been marginalized as a result of rapid market transition, are becoming increasingly active in their demands for socio-economic justice. The rising frustrations of these groups are evident in the growing number of mass protests in the country in recent years.

Arguably, more today than during any previous period in PRC history, both elite interest groups such as entrepreneurs and vulnerable social groups are cognizant of how to advance and protect their individual economic interests and constitutional rights. These divergent socio-economic groups are increasingly seeking representative political elites in the national leadership who will voice their concerns and protect their interests. The competing agendas of these groups at both ends of the socio-economic spectrum, coupled with the divergent interests of the coastal and inland provinces, drive the emergence of a more collective Chinese leadership that implements policies to meet new socio-economic environments. For instance, the recent amendment to establish property rights in the PRC Constitution and the economic goal of the 17th Party Congress to quadruple the GDP per capita by 2020 primarily serve the interests of urban entrepreneurs. In contrast, the populist policy to waive various taxes for farmers and the platform of building a harmonious society reflects the concerns of rural groups.

Collective leadership, therefore, is not only a mechanism of power-sharing through checks and balances among competing political camps, but also entails a more dynamic and pluralistic decision-making process through which political leaders can represent various social and geographic contingencies. The rise of collective leadership may result in fewer policies aimed to maximize GDP growth rates at all costs, such as the huge costs in terms of environment degradation that have been seen in the Reform Era. Instead, it may give way to policies that provide due consideration to both economic efficiency and social justice.

Despite its potential, collective leadership presents a major challenge for the CPC in two important respects. On the policy front, conflicting interests and competing policy initiatives may make the decision-making process lengthier and more complicated, and perhaps even lead to deadlock. At a time when China confronts many tough choices over issues such as the regional redistribution of resources, the construction of a public health care system, environmental protection, financial reforms, and disputes over foreign trade, the Chinese leadership may find it increasingly difficult to reach consensus. On the political front, although the diverse demographic, educational, and administrative backgrounds of China’s top leaders are positive developments that may contribute to political pluralism, the history of contemporary China has shown that differences in the career experiences of political leaders are often the source of tension and conflict. Furthermore, the dual successor model encourages competition and outstanding performance rather than low-profile leadership styles.

Yet one can argue that because of new leaders’ differences in expertise, credentials, and experiences, contending elite groups will realize that they need to find ways to coexist in order to govern effectively. The common interest in domestic social stability and the shared aspiration to further China’s rise on the world stage may make collective leadership both feasible and sustainable. Nevertheless, Chinese elite politics is no longer a zero-sum game. China’s collective leadership is crucial not only because it prompts concrete direction about the so-called intra-Party democracy, but also because it reveals how the governance of the most populous country in the world is changing and evolving. Given China’s long history of arbitrary decision-making by one individual leader, collective leadership represents a big step forward.

[RELATED CONTENT]：

* A Pivotal Stepping-Stone: Local Leaders’ Representation on the 17th Central Committee，Cheng Li，China Leadership Monitor, No. 23，January 28, 2008

* China: Riding Two Horses at Once，Cheng Li，Foreign Policy Web，October 23, 2007

* China’s Most Powerful “Princelings”: How Many Will Enter the New Politburo?，Cheng Li，Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 19，October 17, 2007

* More Related Content »

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現在介紹LNE的網站………

★(4). Leadership Learning Community、 Leadership for a New Era：

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License.
Please credit the author(s) and link back to this website.
***

Home：What is LNE；Why Join LNE；How to Participate；A New Leadership Mindset；

Leadership and Race：Leadership and Networks (Overview and Resources)；

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Support LNE；FAQs；About the Leadership Learning Community

Support LNE；Apply to be a Writer

For new users - please visit FAQ's section to find out how you can edit the page.

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Transforming Leadership ：Leadership for a New Era, or LNE, is a collaborative research initiative launched by the Leadership Learning Community that focuses on understanding how leadership can become more inclusive, networked and collective. We believe the dominant model that places a strong emphasis on the individual is limiting our ability to positively impact change in our society, so we have joined forces with a diverse group of funders, researchers, practitioners and consultants in the leadership development field to make sense of what it would take to start shifting the current thinking. While we have limited the focus of our exploration to four main areas: Leadership and Race, Leadership and Networks, Collective Leadership and Leadership Across Difference, we anticipate many other areas will emerge and welcome our contributors to take the lead in exploring them.

Framing Piece for Leadership for a New Era: A New Leadership Mindset for Scaling Social Change

Over the past 50 years our thinking about leadership, whether in communities or board rooms, has been heavily influenced by heroic models of leadership. We traditionally think of leadership as the skills, qualities and behavior of an individual who exerts influence over others to take action or achieves a goal using their position and authority. At the Leadership Learning Community we believe this way of thinking about leadership is only one part of the leadership story -- one that does not fully recognize leadership as a process grounded in relationships that are fluid, dynamic, non-directive and non-unilateral. In 2009 we launched Leadership for a New Era (LNE), a collaborative research initiative, to understand leadership more fully. Understanding leadership as a process requires us to think very differently about how change occurs and how we work with others. We will never mobilize leadership at the scale needed for significant progress on social change or any other complex issue without expanding our thinking about what leadership is, how it works and how we can support it.

Latest Updates:

* The final Leadership and Race publication will be launched by late August or early September 2010

* Latest draft of the Leadership and Networks publication synthesis

* New section on evidence-based practice research

* New article on young people leading the way towards collective leadership(見下附)

* New article on the future of leadership development

* Check out "Early Lessons on Collaboration Experiment: Partner Engagement, Value Proposition, Self-organizing, Use of Technology and Content Strategy"

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

☆(4-1). Collect ive Leadership

Overview - Strengthen Collective Leadership Capacity: James MacGregor Burns, often considered the father of the leadership development field and author of the seminal leadership book Leadership , was asked in a recent interview about the next frontier for the field of leadership. Without hesitation he answered, “We need to better understand leadership as a collective process.” There is a growing recognition that individual leaders need to be trained to work more effectively to unleash the collective leadership capacity of a group; and to better understand how diverse groups, especially those representing multiple organizations and stakeholders, identify shared purpose and vision and create capacity for coordinated action. Some programs have expressed concern that the selection and recognition of individuals may actually undermine the collective process and diminish the work of teams who share responsibility for achievements.

Latest Update:

Check out the notes from our Collective Leadership session at GEO 2010 featuring Dale Nienow, Center for Ethical Leadership; Barbara Squires, Annie E. Casey Foundation; Miho Kim, DataCenter and Deborah Meehan, Leadership Learning Community.

LLC's Executive Director, Deborah Meehan, participated as a guest on the radio show CLEonair on Tuesday, June 1. She talked about examples of collective leadership - check out the recording here!

Resources - Books and Articles；Initiatives；Research Projects；Tools (請閱原文以利用其超連結)

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這是2005年成立的集體領導協會………

★(5). The Collective Leadership Institute is an independent non-profit organization based in Berlin, Germany, and Cape Town, South Africa. Its mission is to build dialogic process competence for cross-sector sustainability engagement.
The Collective Leadership Institute was founded 2005 to support stakeholders from private sector, public sector and civil society in creating successful partnerships and result-oriented multi-stakeholder-dialogues for innovative solutions to global, societal and local challenges. It offers educational programs, project management, process-oriented research and networking.

[MISSION]：Our globalized world needs innovation for sustainability based on people’s ability to think together, to cooperate across sectors, nations, cultures and to mutually respect difference. As the world is interdependent, sustainability engagement is always a contribution to the service for a greater global good.
Through our work we contribute to

Sustainability developing into a principle for business processes and public service orientation

the awareness that a sustainable future is co-created by different actors from business, civil society and the public sector

leaders integrating their deeper human values more consciously into their day to day business

leaders in private companies and public institutions fostering a climate for people to take on responsibility for a sustainable future

collective intelligence developing in societal and international change endeavours through dialogue and trust-building consultations

a culture of respect for diversity and differences

Sustainability

The challenge of sustainability lies in bringing together differing world views and balancing conflicts of interests: for responsible business and people-oriented civil service. This requires a new competence for global leaders. It is not enough to apply partial solutions, ignore difficulties and press complex reality into fixed plans. What we need is to generate change initiatives towards sustainability that can be supported collectively by all parties involved.

[COMPETENCE]：Creating a climate for collective leadership

Our team is committed to competence building for cross-sector sustainability engagement.
We combine extensive working experience in the public and the private sector as well as in the field of cooperation between the two, with in-depth knowledge of the conceptual and practical aspects of Cross-Sector-Partnerships, Collaborative Change Management, Multi-Stakeholder-Dialogues and Public-Private Dialogue.

Examples from our work
Educational program
Testimonials (videos)

 Find out more about our qualification program:

Young Leaders for Sustainability

download fact sheet: YLS english

We are experienced in project management in multi-national corporations and in international development cooperation.

 Our process-oriented research combines scientific accuracy with people-oriented results. We have an extensive international network into private sector, public sector and development cooperation.

 Our seminar faculty is known for their innovative capacity building in training and leadership development.

 We are passionate about initiating innovative projects that build competence in sustainability engagement.

[HOW WE WORK]：Inspired by what works for sustainability

Since our main purpose is enabling people to implement sustainable action, our work is built around the change in thinking towards sustainability and people’s capacity to act accordingly. We see the ability to partner for sustainable development as an individual, societal and global learning process.
Based on key conceptual content our educational programs incorporate the actual work reality of participants. We strive to deliver knowledge that can be implemented in day to day business. Participant’s feedback helps us to continuously improve.
Our process support for cross-sector collaboration projects combines advisory and capacity building: this way we enable people to develop their own competence according to their specific challenges.
Our leadership development for sustainability fosters change in thinking and practical implementation through knowledge building, reflection and exposure.

Our research is designed as a learning process for sustainability helping people move quicker towards new action.
Our networking connects people from different sectors in order to help bridge gaps and create new opportunities for sustainability engagement.
Our collaboration projects are piloting new approaches to cross-sector learning and engagement for sustainability.

 Collective leadership
is the aware and flexible taking up of leadership responsibility according to what is required for sustainability. It is held in an inner space of service and contribution to the common good with no need to excel or impose. It encompasses the capacity to see future possibilities and facilitate the emergence of novelty and innovation. The inner space and consciousness required for collective leadership has accessed the whole of humanity in one’s own humanity. It is therefore always caring, compassionate and enacted in favour of the collective good.

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中華人民共和國是『中國共產黨黨內集體領導、由共產黨一黨專政』的國家；

中華民國則是『非集體領導、非一黨專政、目前由中國國民黨執政』的國家………

中國共產黨說中華人民共和國由中國共產黨一黨專政就是由中國共產黨集體領導治理中華人民共和國。

共產黨內部實行集體領導是可能的；一黨專政是否就可以因為黨內實行集體領導而就算是集體領導治國呢？待考。

集體領導是新近正在迅速發展的課題；它似乎尚待切實定義。

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