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BanyanOn a Bali high Reasons to cheer, even if ASEAN is selling the same horses againJul 30th 2011 | from the print edition
THE ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations, ASEAN, does not do breakthroughs. The “ASEAN way” involves consensus, bonhomie and progress that is at best incremental and often imperceptible. Yet as this year’s meeting of the club’s foreign ministers and “dialogue partners” in Bali wound up on July 23rd with the ASEAN Regional Forum, a security talking-shop, ASEAN could at least point to noticeable movement on two of East Asia’s perennial sources of tension. At its meeting with China, ASEAN agreed on “guidelines” for implementing a 2002 declaration on a “code of conduct” to minimise the risk of conflict in the contested waters of the South China Sea. And in the margins of the ASEAN meetings North and South Korea held their first public talks for two-and-a-half years. Prospects of a resumption of talks on getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal rose further when Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, used her time in Bali to invite a North Korean negotiator for talks in New York this week. In this section Meanwhile, Thailand and Cambodia, two ASEAN neighbours whose soldiers this year have been shooting at each other around the disputed border temple of Preah Vihear, kept their differences from souring the mood. All in all the organisation and the host, Indonesia, which holds the rotating chairmanship, could congratulate themselves on a useful set of meetings. After fraught months even modest progress comes as a relief. In the South China Sea, China, whose maps include dotted lines showing virtually all the sea as Chinese, has been alarming other claimants by throwing its weight around. Vietnam, which claims both the Chinese-controlled Paracel islands in the north and the Spratly chain in the south, has been especially incensed. But just ahead of the ASEAN meeting it moved to end anti-Chinese street protests in Hanoi. In the Philippines activists are less malleable. On July 20th, as the foreign ministers met in Bali, five congressmen landed on a Philippine-occupied island in the Spratlys, Pagasa, to plant the national flag. China argued, plausibly enough, that this broke the 2002 declaration, which enjoins signatories to avoid provocations. Even so it did sign up to short—and vague—guidelines on turning the declaration into the formal code of conduct promised for nearly a decade now. Even Mrs Clinton, who at last year’s ASEAN meetings in Hanoi angered China by declaring an American “national interest” in the sea and offering to act as a mediator, commended China and ASEAN for the agreement, as a “first step”. She also welcomed the breaking of the ice between the Koreas, as Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s delegate to nuclear talks, met his new North Korean counterpart, Ri Yung Ho. The South’s demand that the North formally apologise for last year’s sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and shelling of civilians was quietly shelved, presumably at least partly at America’s urging. Mrs Clinton’s invitation to another North Korean official, Kim Kye Gwan, to come to New York for talks was freighted with the usual stern riders about not rewarding North Korea simply for returning to the table. In fact, for North Korea, which values bilateral contacts with the United States above all other diplomatic prizes, the invitation itself is the reward. America, keen to avoid another Korean crisis, needs to find some way of engaging the North. When the North is being ignored, it tends to resort to crude attention-seeking behaviour—military provocations, missile and nuclear-bomb tests, and the like. It is not certain that the smiles in Bali will lead to the resumption of six-party talks involving the two Koreas, America, China, Japan and Russia on denuclearisation. Since North Korea does not look like giving up its bombs anyway, not everyone agrees they should resume. In a warning against undue optimism, some observers recalled the equivalent ASEAN meeting in 2002, in Brunei, which North Korea also used to break out of isolation, establishing its first contacts with the administration of George Bush. Nine years, two nuclear tests and countless acts of bellicose aggression later, it is clear that was not a turning-point for the better. Similarly, the guidelines on implementing the 2002 declaration on the South China Sea are hardly evidence of rapid progress. The promised code of conduct itself has still not materialised—let alone agreement even on a mechanism for tackling the complex mesh of overlapping territorial claims. China still insists it wants to negotiate bilaterally with the ASEAN countries with partial claims, which also include Brunei and Malaysia. ASEAN, China points out, has no role in disputes over sovereignty. But its members fear being bullied if picked off one by one. That ASEAN enables them to try to negotiate from a less weak position is an achievement for the organisation. So is its provision of a forum where regional-security concerns can at least be raised, and where, in the margins, useful bilateral talks can be held. This year has been a relative success, with Indonesia, its biggest and most influential member, in the chair. But there is always the danger in ASEAN that the process of consensus is confused with the substance of actually resolving conflicts. Concerns about the future, moreover, only grow. The next chairman is Cambodia. Since it seems unlikely that the Preah Vihear dispute will be settled by the end of the year, this could prove debilitating. Potentially even more damaging is Myanmar’s demand to take the chair in 2014. To grant its wish would be to suggest that last year’s rigged elections under an army-drafted constitution merited international acceptance. It might provoke Western boycotts of some ASEAN meetings, undermining ASEAN’s central role in regional security. But to refuse would antagonise the mufti junta in Myanmar and other ASEAN members, such as Laos and Cambodia, and suggest a willingness to follow Western norms. And that would not be the ASEAN way. from the print edition | Asia ===== On a Bali high Aug 2nd 2011, 17:36
South China Sea is mainly controlled by People’s Liberation Army and has been one of China’s territory. The dispute is emerging clearly when U.S navy wants to amenably cruise through China’s sea of garden. Looking back to this year’s event concerned of this sea, China gains the degree of sovereignty by contracting some agreement with U.S, such as U.S. Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qi-Shan at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington on May 10.
It has been a long time since 1950-1953’s Korean War. Basically after this war, geopolitical research contains the three issues about Eastern-north, -south and East Asia, also known as six-party nuclear crisis, the dispute of South China Sea and Taiwan issue. Accompanying the peaceful rise of People’s Republic of China, these three are getting hotter and hotter. Beijing is discretly dealing with these and trying to unlock some U.S.’s line such as Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan, Taiwan-Philippines-Indonesia-Singapore and newly-established U.S.- Vietnam. For ASEAN, although there are worries more than friendship, they still arrange meetings between ASEAN and China. Meanwhile, the crisis of korean peninsula is soothing. I hold the positive and optimistic attitude toward this Bali interesting meetings. Thanks to the patience of both Korea’s leader inclusive of Lee Myung-Bak and Kim Jeon-Il, today we can see the peace with a smile between both Korea and North Korea- U.S. I’ve heard of some good news from Beijing and Tokyo, knowing the friction between China and U.S is fewer. With China’s carrier “Shi Lang” exercising from the last April, China and U.S. reached the new balance. And remember that China has been owning the sovereignty of this Sea from the Great Ching Empire to today’s P.R.C.
Recommended 8 Report Permalink 正文是指最近ASEAN東南亞國協的外長會議,在峇里島召開,會中提到了南海主權問題。另一方面,當時的美國國務卿希拉蕊‧克林頓邀請北朝鮮官員至紐約會談的和好氣氛,儘量以外交手段減少北朝鮮武力擴張的野心。經濟學人這篇作者甚至擔心若柬埔寨和緬甸當起主席國,反美的情緒會被激起。
回答時,筆者的一種寫法這樣得到的是被西方國家的網友貶重於褒啦,筆者還記得不少人回這篇文和筆者的文會哄哄叫的。筆者偏向支持中國共產黨來台執政,貫徹一個中國政策毫無疑問,看阿扁被法院玩完後被關就一直這麼覺得。包括對中國在南海的主權伸張。順便一提筆者和解放軍內提議的"施琅"號,可謂展示海疆防衛決心及歷史正統性,雖然最後是習近平提示以各臨海省地名來題字,較為柔性訴求。這篇報導對王岐山先生5月10日後赴美談判的迴響而寫也算是。這裡筆者希望能提醒美國民主黨當局也要注意當年有歷史繼承文件因此中國會一直主張對南海的主權。筆者在過幾年後有再提過更進一步證據或相關事蹟。 |
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