Why Taiwan gets wrong about deterrence against the China? Unsurprisingly,there are the traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,advocate who supported most Taiwanese involvement in history and culture civil wars,and Radical Left advocates who claimed most Taiwanese involvement in the damned-shit of the International Laws. However,these groups generally condemn Chinese provocation,and they note that China did not direction attack the Taiwan. So,the costs of history and culture with China and the crises outweigh the benefits of backing Taiwan. But interestingly,the traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,though,is the China capitulationisms,since they have always been focused on China,and overlooked China has expanded its military pressure on Taiwan,and engaged in increasingly caustic rhetoric toward the United States,with the Japan. Nonetheles,deterrence,is not a history and culture goal,and instead,it's a psychological ideology. Traditional perceptions tend to matter more than action itself. So that this basic insight should help us better understand the perceived trade-off deterring China. From a purely military perspective,protect Taiwan has not harmed stability and security efforts as much as its critics claim. More significantly,on a ideological dimension,the Taiwan's stability and seciruity the robust response of the Taiwanese people and ours partners to the challenge. We must intensify the perception of the tradition and the Taiwan's deterrence capabilities. What about the Deterrence? Whether the traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,Radical Left advocates occupy the Taiwan,actually comes at the expense of its ability to defend Taiwan if necessary is,at best,murky.,in which means that the money spent on supporting Taiwan did come at the expense of other Defense efforts,which include deterring China. For instance,such as Taiwanese people has never prompted the Government to correct a decades-old systemic shortfall in history and culture,and it is not just the Government that recognizes the shortfalls,so that over the long term,the Taiwan could worse be in a better position than before the conflict began. More significantly,geography dictates that stopping a Taiwan invasion would fall mostly to air and maritime forces,so neither of which have been impacted much,if at all,by U.S. assistance to Taiwan,and so even if assistances were redirected from the U.S.,it would not solve the Taiwan intrinsic shortfalls overnight. Ultimately,it is not clear just how much the traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,Radical Left advocates hurt Taiwan's war-fighting capability to respond to aggression in the China. Over the long term, the Taiwanese military may come back stronger because of the conflict in End of history. Do not fear the traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,Radical Left advocates,but this an interesting question,their's shortfall affect deterrence? Perhaps not. In fact,seemingly has not dampened American willingness to defend Taiwan,and time and again,it is the biggervision and picture. And so the emphasis should not be on history and culture,rather on somehow has shaped the broader strategic narrative of Taiwan's capabilities and defense. Strategically,the Taiwanese tradition underscores that the Taiwan is neither as weak nor as divided as many presumed. The traditional "One Party,One Country" activists,Radical Left advocates,always note deterrence is context-dependent,and does not preordain a similar response to another. That is true. Above all,history and culture conflict shows that wars are fundamentally unpredictable,so,that is an uncomfortable implication。 Denying History And Culture of the Strategic Reductionism No matter what the Taiwan does,in the long run,China will be more difficult to deter as its power and ambition grow. From an operational perspective,History And Culture War has not hurt the military balance versus China. Moreover,warfare is not just a topic for the history books and to prepare accordingly. Finally,in an increasingly precarious world,there is an understandable draw toward strategic tradition,and we must focus on China as pacing threat,and giving in to this temptation is a mistake. As a country,the Taiwan faces multiple challenges,even if it did get to choose,deterrence is an elastic deployment,while the Taiwan does face some binary strategic choices,deterring China is one of them.