無論如何，讓我們從我們剛脫離的論點來繼續討論….評定最多數人以及最通俗的生活，其善和幸福，似乎可以用是否滿足愉快來做最起碼的鑑定；這是他們享受生活的動機。因為，我們也許可以說，人有三種顯明的生活樣態…一種就是我們前面談過的享樂生活，第二種是政治性的，以及第三種是慎思熟慮的。既然大眾顯然是徹底被他們的興趣驅使，寧願一種適合動物的生活，而且他們以很多高社會地位人都有的那種只顧吃喝玩樂的生活情趣作為參考依據。若以較高教養和具有積極進取性格者，他們的卓越生活來考慮，他們是否幸福是用有無榮耀的名聲來驗證；大抵來說，因為這是政治性生活的目標。但是，對於我們的探究而言，這似乎是太膚淺，因為這看起來是取決於榮譽的施予者而不是他們這樣的受施者，而且，我們推測的關於一個人徹底完整的善，是不會被輕易減少或剝奪的。更加貼切的說，人追求榮耀，似乎是因為它可能用以確認自己的善；至少那是他們追求的，具有德性的人(有些人還是他們認識的)以實際智慧給予他的榮耀。所以，以追求政治性生活的人來看，明白的說，至少，德性是更好的，甚至於必須認為德性甚於榮耀，是政治性生活的目標。但是，即使這樣看似乎也有點不完整，因為擁有德性似乎確實也會死氣沉沉，或終生沉悶，而且，更進一步說，似乎會伴隨最大的苦惱和災難；沒有任何這樣生活的人會被認為是快樂幸福的，除非他不惜代價堅持自己的想法。這樣的生活，經過充分且流暢的討論，我想已經夠了。第三種深思熟慮的生活，我們以後會談。 

求財的生活者，承受難以抵抗的衝動和強制，因此，財富顯然不是我們追求的善；它只是有用的，以及具有其他利益。因為這樣，一個人可能寧願把前述的這些對象當作終極目的，因為它們是本身被喜愛的；可是，明顯的，它們也不是終極目的。而且許多支撐這些的論點，都已被拋棄了；既然如此，我們離開這個話題吧。 

(待續)

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political  life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later. 

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.