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維基解密:胡錦濤強硬的西藏政策
2011/09/07 20:30:12瀏覽150|回應0|推薦0

美國駐中國大使Clark T. Randt簽署發出

標題:胡錦濤強硬的西藏政策;領導層意見一致,但受民族主義情緒的鼓舞和限制

-摘要

¶1. 胡錦濤主席依然牢牢地主控中國的西藏政策,領導班子受到日漸洶湧的民族主義情緒影響,一致擁護北京目前的強硬立場。
據知情人士透露,由於到胡在西藏的背景和經歷,以及西藏問題的“極端敏感性”,領導班子沒人膽敢跟他和黨的方針有不同意見。儘管不同的領導人對中國的西藏
政策有過不同的陳述,但高級領導人之間並無實質性分歧。類似地,大使館的知情人士也認為,南方某黨營報紙儘管近期接連刊登兩篇文章,但並不意味著會引發領
導權之爭或是對政策的重新審視。他認為,這些文章見報其實是反映了黨對媒體策略的調整。由於西方媒體“偏袒性”地報導與西藏和奧運有關的抗議活動,激憤的
民族主義情緒開始抬頭,共產黨也大受鼓舞。不過,這種民族主義熱潮也會限制未來的政策選擇。知情人士說,不管怎麼樣,西藏政策在短期內應該不會發生改變,
起碼到 奧運會結束後是如此。(摘要完)

-胡錦濤大權在握,領導層團結一心






¶2.
(機密)數名大使館內部的知情人士在上周告訴美方官員,胡錦濤主席牢牢掌握著中華人民共和國的西藏政策,而領導層也一致擁護北京方面目前的強硬立場。消息

人士表示,考慮到胡錦濤在西藏方面的突出能力和豐富經驗(胡在八十年代末任西藏自治區黨委書記),以及西藏問題的“極端”重要性和敏感性,幾乎沒有哪位領
導人敢跟他在這一問題上有不同意見。長期為大使館透露消息的無名氏說,西藏政策這一敏感級別的問題往往由少數幾個高層領導人控制,而他們主要來自九人組成
的中央政治局常委會,因此很難精確瞭解到領導層關於西藏問題的討論意見。

不過無名氏認為,“很明顯”胡錦濤“完全”掌握了西藏問題的主導地位,沒有哪位領導“膽敢”頂撞他和共產黨的有關方針。無名氏斷言,這樣做無異於“自毀前程”,極易被扣上“軟弱”甚至是“叛徒”的帽子,最終可能會遭到罷免,比如,前總書記胡耀邦就曾在1987年被趕下臺。

¶3.
(機密)無名氏說,在西藏問題上,領導層“絕對沒有分歧”。對中國領導層而言,西藏的敏感程度甚至要勝過臺灣。在操控著西藏政策的常委會九人中,沒有
一個人擁有跟胡錦濤叫板的聲望或經驗。無名氏說,九人中有四人是常委會的新成員,而親身擁有西藏工作經歷的更是只有胡一人。1987年和1989年的抗議
活動正是在時任西藏黨委書記胡錦濤的監督下被“快速有效地平息”,胡也因此得到了當時最高領導人鄧小平的“高度讚賞”。無名氏回憶道,胡錦濤1992
年被提拔進中央政治局常委會也與此事有關。於是,胡錦濤對西藏問題“擁有高度自信”,他的地位不可動搖。無名氏斷言,領導層可在臺灣問題、經濟發展或政治
改革等方面提出與胡錦濤不同的意見,但在西藏問題上則是胡一人說了算。

-黨內有異議,高層無分歧




¶4.
(機密)多名知情人承認,黨內和精英人士在西藏問題上有不同的看法,不過這並不能反映最高領導層也存在分歧。比如,無名氏承認黨內曾出現過“溫和手段”處
理西藏問題的聲音,但他強調,胡錦濤才是西藏政策的完全控制者。此外,胡等人推崇的“強硬方針”明顯佔據著主導地位。(注:無名氏認為,對中國領導層而
言,西藏的敏感程度甚至要超過臺灣。他說,儘管嘴上說的是另一套,但北京方面已在事實上接受了美國對臺灣的介入。然而,中國不能接受外國力量對西
藏的“干涉”。)無名氏承認他“個人”傾向於“更加慎重”的西藏政策,比如,考慮到“只有達賴喇嘛一人”能團結中國國內國外的西藏人,因此中國政府應
與達賴開展對話。

¶5.
(機密)無名氏在另一場合表示,“很多精英”建議重新審視針對達賴喇嘛的政策,質疑妖魔化達賴喇嘛和拒絕與其談判是否屬於明智之舉。不過,無名氏說,除了
“小部分精英和知識份子”,大部分黨員和“98%”的群眾都支持目前的政策。無名氏稱,就西藏問題而言,任何黨內高層的嚴重分歧都是“不可思議的。”無名
氏也在不同場合表示了同樣看法。

-公開言論:分歧在小不在大




¶6.
(機密)知情人士斷言,多名領導曾公開談論過中國的西藏政策,儘管可能有不同意見,但最高領導層之間並無實質性的分歧。比如,溫家寶據說曾在與英國首相布
朗談話時表達過“溫和”的看法,並於3月30日在緬甸對媒體發表過關于達賴喇嘛的言論,有報導據此推測胡溫兩人之間在西藏問題上意見不合,但在無名氏
看來,分歧並不存在。無名氏稱,在西藏問題上,胡溫一個唱紅臉一個唱白臉,但本質相同。換句話說,二人只是強調同一個政策的不同方面而已。無名氏說他“感
覺到”溫對西藏的看法可能比其他領導人“溫和”,但他認為這只是代表了溫一貫的風格,並不能暗示官方政策存在分歧。無名氏表示同意,認為溫總理3月30日
的言論只是“體現了溫的本色”——他在幾乎所有問題上都是“溫和而理智”的,其言論不能算是嚴重脫離官方的方針策略。

-南方媒體報導無法反映政治分歧




¶7.
(機密)無名氏認為,受共產黨控制的某些南方報紙近期刊登的兩篇文章無法反映領導層的爭論或分歧,而是可能反映了黨在媒體策略上的調整。這兩篇文章均
出現在4月3日的廣東黨屬報紙上,而這兩家報紙正是以挑戰中宣部的底線聞名。第一篇刊登在《南方都市報》的部落格上,批判黨對西藏報導的限制,認為允許國

記者直接報導能夠得出對(3.14)事件更準確的描述。第二篇刊登在《南方週末》上,認為大多數藏人並非藏獨主義者,既不支持或參與騷亂,也不贊同暴力,
因此在對事件的應對上應該區別對待。該文還呼籲與達賴喇嘛開展會談。

¶8.
(機密)上周與美方官員會面的無名氏沒有閱讀或聽說過這兩篇文章,因此美方官員認為兩篇文章並不十分重要。無名氏直言不諱地提出,南都的文章只能算是體現
了南方日報集團和“南方自由派記者”的“親西方立場”。只有通過更加具有“官方權威”的媒體發表,才能反映出文章的重要性。無名氏認為此文代
表了一些精英尋求重新審視西藏政策的願望,但也提到它在黨內受到了不少批評。無名氏說兩篇報導僅僅是反映了這兩家報紙“喜歡打擦邊球”,秉持“傳統的自由
立場”。

無名氏表示,現在就說兩篇文章有沒有“闖紅線”為時尚早。他提到,兩家報紙過去曾招惹過宣傳官員。

¶9.
(機密)出人意料的是,連無名氏自己都沒有看過這兩篇登在自己部門下屬報紙上的文章。在美方官員總結報導內容後,無名氏對它們的政治意義提出強烈懷疑。他
說,它們或許代表著共產黨媒體政策的調整。無名氏推測,南周的主編一定是在得到了上級允許之後才敢發表報導,否則他會因為發表敏感文章而“立即遭到解
職”。無名氏略帶誇張地問道,既然胡錦濤親自監管著西藏事件的媒體反映,又有哪位報紙編輯敢跟官方唱反調,哪怕只是含沙射影?因此,無名氏認為,文章的意
義在於它象徵著共產黨宣傳部門對西藏問題報導的引導開始在三月底出現鬆動——據說正是這一點使得南方周末的報導出現了“略微不同”的觀點。

¶10.
(機密)類似地,無名氏也沒有注意到這兩篇文章。不過,在聽完美方官員的解釋後,無名氏評論道,這些文字可能意味著中宣部最近對傳媒的引導開始允許“不同
觀點”出現。(注意:無名氏認為,儘管可能有“不同觀點”的空間,但西藏仍然是“過於敏感”,因此他的雜誌決定暫時“不去碰”這方面的
東西。無名氏據說曾被“命令”在中宣部的“嚴格”規定下撰寫西藏方面的報導。)

-民族主義情緒令共產黨受到鼓舞




¶11.
(機密)由於西方媒體“偏袒性”地報導與西藏和奧運有關的抗議活動,激憤的民族主義情緒開始抬頭,幾乎全黨上下都受到了鼓舞。無名氏向美方官員強調,
中國人對西方在西藏問題上的“偏見”普遍感到氣憤是不爭的事實,這種情緒會產生長期的影響。無名氏認為,人們為西方媒體的報導感到憤怒,卻沒有意識到大多
數中國人接觸“偏見報導”的唯一通道是官媒新華社的渲染刻畫,真是諷刺的很。無名氏強調,他認識的幾乎“每個人”都很憤怒。他認為,西方報導和抵制奧運開
幕式的呼聲都暗示著對藏獨的支持,讓公眾認為西方是在“打壓中國”。同時,無名氏說民族主義正在興起,但他認為這種情緒主要集中在25-35
歲的漢人和藏人。

¶12.
(機密)知情人士說,不管民族主義情緒上漲的原因為何,其結果都是對共產黨西藏政策的支持率大幅上升。無名氏表示,中國近年來發展迅速,人民自豪感與
日俱增,有鑒於此,民族主義抬頭實屬正常,而西藏動亂正為點燃民族情緒提供了“導火線”。無名氏則在不同場合承認,共產黨的宣傳方針是在蓄意地為民族主義
情緒火上澆油,以鼓動民眾支持西藏政策。迄今為止,此舉成效卓著。無名氏斷言,最近的西藏危機令人民“完全團結地”跟在黨和政府的身後,這在八九十年代的
大部分時期是“不可思議”的。

-……但大眾情緒也縛住了黨的手腳




¶13.
(機密)無名氏警告道,儘管在西藏問題上黨的支持率很高,但大眾情緒也會限制領導層的選擇。民族主義依然是共產黨治理的“基石”,但中央領導不希望這些情

“失去控制”。據稱,中宣部曾於本月早些時候下令官媒減少對西方媒體的攻擊。不過據無名氏觀察稱,中國的部落客作者們仍繼續在網上發起抨擊。無名氏還表示
擔心民族主義情緒爆發產生的長期後果。他提到:“沒有什麼事是十全十美的。”無名氏稱,不論如何,考慮到公眾的憤怒,中央“幾乎不可能”改變針
對西藏和達賴喇嘛的政策,至少在短期內如此。

-短期內政策很難做出改變




¶14.
(機密)知情人士稱,由於一系列原因(不包括公眾情緒),西藏政策在可以預見的將來很難會做出重大調整,起碼到奧運會結束後的一段時期內如此。無名氏認
為。胡曾在1987年和1989年鎮壓過類似的示威,在西藏留下了深遠影響,為避免自己的政策和過去的行為遭到非議,他可能不願採取“溫和”路線。此
外,無名氏估計,如果中國領導人認為改變政策看起來像是迫於國際壓力,那麼他們將幾乎“不可能”做出調整。還有,在領導層看來,國內局勢的穩定高於一切,
這樣一來,目前在西藏和新疆等地實施的強硬路線“幾乎篤定”沒有鬆弛的空間。無名氏表示,自己感覺到了中國領導人的憂慮:如果不維持高壓,那麼可
能就會失去對西藏的控制,這樣不僅會影響到國內,還會造成印度“不請自來”的干涉。

¶15.
(機密)無名氏表示,舉辦一屆成功的奧運會也是政府的工作重點。他推測,在中央領導階層看來,起碼要做到的事是保證運動員不抵制奧運會。因此,中央開始改
變公眾的預期,宣稱哪怕是“抵制”開幕式也並不重要,因為邀請各國國家領導人的決定權在於國際奧會和各國奧會,而不是中國政府。(注:無名氏不贊同此觀
點,他認為對於中國領導人而言,奧運會的成敗在於布希總統是否參加開幕式。)無名氏說,在4月12日博鼇論壇空檔,胡錦濤曾與澳大利亞總理陸克文談話,談
話內容經新華社發表,顯示了中國迄今為止對西藏的強硬立場。這顯示,在國內方面,西藏問題沒有“討價還價的空間”。他斷言道,只有藏區“安穩下來”,奧運
會閉幕之後,才會有重新審視西藏政策的可能。

英文原文


Viewing cable 08BEIJING1454, HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING1454 2008-04-16 10:10 2010-12-04 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6606
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001454

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2033
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KOLY CH

SUBJECT: HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP
UNIFIED, BUOYED AND CONSTRAINED BY NATIONALIST SENTIMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary




¶1. (C) President Hu Jintao remains firmly in charge of
China's policy on Tibet, with the leadership unified over
Beijing's current hard-line stance and buoyed by rising PRC
nationalist sentiment, xxxxx.
Given Hu's background and experience in Tibet, as well as
the "extremely sensitive" nature of the issue, no one would
"dare" challenge Hu or the Party line, contacts say. While
there may be differences in how various leaders publicly
articulate China's Tibet policy, there are no substantive
differences among the top leadership. Similarly, Embassy
sources do not believe that two recent articles in
Party-controlled southern newspapers signaled leadership
debate or a review of policy, instead arguing the pieces
perhaps reflect an adjustment in the Party's media strategy.
The Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment,
fueled in part by anger at the West over "biased" media
reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests, but this
nationalistic fervor also constrains future policy choices.
Regardless, any modification of Tibet policy is unlikely in
the short term, at least until after the Olympics, contacts
say. End Summary.

Hu Jintao Firmly in Charge, Leadership Unified



-

¶2. (C) President Hu Jintao is firmly in charge of the PRC's
Tibet policy, with the leadership unified over Beijing's
current hard-line stance, several Embassy contacts told
PolOffs over the past week. Sources argued that given Hu
Jintao's own expertise and experience regarding Tibet (Hu was
provincial party secretary in Tibet in the late 1980s), as
well as the "extreme" importance and sensitivity of the Tibet
issue, it would be virtually "impossible" for any leader to
challenge Hu on Tibet. An issue as sensitive as Tibet policy
would be controlled by a small group of top leaders, limited
primarily to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), meaning it is difficult to know precisely the content
of leadership discussions on Tibet, longtime Embassy contact
xxxxx.
Nevertheless, "it is still quite clear," xxxxx argued, that Hu
Jintao is "completely" in charge of the Tibet issue, and no
other leader would "dare" confront Hu or the Party line over
such a critical issue. Doing so would be "political suicide"
and would make any leader vulnerable to charges of being
"soft," or even being a "traitor," risking eventual removal,
a la the ouster of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
in 1987, xxxxx averred.

¶3. (C) There is "absolutely no division" within the
leadership on Tibet, xxxxx. For the
Chinese leadership, Tibet is even more sensitive than Taiwan.
Among the nine members of the PBSC who are controlling
China's Tibet policy, no one has the stature or experience to
challenge Hu, xxxxx said, noting that four are brand new
members of the PBSC, and no one on the PBSC other than Hu has
direct experience in Tibet. It was Hu Jintao, as then-Party
Secretary in Tibet, who oversaw the "quick and effective

Sipdis
suppression" of protests there in 1987 and 1989, which earned
him "great praise" from then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
and which was an important factor in his elevation to the
PBSC in 1992, xxxxx recalled. Thus, Hu has "great confidence"
when it comes to Tibet, putting him in a virtually
unassailable position. There may be room within the
leadership for expressing differences with Hu on issues such
as Taiwan, economic development or political reform, but not
on Tibet, xxxxx asserted.

Different Views Exist in Party, but No Disagreement at Top



-------------

¶4. (C) A range of contacts have acknowledged that there are
differences of opinion within the Party and among elites
regarding Tibet, though none believed this reflected any
disagreement among the top leadership. For example,xxxxx acknowledged the presence of
more "moderate" voices on Tibet within the Party, but he
nevertheless stressed that it is Hu Jintao who is
"completely" in charge of China's Tibet policy. Moreover, it

Beijing 00001454 002 of 004



is clear that those such as Hu favoring a "hard line" are
calling the shots. (Note:xxxxx view
that Tibet policy is more sensitive for China's leadership
than even Taiwan, noting that despite its rhetoric, Beijing
has de facto accepted the involvement of the United States in
Taiwan, but China can never accept the "interference" of
foreign powers in Tibet.)xxxxx,
confessed that he "personally" favors a more "measured"
approach to Tibet, to include dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
given that "only the Dalai Lama" can unify the majority of
the Tibetan community both within China and abroad.

¶5. (C) Separately, xxxxx "many elites" are advocating
a reassessment of policy toward the Dalai Lama, questioning
the wisdom of demonizing and refusing to negotiate with him.
According to xxxxx however, apart from a "minority" of
"elites" and "intellectuals," the majority of the Party
rank-and-file, as well as "98 percent" of the public, support
the current policy. Any serious disagreement over Tibet
among the Party leadership is "simply unimaginable," xxxxx
stated, a view separately shared xxxxx.

Public Statements: Difference in Nuance, not Substance



----------

¶6. (C) While there may be differences in how various leaders
have publicly articulated China's Tibet policy, there are no
substantive differences among the top leadership, contacts
asserted. For example, xxxxx said he
does not believe there is disagreement between President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao over Tibet, as some have
speculated based on Wen's purportedly more "moderate"
comments to UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his statement
to the media in Laos on March 30 regarding the Dalai Lama.
xxxx asserted that, on Tibet, Hu and Wen are like a
"restaurant sugar packet," black on one side and white on the
other, but still part of the same whole. In other words, Hu
and Wen merely emphasize different aspects of the same
policy. xxxxx said xxxxx"sensed" Wen may be
"slightly more moderate" on Tibet than some other leaders,
but he thought that represents Wen's style and does not imply
a disagreement over official policy. xxxxx shared this view,
attributing the Prime Minister's March 30 remarks to "Wen
simply being Wen" and appearing more "moderate and
reasonable" on almost every issue, even though his comments
represented no serious departure from the official line.

Southern Media Pieces Reflect No Division over Policy



--------

¶7. (C) xxxxx did not think that two
recent articles in Party-controlled southern newspapers
signaled leadership debate or divisions, instead offering
that the articles perhaps reflected an adjustment in the
Party's media strategy. Both articles appeared on April 3 in
Guangdong Provincial Party papers that have a reputation for
pushing the limits of Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
guidelines. The first, which appeared in a blog run by
Southern Metropolis (Nanfang Dushibao), was critical of the
Party's restrictions on reporting in Tibet, arguing that
allowing foreign reporters to cover the story directly would
provide a more accurate picture of events. The second,
published in Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou), argued that
most Tibetans are not separatists and do not support or
participate in the unrest or advocate violence, and that such
distinctions should be made when responding to the issue.
The article also called for talks with the Dalai Lama. (See
refs A-C.)

¶8. (C) xxxxx with whom
PolOffs met in the last week had not read or heard of either
article, which PolOffs interpreted as a sign that the pieces
are not terribly significant. xxxxx, explicitly made
this point, arguing that the article in the Southern
Metropolis did not represent anything other than the
"pro-Western slant" of the Southern Daily Media Group and
"liberal southern journalists." The piece would only be
significant if more "authoritative" media outlets had picked
it up. xxxxx, thought it represented a desire among some
elites for a review of Tibet policy but also noted that the
piece was criticized by many internally in the Party. xxxxx, saying that
the articles merely reflected the "traditionally liberal"
stances of both newspapers, which are noted for "pushing the
envelope" ("da cabianqiu," literally "playing edge ball").

Beijing 00001454 003 of 004



It is too early to tell whether these pieces have crossed a
red line, xxxxx said, noting that both papers have often
gotten into trouble with propaganda officials in the past.

¶9. (C) Surprisingly, even the xxxxx had
not read either article that appeared in his group's
newspapers. In response to PolOff's summary of the pieces,
he strongly doubted they carried any political significance.
Perhaps, he said, they represent an adjustment in the Party's
media strategy. The Southern Weekend editor-in-chief must
have had prior approval from Party authorities to publish the
piece, xxxxx surmised, otherwise the editor would have been
"dismissed immediately" for publishing such a sensitive
article on his own. With Hu Jintao himself in charge of the
media response to Tibet, xxxxx asked rhetorically, what
newspaper editor would dare challenge the official media
line, even implicitly? Therefore, the article's import, xxxxx
claimed, is that it demonstrates the "slight loosening" of
Party propaganda guidance on Tibet coverage beginning in late
March, which purportedly allows for the "more nuanced"
reporting advocated in the Southern Weekend article itself.

¶10. (C) Similarly, xxxxx was not aware of the articles. After
listening to PolOff's explanation of them, however, xxxxx
commented that the pieces likely represent the fact that
there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda
Department's latest guidance. (Note: Despite this supposed
"room" for more nuanced reporting on Tibet, xxxxx
said Tibet is "far too sensitive" and his magazine has
therefore decided "not to touch" the story for now.xxxxx,
reportedly have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on
Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the Propaganda
Department.)

Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment...




¶11. (C) Almost all of xxxxx the Party has been
buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by
anger at the West over "biased" media reporting on Tibet and
Olympic-related protests.xxxxx all emphasized to
PolOff that Chinese "anger" over the West's "bias" on Tibet
is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. xxxxx
them seemed themselves to be angry over Western
media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for
most Chinese, their only access to this "biased Western
reporting" is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua's
characterization of it. xxxxx emphasized that virtually
"everyone" he knows is angry and believes that Western
reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic
opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence
and makes the public feel that the West is trying to "keep
China down." xxxxx, meanwhile, said
nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this
sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age
group among both Hans and Tibetans.

¶12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the
result has been a dramatic increase in support for the
Party's policy on Tibet, contacts say. xxxxx said this outcome is partly a "natural"
reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become
more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China's
rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the
most recent "spark" to inflame passions. xxxx separately acknowledged, however, that the Party's
propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic
feelings in order to rally the public in support of the
Center's Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very
successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has
"completely unified" the people behind the Party and
Government, something that had been "unthinkable" throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s,xxxxx asserted.

...But Also Constrained by Popular Passions




¶13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is
currently quite high, popular passions also serve to
constrain the leadership's options, xxxxx
warned. Nationalism remains one "pillar" of Party rule, but
central leaders do not want to let these feelings "spin out
of control," xxxxx said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns,
the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly
directed that attacks on the Western press in China's
official media be curtailed, according xxxxx

Beijing 00001454 004 of 004



xxxxx. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers
from continuing their attacks via the Internet, xxxxx
observed.xxxxx also expressed concern about the
long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting
that "nothing is ever completely good." At any rate, there
is "virtually no way" the Center could initiate a change in
policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short
term, given the popular anger over such issues, xxxxx said.

Policy Change Unlikely in the Short Term




¶14. (C) Major policy adjustment on Tibet is highly unlikely
for the foreseeable future for a host of reasons other than
popular sentiment, at least until after the Olympics,
contacts say. Given Hu's own legacy in Tibet, where he
cracked down on similar demonstrations in 1987 and 1989, Hu
Jintao will likely be loath to adopt a "softer" line, lest
his own policies and past actions come under criticism,
xxxxx argued. Moreover, it will be
almost "impossible" for Chinese leaders to reorient policy if
they look like they are doing so under international
pressure, xxxxx assessed. Moreover,
xxxxx observed, domestic stability remains the
leadership's top priority above all else, meaning there will
"almost surely" be no relaxation of the current hard line on
Tibet or in places like Xinjiang. xxxxx said he sensed
Chinese leaders worry they could lose control of Tibet if
they do not maintain tight control there, which would have
both domestic consequences and could invite "unwanted
interference" from India.

¶15. (C) While staging a successful Olympics is also a
priority, xxxxx said he senses the leadership has
assessed that at a minimum, athletes will show up to the
Games. As a result, the Center is starting to adjust public
expectations about the Games by saying that, even if there is
a "boycott" of the opening ceremony, that is not important,
given that it is the IOC and respective National Olympic
Committees, not the Chinese Government, hat decide whether
to invite national leaders. (Note: xxxxx disagreed,
saying that, in his view, the success of the Games for
Chinese leaders hinges on whether President Bush attends the
opening ceremonies.) xxxxx said
that Hu Jintao's comments on April 12 to Australian PM Rudd
on the margins of the Bo'ao Forum, which were reported via
Xinhua and reflected China's hard-line stance on Tibet to
date, signaled that domestically there is "no room for
debate" on the Tibet issue. Only after Tibetan areas have
"settled down" and the Olympics have concluded, will there be
any chance for a possible review of Tibet policy, he asserted.
Randt

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