The rise of China’s maritime power in the Western Pacific and its likely continued rise has prompted the US, still a superpower, to start adjusting its military deployments and develop a new operational concept called Air-Sea Battle. While Taiwan does not have to dance to the US’ and China’s tune, it does at least need to consider strategies to remove obstacles and avoid being marginalized.

After Taiwan’s democratization, changes of government have gradually become normalized. That means Taiwan’s national defense strategies can no longer change every time government power shifts hands. Instead, transparent, effective and forward-looking plans that transcend partisan thinking are necessary to gain the support and recognition of a majority of the public. That is the only way to benefit the long-term development and stability of Taiwan’s national defense.

In the past, security in the Taiwan Strait depended on Taiwan’s democracy and military technology, but as a result of the current competition, cooperation and reliance between the US and China, the US has clearly become quite cautious and conservative when it comes to arms sales to Taiwan. This is because arms sales are no longer a purely military matter; and often involve political, economic and other structural aspects of the trilateral relationship between the US, Taiwan and China.

For the past two decades, Taiwan has been overly dependent on direct arms sales, which has resulted in disparities and fluctuations in military buildup and preparations for war, and it may even have resulted in strategic gaps and discontinuities in combat capabilities. Thinking about how to best invest limited resources on effective weaponry should be the key to the future construction of Taiwan’s national defense. Taiwan also needs to come up with its own ideas and methods on how to solve its military problems.

The ways in which China might use military force against Taiwan can be roughly categorized into four stages: quasi-military conflict, the first battle that ultimately decides victory, rapid landing and sustained warfare. The structure of Taiwan’s national defense forces should be developed toward gaining asymmetrical warfare capabilities, including strategic defense and multiple layers of deterrence.

The thinking behind these core capabilities focuses on finding ways of breaking the connections between the different stages of combat, or maybe even just bringing chaos to these connections, to gain a longer buffer period to allow the intervention of external assistance or the preparation and mobilization of troops for sustained warfare.

The future choices in military investment for the development of these asymmetrical warfare capabilities must meet the following five conditions as closely as possible.

First, they should be capable of allowing mobilization and deployment, as far as possible, to deter aggression. Second, they should be able to assure high levels of survival throughout the entire process of war. Third, they should be able to bridge the gaps between the end of full-blown warfare and residual warfare and stretch the time for as long as possible to make the cessation of ground warfare impossible. Fourth, they should be capable of gaining optimal effectiveness from national defense resources. Finally, they should be able to combine Taiwan’s domestic industrial capabilities to keep core skills and know-how in the hands of Taiwanese to avoid being influenced by the US, China and even changes in Taiwan’s government, and other such factors.

Countries that have been at war with each other in the past and potentially remain hostile or countries that pose potential threats to each other owing to competition, still need to carry out concrete military exchanges with each other. Examples include the standoff between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the present-day competition and cooperation between the US and China. In terms of military contacts, military interaction between Taiwan and China can gradually move from the existing second-track — non-governmental — channels toward a “track one-and-a-half” channel that is semi-official in nature, or a mixture of military and civilian contacts, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding.

In addition, Taiwan should take actions to combine its national defense with diplomacy and adopt a two-pronged strategy to promote Taiwan’s soft power internationally, while at the same time acknowledging the need to simultaneously deal with and deter China. Taiwan’s greatest advantage is its outstanding society, which is capable of bringing about gradual qualitative changes in China.

Deterrence capabilities should be combined with technology and improved education among soldiers and applied through diverse and competing channels. One of the two-pronged strategies would be to continue to engage in bilateral exchanges with China, while a multilateral strategy to strengthen interaction with the US, Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations is carried out.

Neither of these two strategies should be given priority over the other. Rather, their application should be decided by environmental constraints and opportunities as they appear so that each works to strengthen the other.

Finally, former deputy minister of national defense Lin Chong-pin (林中斌) made a good point in August when he said that if we look at the integration of any two different states throughout history, we see that integration using military force has proven to be the fastest way of achieving integration, but also the most impermanent. He ranked political integration next and said that economic and social integration, also known as “assimilation,” was the slowest way to achieve integration, but has also proven to provide the most permanent results.

Therefore, when dealing with cross-strait integration, China should respect Taiwan’s culture with its high and growing level of democracy and freedom, place their trust in Taiwanese public opinion and deal with these phenomena with goodwill and patience.

If it does not, there will be no end to the problems between Taiwan and China. The key to cross-strait integration lies with the people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and not with the use of military force. China should therefore take the initiative in declaring that it will give up military force as an option for dealing with Taiwan.

Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

Translated by Drew Cameron

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/11/15/2003518327