國民黨主席鄭麗文計畫不久後訪問美國，距離她就任主席僅略多於6個月。她的前任主席朱立倫，也是在2022年6月、上任約半年後訪問美國。有些人或許認為台灣政治動盪不安，但在許多方面其實並非如此。政治人物的「面孔」或許更替，但議題往往一再重現。
台灣政治中一個始終存在的問題（甚至在國民政府遷台前亦然），就是國民黨內部的團結或分裂程度。這個問題近期再度浮現，例如鄭麗文主席訪問中國大陸一事，以及在民進黨總統賴清德提出新台幣1.25兆元軍購特別預算後，國防支出應該增加多少的爭議。
近日，一些國民黨內部歧見已「爆發」至檯面上。副主席季麟連公開批評立法院長韓國瑜，原因是韓國瑜似乎支持比季麟連更高的軍購特別預算支出。在同一議題上，國民黨中央也與2024年副總統候選人趙少康公開互相批評。
美國政府已多次明確表態，支持賴清德政府提出的新台幣1.25兆元軍購特別預算，而非國民黨或民眾黨版本。美國國會議員也透過訪台、公開信與社群媒體表達對該預算的支持。國民黨試圖說明不會給賴政府「空白支票」，但迄今尚未說服美國政府與國會議員。此外，鄭麗文主席訪問中國並與中共總書記習近平會面，也在全球媒體引發大量負面關注，以及部分所謂「專家」的負面評論，其中一些人任職於接受台灣政府資助的智庫。當然，這其中也存在某種程度的雙重標準。許多批評鄭麗文與習近平會面的聲音，卻不會批評美國總統川普與習近平會面。
針對習鄭會，民進黨在社群媒體上引用多家國際媒體標題，例如《日經亞洲》稱「國民黨與中共形成對抗台灣主權的統一戰線」，《衛報》稱「習近平在罕見會晤中，告訴台灣反對派領袖兩岸同屬中國人」，路透社報導「台灣反對派領袖與中國談和平，其政黨卻缺席台北防務會談」及「中國一面與反對派談和平，一面持續派遣軍機軍艦」，《經濟學人》則指出「台灣反對派領袖會見習近平，此行暴露其黨內分裂」。
民進黨立委范雲也在社群媒體分享《獨立報》文章，標題為〈專家稱台灣反對派領袖訪中只會成為習近平的宣傳工具〉。《華爾街日報》的一篇分析則以〈漫長的握手：習近平對台灣靈魂的悄然掌控〉為題，並指出「國民黨領袖訪北京暴露其親美與親中路線之間的危機」。
多家智庫亦發布負面報告。位於華府、傾向民進黨的「全球台灣研究中心」稱鄭麗文此行為「高度分化的訪問」；捷克的「歐洲價值安全政策中心」（在台設有辦事處）則稱其言論「令人不安」，並聲稱「即使在國民黨內，此行也未獲所有成員同意」—這樣的說法頗為奇特，因為黨主席並不需要取得全體黨員同意才能出訪。
儘管許多這些專家對台灣內政的了解，遠不如其自稱的程度，例如聲稱鄭麗文訪中在台灣毫無支持。然而事實上，一項在她訪中後進行的民調顯示，有66％的民眾支持恢復兩岸對話。可以確定的是，國民黨在國際媒體中的形象長期受損。馬英九執政時期，國際媒體開始以「親中」形容國民黨；此後在洪秀柱、吳敦義、江啟臣與朱立倫擔任主席期間，這一標籤也持續被使用。
在這樣的背景下，鄭麗文主席即將訪問華府。無論她是否如近期電視專訪所言會晤川普總統，或僅與川普政府其他官員會面，此行都存在相當風險。其中一項重大挑戰是，華府人士未必清楚她究竟只是國民黨主席，還是同時也將成為2028年總統候選人。若她不是候選人，外界可能認為她的發言，未必代表未來國民黨總統候選人在中國或國防政策上的立場。
回顧2022年朱立倫訪問華府前，筆者曾提出五項觀察重點，如今同樣適用於鄭麗文此行：
一、朱立倫當年在華府公開演說中如何談「九二共識」？他可以選擇迴避、重申其為國民黨對中政策基礎，或宣布放棄。最終他稱之為「沒有共識的共識」，引來民進黨批評。對鄭麗文而言，這不是問題，她立場清楚：支持九二共識、反對台獨。好處是立場明確，壞處是華府多數外交政策專家、國會議員及川普政府人士，普遍支持民進黨立場，反對以九二共識作為兩岸關係基礎。
二、是否會出現如2011年歐巴馬政府匿名批評蔡英文訪美時的情況？目前已有接近川普政府的人士公開批評鄭麗文，不排除政府本身也會如此。一旦發生，對賴清德總統而言將是有利結果。
三、鄭麗文是否會像朱立倫在2015與2022年訪美時那樣「匆進匆出」？行程安排不佳將難以令人留下好印象。此外，6月期間許多國會議員正忙於期中選舉，未必在華府。
四、她是否會將所有會面對象稱為「老朋友」？朱立倫過去常如此稱呼外國政要與學者，但事實是，即使曾見過面，多數美方人士對國民黨印象仍偏負面，並非其「朋友」。一廂情願無法改變現實。
五、國民黨是否有能力有效回應賴政府、民進黨或華府親綠團體對鄭麗文與國民黨的「全面批評攻勢」？
2022年國民黨地方選舉的成功，與朱立倫6月訪美無關。同樣地，2026年地方選舉的結果，也不會取決於鄭麗文此次訪問。事實上，朱立倫2022年訪美，並未幫助國民黨總統候選人贏得2024年大選。同理，2026年訪美，也不會幫助國民黨候選人贏得2028年總統大選。
較可能的情況是，2028年國民黨總統候選人將在選前數月赴華府進行一場「面試」。要在這場面試中成功，最好的方式是民調大幅領先。然而，可以確定的是，川普總統不會協助國民黨候選人贏得2028年大選。若國民黨要勝選，仍須依靠自身能力說服台灣選民，而非仰賴美國的支持。
（作者為美國共和黨海外部前亞太區主席）
Kuomintang Chair Cheng Li-wun’s Challenges in Washington DC
By Ross Darrell Feingold
Former Asia Chair, Republicans Abroad
X: @RossFeingold
Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun plans to visit the United States soon, a little more than six months after she became chair. Her predecessor as chair, Eric Chu, also visited the United States in June 2022, a little more than six months after he became KMT chair.
Some people might think Taiwan politics is volatile, but in many ways it is not. The “faces” might change, but the issues often remain the same.
One issue in Taiwan politics (and earlier, before the national government moved to Taiwan at the end of the civil war) that never goes away is the level of unity, or disunity, in the KMT.
This issued has existed recently over issues such as Chair Cheng’s trip to China, or, how much to spend on defense after President William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed a supplemental defense budget of NT$1.25 trillion.
Some of those internal KMT disagreements "blew up" into the open in recent days, with vice chair Chi Lin-lien openly criticizing Legislative Yuan Speaker Daniel Han because Han appears to support spending more on a supplemental defense budget than Chi supports. On the same issue, KMT headquarters openly exchanged criticisms with its 2024 presidential election vice president nominee Jaw Shaw-kong.
The United States government has repeatedly made clear it supports the Lai administration's NT$1.25 trillion supplemental defense budget and not the KMT or TPP versions. Members of the United States Congress have also made it clear through visits to Taiwan, open letters, and social media posts that they support the Lai administration's NT$1.25 trillion budget. The KMT’s efforts to explain that it will not give the Lai administration a “blank check” have yet to convince the United States government and Members of Congress.
In addition, Chair Cheng's trip to China, and meeting with Xi Jinping, had also received enormous negative media attention globally, and negative commentary by so-called "experts", some of whom work for think tanks funded by the Taiwan government.
Certainly, there is a bit of hypocrisy. Most of the people who criticize Chair Cheng for meeting Xi Jinping, will not criticize President Donald Trump for meeting China’s President Xi Jinping.
With regard to the Xi-Cheng meeting, the DPP shared on social media headlines from international media such as in Nikkei Asia “The KMT and CCP form united front against Taiwan's sovereignty”, in The Guardian “Xi tells Taiwan opposition leader people on both sides of strait are Chinese in rare meeting”, in Reuters “Taiwan opposition leader talks peace with China as her party skips defence talks in Taipei”, in Reuters “Taiwan sees only warships and warplanes as China talks peace with opposition”, in The Economist “Taiwan’s opposition leader meets Xi Jinping in Beijing. The trip exposes divisions in her party.”
DPP Legislator Fan Yun shared on social media an article in The Independent headlined “Taiwan opposition leader’s China visit will only serve Xi propaganda, experts”.
An analysis in The Wall Street Journal was headlined “The Long Handshake: Xi’s Quiet Grip on Taiwan’s Soul” and “Plus, how the Kuomintang leader’s Beijing visit exposes the crisis between its pro-U.S. and pro-China wings”,
Think tanks also published negative reports. The pro-DPP Global Taiwan Institute in Washington DC published a report that described Chair Cheng’s trip to China as a “polarizing trip”, and the European Values Center for Security Policy in Czechia (which as an office in Taipei) published a report that described Chair Cheng’s rhetoric as “ominous”, and claimed that “Even within the ranks of the KMT, the visit was reportedly not approved by all members”, an odd claim to make given that the chair does not need to obtain members approval for her travel.
Although many of these experts know much less about Taiwan's domestic politics than they claim to know, such as by making claims that Chair Cheng's trips had no support in Taiwan. In fact, a poll taken after Chair Cheng’s visit to China showed that 66% support a resumption of cross-strait dialogue.
Certainly, the KMT brand is heavily damaged in the international media, as it has been for a long time. When President Ma Ying-jeou was in office, international media began to refer to the Kuomintang as the “China-friendly Kuomintang”, and international media continually referred to the KMT as “China-friendly” during the tenures of former KMT chairs Hung Hsiu-chu, Wu Den-yih, Johnny Chiang, and Eric Chu too.
In this environment, Chair Cheng plans to visit Washington DC soon. Regardless of whether Chair Cheng meets with President Trump as she suggested in a recent television interview, or if she meets with other Trump administration officials, there are significant risks for her.
One significant challenge for Chair Cheng when she meets people in Washington DC is that they will not know whether she is the KMT chair only, or, if she will also be the KMT’s nominee for president in the 2028 election. If she is not going to be the KMT’s nominee, there might be an assumption that whatever Chair Cheng says, the future KMT nominee for president might have difference views on China or defense policy.
In June 2022 prior to KMT Chair Eric Chu visiting Washington DC, this author identified five things to watch for. These same things still apply, this time to Chair Cheng’s visit.
1. In 2022, this author asked whether in his public speech in Washington DC, what will Chairman Chu say about the 1992 Consensus? The options were for Chu to avoid the topic, confirm that it remains the basis for the Kuomintang’s China policy, or, announce that the Kuomintang rejects the 1992 Consensus. As it turned out, in a speech at a Washington DC think tank, Chu called the 1992 Conesus a “non-consensus consensus”, a statement that the DPP was quick to criticize.
This topic will not be a challenge for Chair Cheng, because her position on this is very clear; she has repeatedly said that the KMT policy is to support the 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. The good news for those Chair Cheng meets is that she will tell them a clear position. The bad news for Chair Cheng is that most of Washington DC foreign policy experts, Members of Congress, and people working in the Trump administration agree with the DPP and oppose the 1992 Consensus as a basis for China-Taiwan relations.
2. Will a Trump administration official anonymously criticize Chair Cheng the way an Obama administration criticized then-DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen when she visited Washington DC as a presidential candidate in 2011? Several people close to the Trump administration already frequently, and publicly, criticize Chair Cheng, making it possible that the Trump administration itself might do so too.
If a Trump administration official criticizes Chair Cheng, it would be an excellent outcome for President Lai.
3. Will Chair Cheng “dart” in-and-out of meetings like former chair Eric Chu did when he visited Washington DC in 2015 and 2022? A poorly scheduled itinerary will not impress anyone in Taiwan. In addition, in June, many Members of Congress will be preparing for this year’s United States “mid-term” elections, and might not even be in Washington DC the week Chair Cheng visits.
4. Will Chair Cheng refers to everyone she meets as an “old friend”? Former Chair Chu had a habit of referring to foreign politicians and scholars as “old friends”. The reality is, even if these Americans previously met Chair Cheng, most have a negative impression of the KMT and are not the KMT “friends”. Wishing they are the KMT’s friends will not make it a reality.
5. And finally, can the KMT effectively respond to the Lai administration or DPP (or DPP friendly outside organizations in Washington DC) “flooding the zone” with criticism about Cheng and the KMT?
In 2022, the KMT's success in the local election had nothing to do with Chair Chu's visit to Washington DC in June of that year. Similarly, in 2026 the KMT's success in the local election will have nothing to do with Chair Cheng's visit to Washington DC in June of this year.
In fact, Chair Chu's visit to Washington DC in June 2022 did not help the KMT nominee for president win the 2024 presidential election. Similarly, in 2028, Chair Cheng's visit to Washington DC in June 2026 will not help the KMT nominee for president win the 2028 presidential election either.
Most likely, whoever the KMT nominee for president in 2028 is, the nominee will visit Washington DC for an "interview" a few months before the election. The best way to succeed in that interview will be to have a large lead in the polls.
However, the KMT can be certain that President Trump will not help the KMT nominee for president in the 2028 presidential election, whoever it is. If the KMT is to win the 2028 presidential election, it must rely on its ability (and not the help of the United States) to persuade Taiwan’s voters that the KMT deservers voters’ support.
