曾在美國任教的中國大陸籍學者相藍欣於布胡會前夕撰文,批評和平崛起論,我覺得他是錯的,這裡附上他較早的一篇中文文章.華郵原文的中文人名我打出來了.

“雞犬之聲相聞，老死不相往來”的世界體系北大教授葉自成倒是曾經推崇過,但這並非鄭必堅的意思.

AT THE SUMMIT

Why Washington Can't Speak Chinese

By Lanxin Xiang
Sunday, April 16, 2006; B03

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401896.html?sub=AR

The world's preoccupation with China's sudden rise as an economic superpower is a matter of some bemusement among Chinese political leaders and intellectuals. Massive trade surpluses with the rest of the world? The embrace of free markets and globalization? The Chinese have been there before. As we see it, this is not China's rise, but rather its restoration to its historical position of global influence.

Today's restoration constitutes China's third great encounter with the West, following the Jesuit missions of the 16th century and the Opium Wars of the 1800s. The current encounter -- this time between equals -- will produce much more than economic competition with the United States. As China's economic strength grows, no one, not even the Chinese ourselves, can prevent China's influence from spreading into politics, values and ideology. It is in those arenas that conflicts with the United States can arise, and unfortunately, it is precisely in those areas that misunderstandings between the two nations run rampant.

When I was the Henry Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress two years ago, I was both amused and appalled to learn that most China policy analysts in Washington were still focused on Western political concerns such as how to democratize China or old-fashioned security issues such as how to strike a balance of power within Asia. As a result, I frequently encountered books and articles about the region with sensationalistic and melodramatic titles, such as "Taming the Red Dragon." Aaron L. Friedberg, who later was Vice President Cheney's deputy national security adviser, served up such works as "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia."

Such are the preoccupations of a self-proclaimed indispensable superpower. This hubris was as evident in the Bush administration as it had been among President Bill Clinton's foreign policy elite. Except for a sober corner at the National Intelligence Council, Washington seemed to have turned into ancient Rome, believing it could manage the world singlehandedly, with or without friends.

Sadly, when it comes to China, most Washington think tanks have stopped thinking. Perhaps hoping to double their research funding, U.S. analysts tend to decouple China's domestic politics from its foreign policy and assess the two separately. Many also assume that Chinese leaders will shift their behavior only in response to well-designed external pressures, completely disregarding the role of domestic realities. (Perhaps this is why poor Chinese-language competence in Washington think tanks is no deterrent to the proliferation of China-related reports, briefing papers and strategies.) Only neoconservatives such as Weekly Standard Editor William Kristol and Pentagon adviser Michael Pillsbury seemed to understand the link between a country's external behavior and its internal politics, though whether they fully understand China is a different matter.

Chinese leaders never separate the domestic from the external. When 毛澤東 met Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 1972, Nixon made a somewhat flattering remark: "You have changed the world." Nixon, of course, was referring to the Cold War bipolar system. But 毛's answer reflected a different view. "No, I did not change the world, only the downtown or perhaps suburban Beijing." He was thinking of domestic politics, lamenting that his Cultural Revolution, as brutal as it was, failed to change the Chinese way of life.

Whatever grand global visions Chinese president Hu Jintao might trade with President Bush in his visit to Washington this week, one thing is certain: When Hu wakes up every morning, foreign policy is far from his mind. Are farmers satisfied with the recent government decision on agricultural taxes? Would a revaluation of the yuan push millions of low-wage textile workers into the streets? And why is former president 江澤民 still active in politics behind the scenes? Such concerns dominate Hu's daily activities.

Washington's policy elites hardly deserve all the blame for the lack of mutual understanding. For a long time, Chinese leaders have been incapable of explaining China to the outside world. When the Chinese invent a foreign policy theme, they often deploy coded language that leads to more confusion than clarity on the international front.

A good example is Beijing's recent drive for a non-ideological foreign policy under the motto of "China's Peaceful Rise." Publicly, Chinese leaders stress the twin intentions of the Peaceful Rise: embracing economic globalization and avoiding a Cold War-style confrontation with the West. In reality, the concept is muddled. If China's ascent concludes peacefully, what happens once it reaches the top? Could it then use force to seek global hegemony? And since no country remains on top forever, how would China deal with an eventual fall?

The concept's inventor, a former Communist Party propaganda chief named 鄭必堅, is a key adviser to Hu. He recognizes that the Chinese Communist Party has a legitimacy problem at home and must undergo reforms for one-party rule to survive. The Peaceful Rise is essentially a way of seeking a soft landing for China's political system -- a global peace offering that masks the leadership's true intention of prolonging its grip on power by maintaining economic momentum.

鄭's Peaceful Rise has met strong resistance from the Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as the People's Liberation Army. The former criticizes the effort as a self-indulgent pipe dream, while the latter attacks it for tying the military's hands in case Taiwan must be dealt with by force.

Strangely enough, it was the Americans who rescued 鄭's line from near extinction. Last September, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick officially embraced the Peaceful Rise in a major speech in which he also called on China to become a responsible "stakeholder" in global affairs. The term confused China's leaders; 鄭 (along with some Washington think tankers) took it to mean that China would become an equal partner with the United States, while others interpreted it as a reference to gambling with high stakes. Either way, the U.S. policy elite appears divided on the Peaceful Rise. The neocons dismiss it as just another communist plot, whereas realists such as Zoellick seem happy to play along with the notion of Chinese self-restraint.

The Iraq war showed two sides of the West -- one Greek (Europe) and the other Roman (the United States). With the two increasingly split, China is finding space to restore its tradition, power and role in the world. The decline of America's global appeal means that the world is seeking ideas beyond the simplistic Bush model of "with us or against us." For Chinese leaders, politics needn't be a stark choice between dictatorship and democracy -- there can be alternatives that maintain diversity and multiculturalism. The European Union has already become a genuinely secular community in contrast to the religious trend in the United States; through its integration project, it has officially moved beyond the logics of good vs. evil or balance of power and hegemony. There is also no lack of eager audience for Chinese values in Latin America, which has been burned by the Western liberal model before.

Unfortunately, the task of explaining China to the world remains in the hands of propaganda chiefs such as 鄭 who know very little about geopolitics. Their task is even called "external propaganda," hardly a promising starting point. Simply parroting vague foreign policy slogans will not produce a peaceful landing for the Chinese political system; to the contrary, China's current value-free foreign policy only reveals to the world that China has not developed a political and cultural message to go with its commercial clout.

If China insists on the validity of its own development model at home, it must effectively explain how the world can remain safe for all civilizations. China's leaders must prove -- rather than just assert -- that China's restoration will not produce an inevitable conflict with the superpower of the day.

xiang@hei.unige.ch

Lanxin Xiang is director of the China Center at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

戒言崛起，慎言和谐

http://www.zaobao.com/yl/yl060323_501.html

● 相藍欣 

　　近來一段時期，原本用於中國國內的“和諧社會理論”突然開始介入國際關係領域，據說還是鄭必堅（編按：中共中央黨校前副校長）原先那個不能自圓其說的“和平崛起論”的自然延伸。 

　　眾所周知，“和平崛起論”不論在學理上還是在現實政策中都存在致命的弱點。從學理上講，“和平”是修飾“崛起”這個動作的副詞，而“崛起”一詞在中文中本來就有與和平相悖的，受委屈之後憤然“衝破現存體制”的涵義，譬如雨後春筍之出土，地震後山石之崛起。 

　　我們必須承認，和平與崛起是相矛盾的。此外，這個理論出自小國寡民心態，誤以為一個大國的對外戰略的主動權盡操在自己手中，而對國際地緣政治的互動邏輯缺乏根本理解。 

　　從策略上講，任何大國在其國際地位發生重大變化時，都必須戒言崛起的方式。歷史上從來沒有哪個大國在上升階段突然大談其崛起的手段和方法。 

　　首先，如要侈談“崛起”的手段，那就不可避免地要回答“衰落”時期的應對措施。其次，單方面宣稱絕對不使用軍事手段解決任何國際爭端，非但不能讓外人信服，而且給自己造成毫無迴旋餘地的困境。這個理論之所以反映一種小國寡民的心態是因為它自以為對任何國際衝突都有外交解決辦法。 

　　這實際上是尊“雞犬之聲相聞，老死不相往來”的世界體系為最高理想，並把現實國家利益寄託於某種不現實的期望值當中，於國於民都有害無益。 

“和諧世界”不等於“和而不同”

　　中國和平融入現存世界體系的第一要務，乃在於正面解釋自己的基本思路，而不是用涉及國際戰略手段和方法的“和平”論調來回避現實或說服世界。因此，不論在現在還是將來，和平崛起論都難以自立。 

　　新出現的“和諧世界”理論，被用來表達中國對世界體系和國際關係行為的總看法。同其他的理論創新有一個顯著不同的特點，和諧世界論的來源據說是中國悠久的“和而不同”的文化傳統，其實大謬不然。 

　　僅從學理上講，這個理論在邏輯上便難以自圓其說。首先，用“和諧”這個形容詞來修飾“世界”，到底是要描繪一個現存的國際關係狀態，還是要表明中國的一種外交動作？如果是指前者，事實卻是世界的現狀遠遠未能達到“和諧”的階段。所以，從邏輯上看只能是後者。那麼其涵義就應當是以中土傳統和價值觀將這個現實世界“和而諧之”。這是一個遠遠超過“和平崛起”目標的重大意識形態動作。 

　　所以，“和諧世界”被官方譯為“the harmonious world”是極不準確的，並有誤導作用。其真實涵義應當是描繪動作而不是狀態的“to harmonize the world”。 

　　中國人常常愛說“政者正也”。和平崛起充其量不過只能算是“正己”，和諧世界卻要“正他人”，即徹底改變各國的國際關係行為。 

　　從策略上看，把追求和諧世界作為一個大國的公開戰略目標也許算是創新，但是，把它上升到意識形態的高度卻早有先例。在它之前已有西方人所開拓的帝國主義式的基督教傳教事業，和諧世界論被用來支撐大一統的基督上帝。後來又有國際共產主義運動的宏偉藍圖，以人人平等，取消階級差異為和諧世界的基礎。 

　　那麼，時下流行的和諧世界論的創新之處在哪里？近期有趙汀陽（編按：中國社科院哲學研究所研究員）等推出“世界制度的哲學基礎”說，以所謂“和而不同”的“天下觀”作為中國傳統對外關係的理論基礎。據說它是對中國傳統的新詮釋。問題在於，這個詮釋是否同中國傳統文化相吻合？ 

　　首先，它對中國傳統的“和而不同”已有曲解。孔子在《論語·子路》篇中確實說過“君子和而不同”，但他老人家還有下半句，“小人同而不和。”不知為何，和諧世界論將“和而不同”單獨提出來，並詮釋為一對因果關係，即國際社會首先應當承認或尊重“不同”的大前提，才能達到“和”的結果。甚而有人斷言，中國的“和而不同”原則，一定會成為人類第三個千年實現“差別共存”的重要精神資源。

中西思考方式不同

　　然而，和而不同的本義絕不是“差別共存”。《國語·鄭語》記載著史伯回答桓公的一句話，“和實生物，同則不繼”，才是孔子“和而不同”的原始含義。中國人思考問題的方式同西方人有本質區別。

　　錢穆先生說過：“中國重和合，西方重分別。”也就是說，中國傳統中不存在“和同”對立的概念，因為中國傳統將所有對應的概念，譬如，黑白、日夜、善惡、生死等都看成是相互依存的，所以根本不可能產生“差別共存”的思路。

　　從根本上來講，中國人的世界不是反映空間的靜態概念，而是動態的時間概念，正確的理解應當是（人類的）“世代之間的界限（generational boundary）”。而不是反映空間概念的“world”，從而也沒有“差別共存”的理念基礎。

　　更重要的是，中國傳統中既無西方的所謂哲學，更無所謂本體論。中國傳統思路決不會導向那種無休無止的“這是什麼”的本體論問題。任何帶本體論色彩的對傳統的詮釋，最終必然走向西方的神學。海外新儒家學派所患的不治之症即在於此，因為它公開打出追尋儒家本體論的旗號。

　　趙汀陽亦毫無例外。比如，其立論基礎是西方的對立二元論，將現存世界體系看成是所謂“非世界”，從而引伸出“回歸世界本原”的邏輯推斷。事實上，這恰恰是以“西方重分別”來偷換“中國重和合”的一個典型手段，五四運動以來被中國知識精英們屢試不爽，毫無新意。

　　中國人從來不把相互對應的事物在概念上加以混淆。比如，乾道成男、坤道成女，天經地義，並不能因為要強調男女對立就把男稱為“非女”，女稱為“非男”，蓄意造成概念上的混亂。

　　所謂“非世界說”還有一大弊病，它假設人們應當回歸的“真實世界”，乃中國傳統思想所主導的世界，這就成為一種將自己的價值觀強加於他人的意識形態，實質上屬於“小人同而不和”的心態。

　　總之，時下流行的“和諧世界論”更加接近西方思路，而與中國傳統大相徑庭。我們不能用西方的世界觀來附會中國的“天下觀”，然後用“和諧世界”來詮釋“和而不同”。這只會造成概念混亂，加劇中國對外關係的透明度問題。

　　因此，中國應當戒言“崛起”，慎言“和諧”。即使要創造中國特有的國際關係理論，也必須從傳統源頭上做起。那種光靠幾個外來移植詞作為立論的關鍵字的任何“石破驚天”的理論，都必然站不住腳。

·作者是日內瓦高等國際關係研究院教授