2007/7/1 A16

曾擔任美國助理國務卿和駐聯合國大使的資深外交官郝爾布魯克，在華盛頓郵報撰文說，國際政壇最近出現三項表面上互無關聯的最新發展，深入探討後可以一窺中共與美國雙邊關係的微妙變化，這些事情包括北韓、蘇丹達富爾，以及未引起外界高度注意的緬甸問題。 

朝鮮半島六方會談停滯一年多後，北韓同意在國際專家監督下關閉寧邊核子反應爐，郝爾布魯克說，這主要是中共改變對策所致。兩年前，中共還嚴詞抨擊美國「不肯合作」，但北韓去年十月核試後，中共基於北韓擁核不符一己之利的考量，開始對北韓施壓。郝爾布魯克說，如果戰略利益和美國一致，中共仍會使出熟練的雙邊外交手腕。 

至於達富爾，國際社會多次指控中共為確保擁有穩定的蘇丹原油、礦產資源供應而包庇殘民以逞的蘇丹政權。中共是蘇丹的主要貿易夥伴及原油最大市場，卻拒不配合西方國家派遣聯合國維和部隊進駐達富爾的呼籲。許多國際知名人士最近揚言準備將北京奧運定位為「種族屠殺奧運」後，中共指派特使前往蘇丹，並對蘇丹政府施壓，終於迫使對方改變態度。郝爾布魯克強調，中共改變立場是主要關鍵。 

另外，在嘗試多年仍然無法促使緬甸軍政府同意磋商國內政治壓迫的問題後，美國代表最近終於與緬甸官員會商緬甸在野領袖翁山蘇姬的問題。特別值得一提的是，雙方是在中共居間安排下會晤，儘管此次會商不太可能產生具體進展，卻可能是一種進程的開始，中共更可能在其間扮演類似對於北韓的角色。 

這是否中共改變外交政策的前兆？中美兩國有無可能針對其他雙邊利害一致的課題建立更深厚的合作關係？郝爾布魯克說，雙方對許多事務的立場仍然南轅北轍，許多領域的共同利益卻又可以為他們創造契機。無庸置疑，如無中共參與，國際高峰會針對各項重要課題的共同聲明只是空談。 

China Lends A Hand

By Richard Holbrooke

Thursday, June 28, 2007; Page A25

BEIJING -- Three seemingly unrelated events may not constitute a trend. But they certainly deserve attention when they shed light on the relationship between the United States and China, which is fast becoming the most important bilateral connection in the world.

The first is the much-heralded breakthrough in Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill's negotiations with North Korea. After more than a year in which the six-party talks were suspended, North Korea returned to the table and agreed to disable its main nuclear reactor under the eyes of international inspectors.

This would not have happened without a change in Chinese policy toward North Korea. Two years ago, Beijing publicly criticized Washington's "lack of cooperation." But after North Korea detonated a nuclear device Oct. 9, Beijing started applying invisible but substantial pressure on North Korea, realizing belatedly that another nuclear neighbor was not in its interest. Once China's strategic interest was aligned with America's, it still took skillful bilateral diplomacy to make progress. There is a long road ahead, but this is a welcome diplomatic achievement for an administration that has had very few.

A second recent change in Chinese foreign policy is in Darfur. While still falling far short of what is needed to stop the killing, in some ways this is more remarkable, since Darfur is 7,000 miles away, in Africa, where China has been accused of protecting some of the worst regimes in the world in return for advantageous access to oil and mineral resources. China certainly has leverage -- it is Sudan's leading trading partner and the largest market for Sudanese oil. But Beijing had long resisted Western pressure to force Sudan to admit a United Nations peacekeeping force into Darfur, despite a 14-0 Security Council vote (China abstaining) authorizing such a force.

Finally, when a growing international furor threatened to rebrand the 2008 Beijing Games as "the genocide Olympics," China did something quite unusual -- it appointed a special envoy and began to apply pressure on Sudan, although, as always, in its unique style. "In our own way and through various means and various channels," said China's envoy, Liu Guijin, "we used very direct language to persuade them to understand they have to be more flexible." In Chinaspeak, "very direct language" is about as tough as it gets.

Last week there were some faint signs of movement: Sudan's president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, told U.N. officials he would agree to U.N. peacekeepers. It is too early to tell if this will actually happen or if it will stop the slaughter in Darfur. But it is clear that the change in China's position also changed the equation for the Sudanese thugs.

A third event has so far escaped public attention. After years of unsuccessfully trying to engage the military dictatorship in Burma in a dialogue on its political repression, American representatives finally met with Burmese officials this week to discuss the status of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and opposition leader who has been under harsh house arrest or other restrictions since the early 1990s. It's especially significant that these talks took place in Beijing and were arranged by the Chinese, although China will not be a publicly active participant. While these talks are unlikely to be productive, after years of nothing on Burma, perhaps they will be the beginning of a process in which China can play a role similar to that in North Korea.

North Korea, Darfur, perhaps Burma. Does this signal a change in Chinese foreign policy? Is there a possibility of greater Sino-American cooperation on other issues of mutual concern? The United States and China have vast differences in many areas and profoundly different views on some fundamental issues such as human rights, Tibet and trade. But there are many areas in which common interests can create opportunities. This was the concept in 1971 when Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger opened the modern-era relationship over a shared concern about the Soviet Union, and in 1978 when Jimmy Carter established full diplomatic relations with China. Today we have a different set of issues, but they are no less pressing. If the two countries can work together on North Korea, why not on Iran? And what about energy and the environment? After all, the United States and China are the world's two biggest polluters; surely we have common interests there.

Which brings me, finally, to the G-8. Today these annual summit photo-ops have little value. The eight nations can no longer call themselves the world's leading democracies when Russia is a member and India is not, or the leading industrial powers when Canada and Italy are members and China is not. G-8 communiques on energy, climate change, AIDS, Africa and poverty will remain empty and meaningless without China and India.

The writer, who was assistant secretary of state for East Asia at the time of normalization of relations between China and the United States, writes a monthly column for The Post.