當我看完了下面的文章時,他告訴你.

四月十八日 胡耀邦病逝.學生和(北京市民)開始集合於天安門廣場靜坐示威.當時,在西方眼中的(開明派)趙紫陽和他的幕僚,想用和平的手段來處理,他們認為...這個示威活動,最多延續一個星期就會結束,可是錯了.

四月二十六日 中國政府開始要求軍隊使用催淚瓦斯鎮壓示威活動.軍隊封鎖道路,柔性勸說示威者離開.但是,學生並未如趙紫陽和他的幕僚想的一樣,回去學校讀書.相反的,抗議活動更加的嚴重了.

五月十三日 學生開始絕食示威.最後,趙紫陽在無法解決問題的情形下,被要求下台.

五月二十日 北京開始實施戒嚴.當軍隊進入北京市郊時,遭到(北京市民)的全力阻擋.

六月三日,四日的紀錄.我將它保留中英對照,我想...各位可以去仔細地想一下,當時的情況是如何?

想一下,這四十六天的示威活動.(其中有十五天已經實施戒嚴)的情形.再回頭看一下熊玠教授所寫的文章.你會發現...他只是將(北京市民)做的事情,說成是學生.同時,當時的(北京市民)和軍隊對抗的事實也很清楚.

當然.對台灣和西方的這些有心人來說,他只看見軍隊射殺人民的部分.

CHINA UPDATE: HOW THE HARDLINERS WON
HU YAOBANG (胡耀邦)ALWAYS TRIED TO DO things his own way, from the day at age 14 when he ran away from home to join the Communists to the time in 1986 when, as party leader, he suggested that maybe it was time for Deng Xiaoping to retire. This year, after he had his heart attack - embarrassingly, 40 minutes into a Politburo meeting - the doctor ordered him to spend a week in bed. But Hu, 74, was impatient; in particular, he was tired of bedpans. In the early morning of April 15, on the seventh day after the heart attack, Hu raised his lithe, 5 foot, 3 inch frame from the bed and stepped toward the bathroom. It was too much for him. Hu Yaobang suffered a seizure, collapsed and died. Hu's seizure was a prelude to China's. His death triggered weeks of massive protests, giddy days last April and May when throngs of more than a million filled the streets of Beijing, criticizing the growing corruption, and in general demanding more of the democracy that Hu had come to symbolize. And then, after seven exhilarating weeks, it all came to a sudden end. In the early hours of June 4, as the world watched in horror, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army rolled toward Tiananmen Square and troops fired on the crowds, killing hundreds and wounding thousands

Behind this highly public drama lay another one, less visual and far less understood, yet just as significant. It was enacted not on the streets but in Zhongnanhai - the park-like compound a few hundred yards from Tiananmen where most of China's top leaders have their villas - and in Deng Xiaoping's own large estate a mile north of there. This was the battle within the leadership, a struggle among ambitious men and their competing visions of China. The echoes of this struggle still reverberate through the country, and China's future will depend on how it is resolved.

The following account is pieced together from conversations with dozens of people, including many party officials, as well as a reading of various documents - reports and speeches - some released to the public, others ''internal'' and closely held. In many places in the narrative, I have avoided attribution, sometimes because those involved spoke only on condition their names not be used, sometimes because use of their names would put them and their families in jeopardy.

THE CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE tragedy is Zhao Ziyang, who in 1987 succeeded Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the Communist Party. A wily and sometimes ebullient politician with a razor-sharp mind, Zhao was expected to become Deng's successor as paramount leader. More than any other official, Zhao(趙紫陽) was identified with Deng's economic ''opening'' of the country; he surrounded himself with some of the best and brightest of the country's young scholars who, based in an archipelago of think tanks around Beijing, submitted revolutionary proposals for economic and political change. For many young intellectuals, this was China's Camelot.

By the summer of 1988, however, their patron's job was in jeopardy. Inflation and corruption were on the rise, and the people were grumbling. Many older party officials regarded Zhao as too impatient; they were appalled when he flirted with heretical notions such as freeing prices and selling off state-owned companies to private shareholders. They began to criticize Zhao, in what they viewed as an attempt to save the revolution and the economy. Early this year, some of Deng's most influential associates, most notably Chen Yun, the 84-year-old genius of central planning, formally advised that Zhao, 69 at the time, be dismissed.

Such is Zhao's situation when his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, collapses in Beijing Hospital and the drama begins.

APRIL 18. With the news of Hu Yaobang's death, university students - for whom Hu was a symbol of change - begin hanging posters mourning him and criticizing the party leadership. In the predawn hours, several thousand students march to Tiananmen; within a few days, thousands of them are effectively occupying the square and threatening to force their way inside Zhongnanhai.

During this first week, I happen to have lunches on three occasions with lieutenants or supporters of Zhao. The ruling faction in Beijing will later claim that Zhao was behind the protests from the beginning, plotting with the students with an eye toward seizing power, but this week, none of the aides think much of the students; indeed, they are openly dismissive. ''It's nothing,'' one says derisively. ''It'll be over soon.'' They regard the protests as just another headache for their boss, another threat to his already precarious position. At the beginning, the Zhao faction is as befuddled by the students as anyone else.

The chief lobbyist for restraint is Yan Mingfu, 58, a top official in the central party apparatus and the son of a prominent aide to Zhou Enlai. Fluent in Russian, Yan had translated for Deng during the early 1960's, and their long friendship gives him extra maneuvering room. No one dares countermand Deng's explicit instructions, but Yan argues that the regime must somehow avoid getting blood on its hands, that bloodshed would only further discredit it. He and other officials seek to devise a way to implement Deng's instructions while avoiding a confrontation.

Finally, late in the evening, a decision is made by Qiao Shi, the head of the security forces and one of five men on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee. The troops will be deployed, as Deng had ordered, but they will follow a strategy of nonviolence. Soldiers are to block the roads, and use whatever persuasive techniques they can to calm the students; but they are not to use their guns or clubs.

For a regime struggling to short-circuit a growing mass movement, this proves to be a miscalculation.

4月26日。學生們正在籌劃重大示範明日。雖然鄧已發出指令，高層領導花太多的一天瘋狂談判如何來實施這些計劃，同時避免暴力。同時，部隊帶進北京，吩咐使用催淚瓦斯和必要時可強行鎮壓示威。

對於一個政權奮力短路越來越多的群眾運動，這證明是一個誤判。

APRIL 27. Word quickly spreads on the campuses that troops are in the area, armed with clubs and tear gas. When students emerge from the main gate of Beijing University just before 9 A.M., chanting democratic slogans and waving banners condemning The People's Daily editorial, few expect to reach Tiananmen Square. Some have written their wills, expecting to be clubbed to death in the streets.

And yet a miracle comes to pass: When the students reach the first line of policemen and troops, the men do not use their clubs. The delighted crowd easily pushes through the lines, and soon the streets are full of hundreds of thousands of workers and students cheering for democracy.

It is a turning point: April 27 will come to be regarded by many intellectuals as perhaps the most triumphant day of protest in China this century.

But inside Zhongnanhai, the power struggles have grown more intense. Upon his return from North Korea on May 1, Zhao huddles with his closest aide, Bao Tong, to discuss the situation. Bao, 57, a lean man who doubles as a Central Committee member and secretary to the Politburo, points out that the published version of The People's Daily editorial differs slightly from the one transmitted to Korea. This lets Zhao disavow the increasingly hated editorial. In a roundabout challenge to Deng, Zhao suggests to a number of officials that the party retract the editorial.

MAY 4. Zhao has begun to align himself more and more with the students. In part, this is a genuine reflection of his views, but it is also a tactical move. Slipping within the party, Zhao sees a chance to shore up his position by turning himself into a populist. On this day, he carries this line a step further in a conciliatory speech on national television.

''The just demands of the students must be met,'' he declares, adding that the problems should be solved in a democratic and legal way. In contrast to The People's Daily editorial, Zhao discounts the ''threat'' posed by the students. ''They are by no means opposed to our fundamental system,'' he says of the protesters. ''Rather, they are asking us to correct mistakes in our work.''

The speech, drafted by Bao Tong, marks the beginning of the open split between Zhao and Deng. To cement the image of Zhao as the great conciliator, his aide Bao has the national television networks broadcast the speech this evening and repeat it over the next three days. And he has The People's Daily run the text on the front page and include a roundup of positive responses from the public.

During the week, the demonstrations subside, but Chinese journalists begin to be more aggressive in demanding freedom of the press. For Zhao, the demands represent a chance to position himself as the man of the future.

On May 6, he summons two senior party officials in charge of propaganda, Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen. ''There is no big risk in opening up a bit by reporting the demonstrations and increasing the openness of news,'' Zhao tells them, according to an account later circulated by the Government. The same day, Hu Qili meets with the publishers of China's eight largest newspapers and tells them they can ease up their control. Journalists rush to oblige Zhao, describing what is happening in the streets. The coverage lends new impetus to the democracy movement.

MAY 8. The bosses of Beijing, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong, are outraged. The more the party opens up, the worse they look; in the streets they are increasingly portrayed as villains. The two officials have tried to force Zhao to call meetings so they can confront him with his divergence from the party line as expressed in The People's Daily editorial. Zhao resists; but finally, today, he calls a meeting.

It is a stormy and inconclusive session. The Beijing party faction bitterly criticizes the party leader's May 4 speech, accusing Zhao of betraying the party.

''Who has betrayed you?'' Zhao retorts, according to a Government report. ''It was only during the Cultural Revolution that people were betrayed . . . If I made incorrect remarks, I'll bear the responsibility.''

MAY 11. The paralysis in the leadership, and the public groundswell for change, are combining to help Zhao. According to some sources, Zhao is at his finest when the Politburo gathers in an expanded meeting in Zhongnanhai.

In addition to the regular Politburo members, other prominent officials fill the chairs around the table. But Deng Xiaoping does not attend, and this gives Zhao an edge; in Deng's absence, it is he who holds the position of authority.

It is a tense time; Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev is due to arrive in a few days for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, and yet the student movement threatens further unrest.

Zhao seeks a mandate for his conciliatory approach, urging that the leadership move toward some of the principles of the democracy movement - particularly an end to corruption and a more open government. He submits a letter welcoming an investigation of his two eldest sons, who are known to be using their connections to make immense sums of money.

This is one of Zhao's key efforts to turn himself from party boss to populist, and at first it seems to work. In the absence of any organized opposition, the meeting ends with a half-hearted endorsement of Zhao's approach.Zhao can stay in control and consolidate his position,'' he says. ''The worst stage of the fire appears to be over, but there is still danger.'' The key, he says, is that Zhao's conciliatory approach has to be proven effective: The students will have to respond by ending their occupation of Tiananmen and returning to campus.

But this is not what happens. Instead, the protests escalate, and the students thereby doom their protector.


大約在同一時間，我吃午飯，趙的助手之一，一個才華橫溢的年輕男子試圖重塑中國，他是滿懷希望，他一直在幾個月。 “有希望可以留在趙控制和鞏固他的地位，他說。 “火的最糟糕的階段似乎已經過去，但仍然有危險。''他說，關鍵是，趙和解的方法已被證明有效的：學生們將不得不結束自己的職業天安門回應重返校園。

但是，這是不是發生了什麼。相反，抗議活動升級，學生從而厄運他們的保護者。

MAY 13. The students begin a hunger strike on Tiananmen Square, and sympathetic citizens surge onto the streets to show support, literally taking over the center of the capital.

During Gorbachev's visit, there is chaos. The embarrassed Chinese Government finds itself constantly rearranging its plans to avoid interruption by the students.

During this time, Yan Mingfu, the party's chief negotiator, pleads with the students to go home, warning in a private meeting that, if they press too far, they could well destroy those leaders who sympathize with them. The students listen politely but refuse to compromise; these are matters of principle, they say. Though Zhao's rivals view the demonstrators as pawns of the party leader, the students' action at this point undermines their supposed sponsor.

In the struggle within the leadership, the turmoil creates new uncertainties. Zhao, no doubt realizing that hardliners will try to seize on the growing chaos to force his retirement, takes the offensive. On May 16, during his televised meeting with Gorbachev, Zhao Ziyang lunges for power.

''Our whole party cannot do without comrade Deng Xiaoping's helmsmanship on important issues,'' Zhao tells Gorbachev and the watching Chinese people. ''We formally adopted a decision at the first plenary session of the 13th Party Congress that on important questions we still need him as the helmsman. The decision has never been released until today, but it is a very important decision.''
To outsiders, this seems a defense of the senior leader. It is the opposite. Many Chinese immediately understand that Zhao is blaming his long-time patron for the stalemate over the students. Zhao is saying that he would like to meet the student demands, but that Deng, ''the helmsman,'' will not allow it.

MAY 17. As the streets overflow with protesters and the Government loses control of the capital, the Politburo Standing Committee is summoned to the home of a furious Deng Xiaoping.

It is there, according to many Chinese officials, at a stormy meeting in the home of his former patron, that Zhao pleads for a program of conciliation with the students. It is the moment of confrontation, but Deng and his prestige prevail. Zhao is a minority of one - with Prime Minister Li Peng and the planning czar Yao Yilin strongly opposed, the security chief Qiao Shi emphasizing the need for order and the propaganda boss Hu Qili, though sympathetic to Zhao, still unwilling to disagree openly with Deng. Although no formal decision is taken, it is at this meeting that China is set firmly on the course toward June 4.

Having lost the vote, Zhao does not give up. His aides lobby furiously, sensing that Qiao Shi and Hu Qili can be persuaded to come around. Meanwhile, to put further pressure on the party, Zhao submits his resignation.
''My way of thinking is not in accord with your way of thinking,'' Zhao writes Deng. Zhao knows that the announcement of his resignation might well bring further protests, and gambles that the Politburo will prefer to adopt his proposals than risk being blamed for ousting him.

But Deng refuses to accept the resignation, and a day later Zhao revokes the offer. Instead, Zhao goes on sick leave, announcing that because of some unspecified ailment he will henceforth not participate in party business. Meanwhile, he tries to take his case to the people, leaking word of the May 17 Politburo session (reportedly, through Bao Tong). A new wave of public anger and indignation at the leadership follows -and with it, for the first time, a certain amount of sympathy for Zhao.

Around this time, a Mercedes Benz limousine with an A01 license plate and darkened windows pulls out of Zhongnanhai. The car slowly circles Tiananmen Square several times, so the passenger can see for himself the enormous demonstrations.

In the car is Zhao Ziyang. All week, he has been telling aides and other officials he wants to visit the demonstrators - which would advance his conciliatory posture one step further. But when he proposes this idea to his colleagues, Li Peng vetoes it as too radical a move. So Zhao drives around the square, observing events - if only from behind the darkened windows.
Meanwhile, after the epochal May 17 meeting, Deng and his elderly colleagues, together with Li Peng and the conservative faction in the Politburo, decide to call troops into the capital and declare martial law. One aim, of course, is to re-establish order and win the streets back from the demonstrators. But there is another reason, perhaps a more important one: Deng and his colleagues, believing they have been betrayed by Zhao, fear the party leader might somehow mount a coup d'etat. They intend the troops to guard key government installations and ministries from a possible attack.

Amid this atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion, party officials hold hurried negotiations, debating how exactly to summon the troops. Zhao sends for Yan Mingfu. The party leader asks him to visit President Yang Shangkun where, pretending he is acting on his own initiative, Yan is to urge the President not to call in the Army.

Yan, torn between conflicting loyalties, goes to see the President. ''Zhao Ziyang has asked me to come to you and urge that the army not be summoned to Beijing,'' he tells Yang, and adds, according to a well-placed party official, ''I was supposed to say it was my own idea, not his.'' President Yang is angry at Yan for being a lackey of Zhao, and Zhao is furious at Yan's betrayal.

Word spreads that General Xu, commander of the 38th Army, has refused to move his troops into the capital. The consternation at Zhongnanhai grows. ''I moved troops against the people once'' - on April 27 - General Xu reportedly says. ''I'm not going to do it again.''
Rather than command his troops, General Xu reports to a local hospital. His disobedience is doubly worrying because he is the son of one of China's most senior military figures, Xu Haideng. If he cannot be trusted, who can be?

MAY 19. In Tiananmen Square, the hunger strikers have been fasting for nearly a week, and many of them have begun to drift in and out of consciousness. Each time a student faints, an ambulance races through the crowd along a special lane that is kept open for the purpose.

Within Zhongnanhai, the almost constant sirens exacerbate the sense of crisis. Zhao repeatedly asks permission to go out and show sympathy for the hunger strikers, but other Politburo members refuse the request.

Finally, early this morning, Zhao announces he is going to the square anyway. In an effort to show party unity, an appalled Li Peng trails behind as Zhao leads a small retinue into the square. ''We have come too late,'' Zhao tells the students, as tears well in his eyes.

Deeply disturbed by what he regards as the chaos growing around him, Li Peng convenes the Politburo Standing Committee later in the day to endorse the declaration of martial law. Li also arranges for a televised mass meeting that evening in the Army-owned Jingxi Hotel. Zhao, who apparently led his colleagues to believe he would preside, at the last minute refuses to attend.''At least sit at the rostrum to show unity,'' President Yang reportedly pleads. ''You don't even have to say anything.'' But Zhao insists he cannot go along with the crackdown, and that in any case he is ill.

Instead, Qiao Shi presides and Li Peng gives the main speech. Then President Yang makes an impromptu announcement ordering troops into the capital. Though the plan had been not to impose martial law until the early hours of May 21, troops are already visible on the streets. Martial law is formally imposed on May 20.


相反，喬石主持，李鵬給出了主要講話。然後命令部隊進入資本總裁楊做一個即興公佈。雖然該計劃一直沒有實行戒嚴，直到5月21日凌晨，部隊已經在街道上可見。 5月20日正式實行戒嚴。

But when the bulk of the troops arrive at the outskirts of the capital, citizens rush from their homes to block their way, some people lying down in the street in front of the military trucks. Hundreds of thousands of protesters, organized in groups representing factories and offices and even the Foreign Ministry, parade through the center of the city.

With the troops stymied, it seems for a few days that Zhao might win after all. But how can he convert this apparent victory in the streets to a political triumph within the party?

Zhao quickly turns to the mechanism of the National People's Congress to revoke martial law and perhaps even impeach Li Peng. Almost a third of the 158 members of the Congress's Standing Committee agree to hold a special session (an entirely legal process, but one that eventually lands an organizer, Cao Siyuan, in prison). Zhao then surreptitiously sends a message to the head of the Congress, Wan Li, who is visiting the United States, to rush home.

When Li Peng finds out about the message shortly thereafter, he hurriedly convenes a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which sends an equally urgent cable to Wan Li ordering him to remain in the United States. Having received both cables, and with the situation in Beijing appearing increasingly chaotic, Wan has no idea what to do.

但是，當大量的部隊到達首都郊區，市民急於從他們的家園，以阻止他們的方式，有些人在前面的軍用卡車在街上躺著。數以百計的數千名示威者，在工廠和辦事處的代表組織，甚至外交部，通過中心城市的遊行。

隨著部隊陷入困境，似乎趙畢竟可能贏得了幾天。但是他如何能在街頭轉換這種明顯的勝利在黨內的政治勝利？

趙迅速變為全國人大撤銷戒嚴，甚至彈劾李鵬的機制。幾乎有三分之一的158個成員大會常務委員會同意舉行特別會議（一個完全合法的過程，但最終土地組織者，曹思源，在監獄裡）。趙然後偷偷地發送一個消息給國會的頭，萬里，誰是美國的訪問，要趕回家。

當李鵬發現有關的消息，此後不久，他慌忙召開中央政治局常委會議，發送同樣迫切的電纜連接到命令他留在美國萬麗。收到這兩種電纜，在北京出現越來越混亂的局面，萬不知道做什麼。

MAY 23. Finally, after meeting President Bush in Washington, Wan Li cuts his trip short, announcing that because of illness he is returning to China. Bao Tong tries to have someone meet his plane in Shanghai, but the other faction is a step ahead. As soon as the plane touches down, a limousine sent by Shanghai boss Jiang Zemin rolls onto the tarmac, collects Wan and bundles him off to a guest house where the situation is explained to him. After some discussion, Wan Li agrees to back his old friend Deng Xiaoping and support martial law.

After this episode, Bao Tong notices he is being followed, and his telephone tapped. A few days later, he is arrested. Meanwhile, the bodyguards assigned to his boss, Zhao Ziyang, are changed, and the nine new guards respond not to his commands but to the Politburo's. Zhao's secretary is dismissed, and is spared arrest only because the Politburo thinks well of his family.

Around this time, there are frequent reports that Deng Xiaoping is traveling to Wuhan and other cities to meet with military leaders and ask for their support. But Chinese officials with knowledge of Deng's movements say this never happened. Deng and his colleagues were already consolidating their hold over the party and the military, and as it became clear that Zhao had lost the battle, people streamed to the winning side.

Provincial leaders are summoned to Beijing for indoctrination. They are housed in special guest houses and forbidden to bring more than one aide; all their movements are controlled to prevent contact with the Zhao forces. Some complain that they are treated as virtual prisoners.

5月23。最後，在華盛頓會見美國總統布什後，萬里削減他的行程短，宣布因為生病，他回到中國。鮑彤試圖有人滿足他的飛機在上海，但另一派是領先一步的。只要飛機著陸，由上海老闆江澤民輥傳送到停機坪上，一輛豪華轎車收集灣及捆綁他來家裡做客的情況向他解釋。經過一番討論後，萬里同意支持他的老朋友鄧小平和支持戒嚴。

這段小插曲過後，寶通通知他被跟踪，竊聽了他的電話。幾天後，他被逮捕。同時，分配給他的老闆，趙紫陽的保鏢被改變，不回應他的命令，但政治局九個新衛士。趙的秘書被駁回，和是不遺餘力只逮捕，因為中央政治局認為，他的家人。

大約在這個時候，經常有報導，鄧小平前往武漢等城市，以滿足軍事領導人，請他們支持。但中國官員說，這從來沒有發生過鄧小平的運動知識。鄧小平和他的同事們已經鞏固他們在黨和軍隊的保持，因為它變得清晰，趙已經失去了戰鬥，人分流到勝利的一方。

省領導被召集到北京灌輸。他們被安置在特殊的招待所和禁止攜帶超過一個助手;控制他們的行動，以防止接觸趙部隊。有人抱怨說，他們被視為虛擬的囚犯。

The conservative faction -particularly Li Peng, Yao Yilin, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong - now has the edge, and the latter two Beijing officials are expecting promotion. But on May 31, Deng meets with Li Peng and Yao Yilin, and tells them the party needs fresh faces. Deng has already consulted with his octagenarian colleagues, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, and decided to choose Jiang Zemin to replace Zhao.

''I hope everyone will regard Jiang Zemin as the core of the party and unite together,'' Deng tells Li Peng and Yao Yilin, according to the confidential text of his remarks. ''Please don't look down on each other and waste energy fighting among yourselves.''

保守派特別是李鵬，姚依林，李錫銘和陳希同 - 現在有優勢，​​後兩者在北京的官員都希望推廣。但在5月31日，鄧小平會見李鵬，姚依林，並且告訴他們黨需要新鮮的面孔。鄧已經諮詢與他octagenarian的同事，陳雲，李先念，決定選擇江澤民取代趙。

“我希望每個人都會把江澤民同志為核心的黨的團結在一起，鄧小平告訴李鵬，姚依林，根據他的言論機密文本。 “請不要看不起對方和能源浪費戰鬥在你們中間。

JUNE 3. Thousands of troops have infiltrated into the capital, and people are growing accustomed to them - even in the Tiananmen Square area. The demonstration itself has lost much of its impetus, with many students from outside the capital returning to their homes. Fewer than 10,000 - probably considerably fewer - are still living in the square.

During the early hours of this Saturday morning, thousands of soldiers are sent into Beijing from the east, probably to bolster the show of force in the capital and gradually restore order. At this hour, the streets are empty of civilians, and it seems likely the plan was for the troops to enter the city quietly, without attracting attention.

But shortly before midnight, three miles west of Tiananmen, a speeding police van had swerved out of control, killing three bicyclists. An angry crowd quickly gathered, and many of the suspicious people insisted the incident was intentional. Some also declared that since the van was racing toward Tiananmen Square, the police must be preparing to evict the demonstrators.

The news has raced around Beijing, and, for the first time in a week, people swarm out of their houses to occupy the streets. The angry, defiant crowds soon encounter the exhausted soldiers, who are just finishing their forced march into the city, confirming the public impression that the authorities are scheming to attack the students. The indignant citizens search all vehicles passing by on the roads, and beat up some of the soldiers.
The troops are unarmed, probably to insure safety during the trip; their gear and weapons are transported separately in buses taking another route. Under normal conditions, these buses would never have been stopped, but after the accident, they are halted and searched, and machine guns are found. The discovery further inflames the crowds, and angry citizens confiscate the weapons.

6月3日。十萬大軍已滲入首都，人們越來越多的習慣 - 即使是在天安門地區。示範本身已經失去了它的動力，從境外資本很多學生返回自己的家園。不到10,000 - 可能相當少 - 仍然住在廣場上。

在這個星期六早上凌晨，數千名士兵被送入北京東部，可能以加強資本炫耀武力，並逐步恢復秩序。在這一小時中，滿街都是空的平民，而且似乎該計劃是為部隊悄悄地進入城市，沒有引起人們的注意。

但午夜前不久，三個位於天安門，一輛飛馳的警車駛向失控，殺害三名騎自行車。憤怒的人群迅速聚集，許多可疑人民堅持事件是故意的。有些人還宣布，由於麵包車賽車走向天安門廣場，警察必須準備驅逐示威者。

這一消息已經在北京比賽，並首次在一個星期，人們蜂擁而上，他們的房子佔據了街道。生氣，目中無人的人群很快遇到疲憊的士兵，誰是剛剛完成他們的急行軍進了城，確認公眾的印象，當局正策劃攻擊學生。憤怒的公民搜索所有車輛通過的道路上，並打了一些士兵。

部隊是手無寸鐵的，大概要確保安全，在旅途中，他們的裝備和武器都在採取另一條路線的巴士分別運送。正常情況下，絕不會被這些公交車停了下來，但事故發生後，他們都停止和搜查，發現機槍。這一發現進一步煽風點火的人群，憤怒的市民沒收的武器。

JUNE 4. News that troops have been beaten, and guns stolen, alarms the conservative officials now holding the reins of power. Though the capital has been growing steadily calmer during the last week, the leaders decide they have to act decisively. And so Deng and his colleagues order the Army to take control of the city, using whatever force is required.

What happens before dawn on this Sunday has been much written about, and much confused. Based on my observations in the streets, neither the official account nor many of the foreign versions are quite correct.

There is no massacre in Tiananmen Square, for example, although there is plenty of killing elsewhere. Troops frequently fire at crowds who are no threat to them, and at times aim directly at medical personnel and ambulances. Some of those who are shot have been threatening the troops - for while the students have generally urged nonviolence, many young workers carry firebombs or pipes, and they manage to kill more than a dozen soldiers or policemen. But many other civilians are casually slaughtered for no apparent reason.

An acquaintance of mine, the only son of a party member who has always believed in the Government, is riding his bicycle to work in northeast Beijing that morning when a detachment of soldiers sees him. They shoot him in the back, killing him. He becomes simply another data point in the tragedy of 20th-century China.

6月4日。新聞部隊已遭到毆打，槍支被盜，報警保守的官員現在掌權。雖然資金一直在穩步增長，在過去的一周平靜，領導人決定他們必須採取果斷的行動。所以鄧小平​​和他的同事為了陸軍採取控制的城市，使用任何武力是必需的。

會發生什麼事黎明之前一直備受寫在這個星期日，很多困惑。根據我的觀察在街上，無論是官方賬號，也沒有很多國外版本是相當正確的。

有沒有在天安門廣場的大屠殺，例如，雖然有很多別處殺害。部隊經常沒有威脅到他們的人群開火，有時直接以醫療人員和救護車。那些被槍殺的人已經威脅到部隊 - 而學生普遍呼籲非暴力，許多年輕的工人攜帶燃燒彈或管道，他們管理就殺了十幾名士兵或警察。不過，其他許多平民隨便屠宰沒有明顯的原因。

我的一個熟人，誰始終相信在政府的一名黨員，唯一的兒子騎著他的自行車，今天上午在北京東北部，當一支隊戰士看到他的工作。他們在後面拍他，殺害他。他簡直變成另一個數據點，在20世紀中國的悲劇。

ARMED FORCE ENABLED Deng and his colleagues to regain control over the capital, and during the months since, the leadership has slowly been consolidating its authority and purging those who are judged to have failed the test. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all his offices and has vanished into a walled villa at No. 6 Fuqiang Alley, where he is said to spend much of his time reading. Bao Tong remains in prison.

Yet the killings of early June did not resolve the power struggles, they intensified them. There still is no consensus in the leadership about how China should be managed politically or economically. The leaders continue to fight among themselves about what economic policies to endorse, and whom to promote or purge.

On the surface, a degree of normalcy is returning to China, and martial law has been relaxed in Beijing. But there remain deep and unresolved tensions that have only been exacerbated by the bloodshed. Many Chinese compare the present period to the jockeying for power at the end of the Maoist era in 1976, and they note that the Maoist political hierarchy and economic system collapsed only two years after Mao died. When Deng and his octagenarian colleagues follow Mao, the same thing may well happen.
At that time, when change finally comes, it is likely to be all the more rapid, all the more sweeping, for having been repressed in 1989. Many of my Communist friends used to believe in the system. Now they are no longer Communists but simply party members who believe neither in the party nor in Communism
Zhao could well re-emerge - now 70, he is still four years younger than Deng was on his triumphal return to power in 1978 - but the change will not depend on him; for throughout the party and nation there is a deep longing for change, a deep sadness about what has happened. Today, many Chinese remember the words of the great writer Lu Xun early in this century: ''Lies written in ink cannot obscure a truth written in blood.''

鄧小平和他的同事啟用武力奪回首都的控制權，並在幾個月以來，領導已經慢慢被鞏固其權力和清除那些被判定為失敗的測試。趙紫陽被剝奪了他的辦公室，並在富強胡同6號，據說他花他的時間閱讀到一個有圍牆的別墅已經消失。寶通仍然在監獄裡。

然而，六月初殺害並沒有解決權力鬥爭，他們加劇了他們。還有關於中國應如何在政治上或經濟上的管理是沒有共識的領導。領導人繼續彼此之間的鬥爭有關認可什麼樣的經濟政策，以及促進或清除。

從表面上看，有一定程度的正常返回中國，並在北京已放寬戒嚴。但仍然存在著深刻而尚未解決的緊張已經加劇了流血。許多中國人比較目前時期權力爭奪在毛澤東時代結束於1976年，他們注意到，毛澤東的政治階層和經濟體系崩潰毛澤東去世後僅兩年。當鄧小平和他的octagenarian同事跟隨毛澤東，同樣的事情可能發生。

當時，當變化終於來臨的時候，它可能會更快速，更徹底，於1989年被壓抑。許多共產黨的朋友我相信系統中。現在，他們不再是共產黨員，但只是黨員既不相信黨，也不是共產主義
趙很可能重新出現 - 現在70，他仍然是4歲的鄧小平是他在1978年凱旋回力 - 但這種變化將不依賴於他，整個黨和國家有很深的思變發生了什麼事了深刻的悲傷。今天，許多中國人還記得在本世紀初的偉大作家魯迅的話：“墨寫的謊言不能掩蓋血寫的一個真理。