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Third island chain .

The third island chain is the final part of the strategy. This island chain begins at the Aleutian Islands and runs south across the center of the Pacific Ocean towards Oceania, through the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa and Fiji, to reach New Zealand.^[1] Australia serves as the staple between the second and third chains.

.所謂的「島鏈」，是美國前國務卿杜勒斯在1951年提出的戰略概念，為的是防堵共產勢力擴散到太平洋。島鏈一共有三條，台灣位在第一島鏈的樞紐中心，第二島鏈在日本與巴紐之間，第三島鏈的核心則是夏威夷群島。台灣的南太平洋邦交國，絕大多數都位在第二島鏈與第三島鏈之間。

如今美國智庫的學者專家建議美國撤守至第三島鏈防禦為什麼?

20241231.中國海軍奪得太平洋第一島鏈的控制權.?..

.U.S. think tank calls on U.S. troops to retreat to third island chain.

太平洋第一、二島鏈擋不住中國海軍?

美智庫籲美軍後撤, 退到第三島鏈?  為什麼? 

美國人忘記"紅星照耀太平洋",

RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC, 夢想成真.

陸權大國(中國)打敗海權大國(美國) 指日可待?

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美國「海軍學院」202501報告,如果美國執意介入台海局勢,那麽就應該做好太平洋第一島鏈,第二島鏈失守，,守第三島鏈的準備。 

「第一島鏈」通常是指日本,琉球群島,台灣和菲律賓一線；「第二島鏈」以關島為核心，包括小笠原群島和馬利亞納群島等西太平洋島嶼；「第三島鏈」則以阿留申群島為起點，向南穿過太平洋中部並途經夏威夷、美屬薩摩亞和斐濟等島嶼，最後抵達紐西蘭。 

「海軍學院」在2024年的檢討報告書提出,當第一和第二島鏈的防空和導彈防禦面臨不確定性時,美國依託島鏈介入台海的戰略將充滿挑戰,這會迫使美國海空軍後退到第三島鏈。(阿留昇群島).裁是上上的策略.

中國現在擁有世界上最龐大的海軍,擁有370艘艦艇和潛艇以及140多艘主要水面作戰艦艇。中國13家海軍造船廠的產能也比美國7家海軍造船廠的總和還要多,這突顯了美國在海軍造船方面日益劣勢。

除此之外美國的某些智庫學者專家分析認為,美國海軍傲慢自大,自從2020年度以來否決中國海軍參加環太平洋軍事演習,RIMPAC.喪失偵測蒐集中國海軍最新艦艇的資訊,如055D.095SSN.096 SSBN.075 LHD.以及中國海軍其他的軍事演習的機密資訊,尤其是否055D.的海上試射各式各樣的反艦導向飛彈(水面水下空中)的參數資訊,導致於美國海軍關閉自守,自己玩弄海洋作戰遊戲,殊不知中國海軍強勢崛起,直追美國海軍,這樣一來是美國海軍自廢武功,不戰而敗事實,也是如此導致於202412.中國海軍挑戰美國海軍,爭奪太平洋第一島鏈的控制權,結果美國失敗從琉球群島撤軍是真的事件..

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20241207-20241231.中國海軍出動2 艘航空母艦戰群總計90艘各式各樣的軍艦及潛艦在太平洋第一島鏈與美國海軍對峙,並舉行實兵實彈的演習,爭奪太平洋第一島鏈的控制權成功.

「美國海上力量計畫」,也發佈了一篇假設 2026 年台海衝突爆發的「戰爭情景」報告稱,一旦台海局勢升級,解放軍會對第一和第二島鏈的美軍基地發起先發制人的打擊,以阻止美國干涉,「這就像 1941 年日本偷襲珍珠港一樣」。

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美國「海軍學院」這個邏輯實際上是歷史影射,其文章要表達的意思就是把今天的中國比成二戰的日本,先推導出一個「如果中美衝突爆發,美國會像二戰一樣守不住菲律賓」的判斷,然後再稱「等到美國重建第三島鏈基地後,一定會打回來」,最終得出「美必贏,中必輸」的結論。

美國海軍作戰部長（Lisa Franchetti）上將宣布最新的海軍作戰領航計畫「33號計劃」（Project 33）,旨在為可能與中國在2027年前發生的潛在衝突作好準備,同時提升海軍的長期優勢,並且解決和維護積壓和迎接中國海軍挑戰的問題,並重點關注戰備狀態,能力的提升等。

海軍戰爭學院（Naval War College）發布「美國作戰海軍領航計畫」,（Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy）,作為海軍的戰略指導方針。美國海軍於2022年發表的前一版本「美國作戰海軍領航計畫」,已經提到應對中國軍事威脅的必要性,而今年的新版則首度提到2027年的時間點。

美國海軍以2027年為目標,是因為這是中國國家主席習近平,要求軍隊做好戰爭準備的時間,即要求解放軍提前在2027年前完成具備攻台能力的準備? 

20241207-20241231美國海軍罕見的派出自第二次世界大戰以後強勢的3艘航空母艦戰鬥群,前往太平洋第一島鏈對抗中國海軍,結果"失敗,隨即發表自琉球群島撤出9000 名美軍至關島等地區,202501.美國「海軍學院」「美國海上力量計畫」發表由智庫學者專家的建議案,建議美國海軍撤守至太平洋第三島鏈,以圖日後的反攻計劃,打敗中國海軍,其中美國學者專家分析認為,如美國冒然介入日後爆發的台灣海峽兩岸的戰爭,必然失敗,且得不償失,因此許多因素導致於美國必須撤退至太平洋第三島鏈,保留實力,因為截至目前為止,美國無法攔截中國的超高音速彈道飛彈,如DF-17.DF-21.DF-26D.等系列的導向飛彈,可以直接攻擊到太平洋第二島鏈的關島,包括航空母艦戰鬥群,美國在多次的電腦模擬演練包括實際的演習結果,都是以失敗告終,無法抵擋中國海軍強勢的崛起,也就是說應證了

紅星照耀太平洋",RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC,一書中的描述情節,中國海軍打敗美國海軍,失去太平洋第一及第二島鏈的控制權,否則美國智庫的學者專家不會提出建議案,建議美國退守太平洋第三島鏈的計劃.

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.Red Star is at once succinct and expansive, accessible and erudite. Moreover, it is incredibly illuminating—the kind of book in which you will find yourself highlighting and writing notes in the margins. The authors don’t just admire the problem of China’s growing naval power; they explain how this power fits into China’s worldview and grand strategic design. They set out to tell us what Chinese leaders are doing and why. If you only have time to read one book about the challenge China poses to U.S. interests in the Pacific, make it this one.China often casts the island chain construct as Cold War relics, part of an “infrastructure of containment” built by America to keep China a second-rate power. It was, after all, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson who in 1950 first referred to an American “defense perimeter of the Pacific.” Douglas MacArthur, addressing Congress in 1951, stated that it was this “chain of islands” that would enable America to “dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.” So, it is not without reason that China’s leaders view these islands as ramparts defended by hostile prison guards. Red Star makes a compelling argument that all of China’s maritime actions must be viewed through this lens.

20241207-20241231.中國海軍出動2 艘航空母艦戰群,總計90艘各式各樣的軍艦及潛艦,在太平洋第一島鏈與美國海軍對峙.並舉行實兵實彈的演習.

美國海上力量計畫」,也發佈了一篇假設 2026 年台海衝突爆發的「戰爭情景」報告稱,一旦台海局勢升級,解放軍會對第一和第二島鏈的美軍基地,發起先發制人的打擊,以阻止美國干涉,「這就像 1941 年日本偷襲珍珠港一樣」。

美國「海軍學院」這個邏輯實際上是歷史影射，其文章要表達的意思就是把今天的中國比成二戰的日本：先推導出一個「如果中美衝突爆發，美國會像二戰一樣守不住菲律賓」的判斷，然後再稱「等到美國重建第三島鏈基地後，一定會打回來」，最終得出「美必贏、中必輸」的結論。

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.20241207-20241231美國海軍罕見的派出自第二次世界大戰以後強勢的3艘航空母艦戰鬥群前往太平洋第一島鏈對抗中國海軍 結果"失敗",隨即發表自琉球群島撤出9000 名美軍至關島等地區.202501.美國「海軍學院」「美國海上力量計畫」發表由智庫學者專家的建議案,建議美國海軍撤守至太平洋第三島鏈,以圖日後的反攻計劃打敗中國海軍.,中美國學者專家分析認為,如美國冒然介入日後爆發的台灣海峽兩岸的戰爭,必然失敗,且得不償失,因此許多因素導致於美國必須撤退至太平洋第三島鏈,保留實力,因為截至目前為止美國無法攔截中國的超高音速彈道飛彈,如果DF-17.DF-21.DF-26D.等系列的導向飛彈,可以直接攻擊到太平洋第二島鏈的關島,包括航空母艦戰鬥群,美國在多次的電腦模擬演練包括實際的演習結果,都是以失敗告終,無法抵擋中國海軍強勢迪崛起,也就是說應證了,紅星照耀太洋,RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC,一書中的描述情節中國海軍打敗美國海軍導致於議和失去太平洋第一及第二島鏈的控制權.

China’s DF-21D And DF-26B ASBMs: Is The U.S. Military Ready?

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 .U.S. rivals understand the powerful geography of the Aleutian Island Chain. The United States should build new infrastructure on the Aleutians to strengthen deterrence, protect trade, and evacuate U.S. aircraft in the event of an attack in the Pacific.

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Bases on the Aleutian Islands Would Project U.S. Power Across the Pacific.Aleutian bases could complicate adversary access to the Arctic and be staging grounds for operations in a Pacific conflict

.The Aleutian Island Chain stretches more than 1,000 miles west across the Pacific from the Alaska Peninsula. The rugged islands dot the North Pacific shipping route and guard the approaches to the Arctic.

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Control the Arctic Crossroads:At 51 degrees North, the same latitude as London, Adak is the southernmost port in Alaska. It is closest to the great-circle shipping lanes that arc between Asia and North America, making it the most logical stop for U.S. warships or convoys traversing the Pacific. While Adak is roughly 1,000 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle, it forms the center of a natural island barrier that could control access to the Arctic.

.In 2021, Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan said the Navy was interested in reopening a base on Adak that was closed in 1997. Sullivan claimed the island “is enormously strategic in terms of [being] really the gateway to the Asia-Pacific and the gateway to the Arctic.”³ A base on Adak could provide expeditionary logistics for U.S warship and submarine deployments to control these waters. This would protect existing transPacific and emerging Arctic trade routes. At the same time, it would control access to strategically vital waterways. In any conflict, the Aleutians would become the fastest and safest route for convoys headed to the western Pacific.

 The same route through Honolulu is 6,300 nm. More important, Adak sits 2,900 nm from Okinawa while Honolulu is 4,000 nm distant, making Adak the closest U.S. port outside of Guam to Taiwan. 

.Rather than position high-value assets such as carriers within China’s weapons engagement zone, the United States could station bombers equipped with long-range missiles that could threaten Chinese targets from safer stand-off distances, potentially reducing U.S. losses.⁶ Eareckson’s airfield is 2,900 nm from the Taiwan Strait.

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 .China seeks nothing less than to displace the United States as the preeminent power in the Pacific, if not the world. It intends to make a new order that expands the reach of its state-driven economic model.To achieve this vision, Chinas leaders have characterized the first two decades of the 21st century as a "period of strategic opportunity," during which Xi Jinpings “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation can be realized.

Red Star concludes by arguing there must be major changes to America’s maritime strategy in the Pacific if Xi’s vision is to remain unrealized. The first step is recognizing that China is already an unhyphenated peer competitor. American naval power should be recalibrated around this threat. American naval strategists must relearn the tenets of Mahanism still useful in the 21st century—access and communication through alliance, collective defense, and free trade shored up by a powerful navy.

.The authors do not subscribe to the determinism of Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap. They do advise Western strategists to “temper the sinister,” without “quashing [the] benign.” They recommend an American maritime strategy that approximates a “new Cold War,” setting up tripwire forces and layered defenses that might forestall China’s advance beyond the first island chain.

“Steadfast, firm, patient pushback,” they write, “could induce Beijing to postpone its ambitions.” They leave us with the almost wistful thought that, “if it postpones them long enough, internal change could engender more healthful attitudes toward regional politics.”

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