A pressing need for submarines

By Wang Jyh-perng 王志鵬

(本文刊登於2012年2月26日，Taipei Times，版8)

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) will apparently officially propose a plan during the current legislative session to produce submarines domestically. Unlike the 2001 Sea Star Project, under which Taiwan was to purchase eight 2,000-tonne submarines from the US, the new project aims to either develop a 1,000 to 1,500-tonne prototype through technology transfer or purchase second-hand submarines to replace the old Guppy-class submarines and then develop new submarines after obtaining sufficient capability to do so.

Either way, the project is likely to gain support from the governing and opposition parties, as well as that of the defense industry. Whether it is pushed through, subsequent to approval of the budget, depends entirely on President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).

The 2001 submarine purchase plan, originally the most important of the three major arms procurement targets, has been dead in the water ever since the US Navy’s “independent cost estimate” (ICE) of as much as NT$290 billion (US$9.8 billion) led to it being boycotted by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP). At the time, the issue was exploited by political parties wrangling over power in the legislature.

The Republic of China (ROC) Navy has previously always insisted on purchasing submarines directly. By the time US President Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush in 2008, China was much more powerful, both economically and militarily. Just as Beijing has been expanding its navy, the US has been gradually reducing its military budget because of various internal and external issues. With the Sino-US “co-management” of Taiwan and better cross-strait relations, there has been little chance of direct US submarine sales to Taiwan and the original procurement project has been sidelined.

Over the past 10 years, Australia and South Korea have been the most successful countries in terms of submarine development in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia plans to spend US$36 billion to build 12 new advanced submarines, which are expected to be ready for testing by 2022 and in service by 2025. However, a large-scale submarine project is also problematic, the biggest issues being securing the funding and deciding whether the submarines should be built domestically or purchased directly. Ultimately, the Australian government and navy decided to build the submarines domestically.

South Korea, having previously built Type 209 submarines, continued by pursuing German-made Type 214 submarines. According to a recent report, Indonesia plans to spend US$1.1 billion to purchase three South Korean Type 209, 1,400-tonne submarines, the first of which is to be delivered in 2018. This is a result of the cooperation and efforts of the South Korean government, navy and industry over the past 10 years.

In the face of China’s military rise, Taiwan cannot and should not engage in an arms race, yet it must inevitably make significant changes to its defense strategy. According to the MND’s March 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, priority is now to be given to preventing enemies from making landfall.

The report said: “The size of the ROC Armed Forces shall be adequately measured by combat requirements, [the armed forces] should be large enough to safeguard the country, but not so large that they cause a financial burden. The goal for the ROC Armed Forces is to prevent enemies from landing and establishing a beachhead. Defense resources, therefore, shall mainly be allocated to major combat forces, and applied to develop basic and asymmetric forces in order to ensure the sustainability of total combat capability.”

In addition, according to the MND’s 2011 National Defense Report, the ministry should integrate the armed forces to disable the enemy’s operational center of gravity and execute joint interception, anchorage and beachhead attacks, so as to achieve the strategic goal of preventing enemies from landing.

“Joint operations of the ROC Armed Forces are focused on building long-range precision operations and synchronous joint engagement capabilities, and the simultaneous application of precision strikes, multilayered interceptions, anchorage and beachhead attacks, and asymmetrical operations,” the biannual report states.

“When the enemy’s intention to invade is apparent or the enemy has already taken action, troops and fire support of the armed forces is deployed according to their effective range to disable the enemy’s operational center of gravity, execute joint interception, anchorage and beachhead attack, and achieve the militarily strategic goals of preventing enemies from landing and disembarking on Taiwan,” the report adds.

All of this is true, but the key is to have an adequate number of submarines.

Taiwan’s situation is different from that of either Australia or South Korea. Still, it makes sense to produce our own submarine prototype, just as we produced the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Despite the research and development, as well as all obstacles it may face, it at least shows a degree of determination to develop a defensive capability, not to mention the significant strategic implications this would have for Taiwan-China-US relations. Although the submarine project comes so late, the MND and navy deserve our praise for the change, because they are aware of the situation and the need to push for it.

Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

Translated by Eddy Chang