原文如下：

Andrew Yang

Taiwan's Deputy Defense Minister

By Wendell Minnick
Published: 7 August 2011 p.30

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) continues to maintain a strong deterrence in the face of a growing Chinese military threat. The island state's future is uncertain as the U.S. and China grow closer and Washington wavers on the sale of new F-16 fighter jets. This makes Nien-Dzu "Andrew" Yang's role as the MND's policy coordinator a challenge.

The stakes are high. Should China capture or confederate Taiwan, the potential is great for destabilizing the region. China, which continues to threaten to impose unification by force, has more than 1,400 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. The MND, meanwhile, faces budget constraints as it struggles to implement an all-volunteer force, begin an expensive streamlining program, pay for $16 billion in new U.S. arms released since 2007, and convince Washington to sell it F-16s and submarines. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced recently the decision would be made by Oct. 1.

Adding to the confusion, since 2008, China and Taiwan have signed historic economic agreements that are moving them closer together. Taiwan has just opened the floodgates for mainland Chinese visitors, prompting fears of an increase in espionage and agents of influence here.

Yang is a former secretary-general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies and adviser to the Mainland Affairs Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MND.

Q. China now has unprecedented influence over the U.S. with its economic, diplomatic and military muscle. How can Taiwan expect the U.S. to continue to defend Taiwan?

A. We are certainly aware that Beijing is a very important global and regional power and has close mutual interests with the United States. High-level visits are becoming regular in intensity. Beijing is increasing their influence over Washington decision-making not only over Taiwan, but over other important regional and global issues.

We firmly believe that Washington still plays great influence in Asia and has repeatedly made strong commitments to regional security. Taiwan is a very important factor contributing to the multilateral effort to preserve peace and stability in this region. So I do not think the United States will tip over to Beijing's side and ignore its vested interest in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Taiwan. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized they will continue to honor the Taiwan Relations Act and provide adequate and necessary articles to enhance our self-defense.

Q. How has the U.S. reacted to a reduction of tension between China and Taiwan since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 election?

A. The U.S. fully supports President Ma's strategy and approaches. They consider his approach as a way to de-escalate tensions and find opportunities to enhance peace dividends and to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation. This has, in a way, made Beijing less belligerent toward Taiwan.

Q. Has China reduced the military threat against Taiwan, or the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan?

A. No, they have not done anything yet. There has been nothing from Beijing's top leadership on the issue. I think Beijing considers that both sides can create a new kind of status quo based on engagement. It doesn't mean that Beijing is reducing its military preparations over Taiwan, but they have to think twice in terms of their approach.

There are more mutual interests involved, not just between Taiwan and mainland China, but also multilateral interests in this region, which Beijing needs to continue to develop its economy and stabilize its society. So Beijing has to make some kind of calculation here - whether to rock the boat for the sake of pursuing Beijing's unification policy, either by force or by other means; or work side-by-side with Taiwan and regional partners to create a more stable, peaceful and prosperous environment.

Q. As the U.S. becomes economically weaker and defense budgets are slashed, many in China see the U.S. as a declining superpower. Will this encourage Chinese adventurism?

A. If you look at Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Washington earlier this year, it seems to me that from the policymaker's point of view, they don't look at each other as enemies. That's number one. They are still reaching out to each other to the best of their ability to create a win-win situation. From Chinese leaders' comments, they are not taking advantage of U.S. weakness to advance Chinese strategic or national interests in this region. They still emphasize that China should work along with the U.S. to resolve many problems around the world.

Q. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the U.S. will decide about the sale of 66 F-16C/D fighters by Oct. 1. What do you think Beijing's reaction will be if the U.S. releases new F-16s to Taiwan? China calls it a "red line."

A. They will be extremely unpleasant and upset, as they always are. They've been calling everything a red line for 30 years, ever since 1979, when the U.S. switched relations from Taipei to Beijing.

If we don't get the F-16C/Ds to replace our vintage fighters, then we lose our leverage and immediately face the challenge of fulfilling our responsibility of preserving peace and stability in the region. Washington sometimes does not get the right picture of Taiwan's responsibility. That is part of the reason we want new fighters. Otherwise, the U.S. has to send its own military to replace our daily patrols in the region.

China has already sent a strong warning to Washington that if such a decision is adopted, then U.S.-China relations will be damaged. Cutting off regular military exchanges is one way to show Beijing's animosity. But if we look at previous experiences, they will be downgraded for a while, but they have strong mutual interests binding each other together. So they have to make a decision on what will be the next step.

Q. Economic sanctions?

A. I don't think Beijing will take drastic economic actions against the U.S., because they have a lot of investments, including huge foreign reserves in U.S. banks. If the U.S. economy suffers, Beijing suffers.

Q. The U.S. offered Taiwan eight submarines in 2001, but the deal has been stalled. What's the status?

A. It's a long-delayed decision by the U.S. We are constantly urging them to pay attention to our concerns because we consider submarines to be important to our self-defense.

Q. What would happen if China took control of Taiwan and placed bases here?

A. It opens the door for Chinese military and power projection not only into the East China Sea, but also into the South China Sea. Taiwan would become an important hub and stepping stone for China to exert and expand its presence in the South China Sea, which is certainly not in the U.S. interest. It would immediately challenge U.S. strategic calculations and its security umbrella in the Asia-Pacific region. If Taiwan becomes part of China in terms of political integration in the future, then immediately the United States will lose a vital interest in this part of the world.

Q. There has been talk about beefing up Taiwan's military presence on Taiping Island in the South China Sea.

A. We are not ruling out our options. But the current decision adopted by the National Security Council and the president is to improve and reinforce the Coast Guard's capability on the island. So the Marines are training the Coast Guard members stationed on the island. We are also evaluating whether they can actually perform the assigned responsibilities and duties to protect the island and conduct judicial patrol over the waters.

We will never allow China to step onto the island. It is part of our territory, under our management. There is no room for compromise.

Q. Is the primary Chinese military threat amphibious invasion or missile bombardment?

A. It's a combination. They have all sorts of options at hand.

Of course, Beijing will use the minimum military option to achieve maximum political objectives. Our way of defending ourselves is to make sure they pay a high price and cannot succeed in achieving their political objectives. We have to make sure that if Beijing launches missiles against Taiwan, they cannot immediately compromise our defense and force Taiwan to come to terms with Beijing.

Q. Is the streamlining program still on schedule? You are going from conscription to an all-volunteer military force.

A. It is very much on schedule. By law, we have to implement this streamlining process starting in January. We have to implement the all-volunteer program.

It's an incremental process. We are not targeting any particular date to complete this transformation. Certainly, they are predicated on continuous sufficient resource allocation and support from the legislature.

Q. Do you worry about Beijing becoming more nationalistic, more aggressive?

A. It is always a major concern. China is a dynamic society. You have many forces inside China. People only talk about the good side of Chinese development, but not many pay great attention to the challenges and the difficulties.

They are facing increasing domestic problems. We hope the Chinese government can have better management of those problems, but you never know. We worry about succession. Beijing is going to have a top leadership change next year, so who will be the official leader? What does he think about Taiwan? What will be his priorities? We don't want to wake up to a renegade in charge of China who fires missiles over the Taiwan Strait.

Q. How good is Taiwan's intelligence inside China?

A. We are collecting good stuff, at least from our neighborhood. We also share our intelligence during regular meetings with the United States and others. We are much better off than our counterparts, like Japan and the U.S. The U.S. has its satellite images, but we have our human intelligence, and our analysts are resourceful. We have analysts who have spent 30 years watching China.

Ministry Profile

Established as the Ministry of War in 1912 in China; became the Ministry of National Defense in 1946. Moved to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War.

Defense budget:

■ $10.2 billion for 2011

■ $11.2 billion projected for 2012

Troop strength:

■ 275,000 currently

■ 215,000 projected for 2014

Source: Taiwan MND

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7326197&c=FEA&s=INT

2011年8月11日國防部澄清新聞稿

國防部說明楊副部長接受美國「國防新聞週刊」專訪內容（100年8月11日）

針對媒體報導副部長楊念祖先生接受美國「國防新聞週刊」專訪，指出「臺灣若無法自我防衛，到頭來可能迫使美國介入，甚至必須定期巡防臺灣週邊」乙情，國防部今（11）日鄭重說明，楊副部長之本意認為，美國應了解我國在區域安全上應盡的責任，如果我國無法獲得F-16 C/D戰機，以強固自我防衛的能力，則亞太區域的安全將出現重大缺口，這應是美國所不願樂見的。
　　國防部謹就日前副部長楊念祖先生接受美國「國防新聞週刊」專訪全文，詳列如后：
　　問：中共目前之經濟、外交與軍事實力對美具有史無前例的影響力，臺灣何能期待美國會繼續防衛臺灣？
　　答：北京已是全球與區域大國，與美國存有共同利益，兩國高層互訪頻繁，北京不僅想影響美國對中華民國的政策，亦想影響其他區域與全球議題。相信美國依然會在亞洲發揮強大影響力，並對此區域安全履行承諾，而我國在維持區域和平與穩定上扮演重要角色，所以我不認為美國會偏向北京立場，忽略其在亞太地區的既有利益，特別是中華民國。美國一再重申尊重臺灣關係法，並提供適當與必須的防衛性武力給我國。
　　問：美國對馬英九總統2008年獲選以來降低臺海兩岸關係的反應為何？
　　答：美國完全支持馬總統的大陸政策，美方認為馬總統的政策可降低兩岸緊張，減少誤解與誤判，亦使北京對我國挑釁降低。
　　問：中共是否降低對貴國武力威脅，或瞄準貴國的飛彈數目？
　　答：目前為止沒有，北京認為兩岸基於接觸，可創造一種新的維持現狀模式，但這不意味北京會降低其對我之軍事部署。在亞太地區有共同的利益存在，不僅是介於臺灣與大陸之間，北京當局也將持續發展經濟及穩定社會，所以北京當局必須作出抉擇：是否為了統一政策而動用武力或其他手段，影響整個亞太地區，或者與我國及其他地區性夥伴，共同創造更穩定、和平、以及繁榮的大環境。
　　問：美國經濟力減弱，國防預算遭到刪減，許多人視美國為一衰退的超強，這是否會鼓勵中共採取躁進行動？
　　答：如果你看中共國家主席胡錦濤今年訪問華府，他們並未將彼此視為敵國，他們仍致力接觸以達雙贏，中共依然強調中國大陸應和美國攜手合作共同解決諸多全球議題。
　　問：美國務卿希拉蕊說美國將於10月1日前決定是否出售66架F-16 C/D型戰機給貴國？若美國決定出售貴國新型戰機，你認為北京將會有何反應，中共稱其為「紅線」。
　　答：北京當然會如以往一樣表達憤怒，中共自從1979年與美國建交30多年來，每一件事都聲稱踩到紅線，如果我們獲得不了F-16 C/D型戰機，將失去維繫兩岸和平的操作槓桿，將立即面對無法履行維持區域和平與穩定的挑戰。美國有時不了解我國對區域的責任，這也是我們需要新戰機的原因，否則美國將需要肩負巡弋區域的責任。中國大陸已對美國發出強烈警告，若美國正式通過此決定，陸、美關係將會受損。而切斷例行軍事交流是北京當局表現抗議的一種方法，但若我們觀察過去的經驗，陸、美友好度會降低一段時間，但因陸、美的共同利益實在太大了，使得雙方關係密切，他們將需協商討論下一步該怎麼走。
　　問：大陸會對美採取經濟制裁手段作為報復？
　　答：我不這麼認為，因大陸對美國有很多投資，包括大量外匯存底，如果美國經濟受傷害，北京亦受害。
　　問：美國曾於2001年承諾出售臺灣8艘潛艦，但一直延宕至今，目前情況為何？
　　答：我們一直籲請美國重視我們的擔憂，潛艦對我國防衛很重要。
　　問：如果中共控制臺灣，並在此設立基地，會發生何種情形？
　　答：這將替中共軍力深入東海與南海開出一道門，這將不符合美國國家利益，這也會立刻挑戰美國在亞太地區戰略地位及其國安庇護，若是我國在未來變為中國大陸的一部份，美國則會在亞太地區失去重要的利益。
　　問：目前有聽到臺灣將加強在南海太平島的兵力部署？
　　答：我們不排除此種可能性，目前由國安會與總統來決定是否增強在該島的海巡兵力部署，所以海軍目前正協訓海巡部隊，我們也正評估他們是否有能力保護島嶼及在海上進行嚴密的巡邏，我們不會讓中共進入該島。
　　問：中共對臺灣的主要威脅主要來自兩棲登陸入侵或是飛彈攻擊？
　　答：兩者對我國都是威脅，北京會使用最少軍事選項取得最大政治目的，我們必須加強防禦，讓他們付出高昂代價，並且達不到政治目的，我們必需確認如果北京對我發射飛彈，他們無法馬上就癱瘓我們的防禦，也無法強迫我國對北京當局投降。
　　問：目前精實計畫是否仍在進行，由徵兵制改為募兵制？
　　答：目前一切皆按照規劃進行，我們依法必須從1月份開始實施此一計畫，實施募兵制度，其為漸進過程，並沒有特定完成日期。當然，對此計畫我們將持續分配足夠的資源及支援。
　　問：你是否擔心北京變的更傾向民族主義？更具侵略性？
　　答：中國大陸是一充滿活力的國家，人們只談論大陸發展快速與好的一面，但未注意到其挑戰與困難。北京面對著許多國內的問題，我們希望北京當局能夠更巧妙管理這些問題，但我們永遠也不知道。我們也擔心繼任的問題，北京明年將面臨高層權力交接與更迭，誰會成為下一個領導者？他對我國的想法如何？他的優先選擇又會是什麼？我們不想面對一個對我國發射飛彈的領導者，這又是一個新的局面。
　　問：臺灣在中國大陸內陸的情報工作做得如何？
　　答：我們至少會藉由鄰國蒐集情報，我們亦會藉由與美國及其他國家定期情報會議來交換情報，比美、日的情報工作改善更多。美國有衛星影像，但我們有情報人才，這些分析人員具有30年監看中共的工作經驗。

http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=49086