Taiwanese best judges of policy

By Wang Jyh-perng 王志鵬

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/04/15/2003500767

Fri, Apr 15, 2011 - Page 8

Ever since he took office, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has been calling on China to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan. I have been paying close attention to this issue, and in July last year I expressed my view in several articles published in the press.

The first thing I said is that China has at least three possible strategies for handling the missile withdrawal issue. From Taiwan’s point of view, the preferred strategy would be one that could surmount any problem, which would be for China to agree to withdraw the missiles, and at the same time to announce to the world that as long as Taiwan doesn’t declare independence, China will not use military force to resolve the “Taiwan question.”

The second-best strategy would be for China to withdraw its missiles and for the two sides to negotiate building a mechanism of mutual trust in military matters on the basis of the so-called “1992 consensus.”

The third strategy, and the least favorable for Taiwan, would be for China to agree to withdraw its missiles and end the state of hostility across the Taiwan Strait on condition that Taiwan accepted the “one China” principle.

I suggested that, as time passed and cross-strait relations developed, things would move from the least favorable option toward the next-best and most favorable ones.

The second point I made was that withdrawing the missiles would have no real military significance, and that it would only be an expression of goodwill at the political level. The real key issues are those of building a mechanism of mutual trust in military affairs and halting US arms sales to Taiwan.

My third point was that the mood among senior military officers on the two sides of the Strait was different, since Taiwan’s current military leaders have clearly expressed their opposition to such proposals, and that the missile withdrawal issue will come to have less influence.

Finally, I said that while the US and Japan publicly support and encourage cross-strait dialogue, they are very concerned about how things develop and would like to stay in control, even by intervening.

The Chinese armed forces’ concept of military confidence-building was included for the first time in last year’s white paper China’s National Defense in 2010, with a whole chapter devoted to the topic. Proposals for a cross-strait mechanism for military security and mutual trust was also included for the first time.

A few days ago, a delegation of 35 retired generals from Taiwan, headed by Wang Wen-hsieh (王文燮), chairman of the Taipei-based Society for Strategic Studies, ROC (Republic of China), visited Beijing, where they attended a seminar on strategic studies and peace development across the Strait hosted by Peking University.

Addressing the seminar, Major General Luo Yuan (羅援) of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said he did not understand why the Taiwanese people cared so much about the issue of withdrawing the missiles, because, “whether they are withdrawn or not is of no significance.”

Luo said the issue of withdrawing missiles covers five major factors. First, missile deployment in China is based on overall national defense considerations; second, China makes adjustments to its military deployment based only on its own decisions, without outside influence; third, cross-strait goodwill should be under the principle of interaction, but Taiwan still sees the “mainland” as its hypothetical enemy; fourth, missile withdrawal is an issue for discussion rather than a premise; and fifth, Chinese missiles will never be used against Chinese people, unless they don’t recognize that they are Chinese.

He added that China could signal its goodwill by withdrawing its missiles on the principle of “interaction,” meaning that Taiwan should reciprocate by adjusting its own military deployment vis-a-vis China, especially with regard to US arms sales to Taiwan.

Based on what Luo said, one might say that China’s apparent willingness to withdraw its missiles has advanced from three to five or six points on a 10-point scale.

In recent years China’s armed forces have advanced faster than most people expected in their thinking, quality, training and equipment, and this has given their senior decisionmaking officers plenty of confidence and room for maneuver. Nevertheless, I find it very hard to believe that withdrawing the missiles could achieve the purposes of establishing a mechanism of mutual trust in military matters and stopping the sale of US arms to Taiwan.

If the PLA slips up due to overconfidence and impatience, that could have negative consequences on China’s willingness to pursue cross-strait military confidence.

I strongly agree with military strategy researcher Chang Kuo-cheng (張國城), who has suggested three things that cannot be allowed if Taiwan is to sign an agreement on cross-strait mutual trust in military matters.

Chang says Taiwan cannot allow the sovereignty of the ROC to be diminished, its defense capabilities to be weakened, or its security relations with other countries to be damaged. These three points are in line with the Taiwanese understanding and basic expectations.

As negotiations proceed, Taiwan may declare that it no longer regards China as its hypothetical enemy, but as Chang says, Taiwan’s national defense has been built on the basis of the risks that it may face in the future. Taiwan’s defense capability is quite basic; it can hardly be compared to China’s rising military might. So there is really no need for China to get so upset about the small amount of weapons Taiwan wants to buy.

When it comes to the choice between independence and unification, the decision should be up to the Taiwanese themselves. Taiwan has a highly educated society that enjoys an environment of freedom and democracy and an electoral system that is improving and maturing as time goes by. Taiwanese are no fools. They understand quite clearly what kind of cross-strait policy is best for Taiwan. Public opinion polls over the years show that there is less and less support for extremist politics among people in Taiwan.

Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG