Transparency is needed in defense

By Wang Jyh-perng 王志鵬

(本文刊登於Taipei Times 2011年1月3日8版)

On Dec. 24, the online edition of the US weekly publication Defense News had an article that said: “Taiwan has operated a variety of S-2 models since the late 1960s. Today, sources indicate only a handful are still operational and that none are mission capable.”

Last Monday, the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Navy Command Headquarters published an article in the Youth Daily News that openly responded to this article by saying that for the past five years, the navy’s S-2s have reached and even surpassed their required standards and that they are all fully mission capable for taking part in the Han Kuang military exercises this year. In response to this, retired vice admiral Lan Ning-li (蘭寧利) also published an article about how Taiwan’s anti-submarine aircraft were useless. In this article, the author revealed the truth behind the Taiwanese navy’s plans for the S-2Ts and the way the situation has deteriorated, while also saying that it was generally accepted that the P-3C anti-submarine aircraft that had cost hundreds of billions of dollars will soon be useless. So we have two responses, the first being the official response trying to paint a rosy picture and pretending everything is fine, while the other was an open warning from a navy leader who cares deeply about the navy and does not want to see it deteriorate any further.

For a long time now, Taiwan’s military has tried to mimic the culture and system of the US military. However, they have only succeeded in a superficial way. What has happened to the sense of responsibility and honor? Or the readiness to accept challenges? These have all declined over the past decade. The US government has laws in place that allow private think tanks to conduct research and assessments into national defense affairs and the US army has well-organized, independent groups that launch -investigations into all major incidents that happen, normally within six months of them occurring. The results of these investigations are handed over to the government and Congress, but the documentation is also made available online for private organizations on official Web sites, including details of the event, reviews of the incident and any commendations or punishments that were given. Confidential information, of course, is blacked out before it is posted. Laws and codes related to follow-up reforms are also publicly announced and all this helps set up a time-tested, professional system.

However, if we look at the major accidents and corruption cases that have happened within our military in recent years, we will see some huge differences. There was, for example, the incident on Sept. 14, 2009, when Chen Chi-tsung (陳紀宗), the captain of the submarine Hai Lung fell overboard. Then, on Jan. 26 last year, a T-34 trainer aircraft met with an accident that killed two pilots in Namasiya (那瑪夏) Township, Kaohsiung County. On June 11 last year, a Taiwanese navy submarine lost torpedoes test fired in waters off Zuoying (左營). Their whereabouts are still unknown. Detailed information about these incidents and the investigations that were carried out into them have yet to be made available. All we got were a few brief few words or a short explanation. Anything above this is kept away from the public, as such information is considered classified.

In addition, if we look at the verdicts that have been made via the judiciary or military law on corruption cases within the MND in recent years, we can see that our military is gradually losing all sense of morals for commanders and staff officers. Roughly a decade ago, when information systems were not as developed, memorandums to superiors were still handwritten and gradually went through each level of rank and if anyone had any objections, these were to be written by hand in the margins. In the event of any irregularities, it was possible to trace where the mistake had originated.

However, with the informatization of official documents, MND leaders often give oral directives on sensitive decisions and matters so as not to create a trail of written documents and staff officers often have to follow these oral directives without knowing the reasons and genuineness of the directives. Also, in terms of the document approval process, a complete rewrite is required if a superior is not satisfied with the contents of a document and the original version is immediately destroyed instead of being filed together with the new version.

Sometimes, a whole case may develop along two completely different lines or even violate routine practice. If the officer handling a case does not employ various means — such as xeroxing or recording — to preserve the original process and any changes, and file them thoroughly into the official document system afterward, their superiors may refuse to admit having given any oral instructions, remain silent or purposely “forget” something if a scandal breaks out. In the end, the low-ranking officers are likely to have to take the blame.

Moreover, in terms of deteriorating ethics of staff officers, when attending a review meeting on arms procurement, I once pointed out that the law was being violated and that the issue could not be allowed. Surprisingly, my comments were not listed in the minutes of the meeting. I contacted the officer in charge and requested that I be allowed to read the document, but he rejected my request, saying that the case might not be approved if my comments were also listed. Since I did not have the related papers or recording to hand, I had to give up. The above cases are examples of how staff officers try to either keep their posts or strive for promotions.

Take the Navy’s anti--submarine affairs recently uncovered by Defense News. On Jan. 27, several Japanese naval vessels and anti-submarine aircraft detected an unidentified submarine 44.4km off the military port in Zuoying District, Greater Kaohsiung. In the next three days, the chaotic statements of low-ranking officials, the Naval Fleet Command and Navy Command Headquarters caused more disputes. This is a typical example.

No wonder most media question public information or press releases from the military. The Navy’s official explanation was a cover-up of the truth. Can it make public the “full mission capability” (FMC), as well as performance records and results of Taiwan’s Turbo Trackers (S-2Ts) over the past five years and submit it to the outside world’s professional examination and doubts?

In addition, most insiders know that the US conducts an annual assessment of Taiwan’s anti-submarine capacity. Rumor has it that researchers at the related think tanks originally thought Taiwan’s military strength was equal to Israel’s until they discovered that it was as weak as that of Panama, according to the assessment results.

How can the government hide its head in the sand and lie to the public? Military transparency has existed in the US for decades. If Taiwan’s MND is unwilling to face the problem openly and transparently, the legislature and the Control Yuan should clearly demand that it learn from the US and make such assessment reports public.

Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON AND EDDY CHANG