hegel_dialectic_ch02_part2.mp3

36. The peculiar importance of this section lies in the emphasis laid simultaneously on both the elements of the dialectic process. On the one hand the start is definitely asserted, as in the quotation from Section 9, to be made from experience. On the other hand we are told that the result relates itself negatively towards the point from which it draws its origin. This precludes on the one side the theory that Hegel endeavoured to produce the dialectic process by mere reflection on the nature of pure thought in abstraction, and, on the other side, denies that a reference to experience involves a merely empirical argument. The reception into philosophy of the material furnished by science is declared to be identical with the development of thought out of itself. We are enabled also to understand correctly, by means of this Section, certain expressions with regard to the dialectic process which are occasionally interpreted by critics as meaning that the medium of the Logic is abstract pure thought. For example, here as in other places, Hegel repudiates the idea that “philosophy is a child of experience, and owes its existence to an à posteriori element.” Such an idea, we are told, is “unfair.” Such expressions might lead us to reject the theory of the dialectic offered above, if it was not for the explanation which here follows them. It is only unfair to say this, Hegel continues, in the same sense in which it would be unfair to say that we owe eating to the means of nourishment. Now it is unquestionable that, without something to eat, eating is impossible, and if eating does not depend on the existence of something to eat, it follows that the existence of experience may be indispensable to the existence of philosophy, although philosophy has been declared not to depend on experience. Mediation, as Hegel uses the word, is not equivalent to dependence, and it is possible for thought to require a mediation by sense, and therefore to be helpless without it, while it is nevertheless, in Hegelian terminology, not in a state of dependence (Bedingtheit) on it. Without the data which are supplied to us by sense, the dialectic could not exist. It is not, however, caused by those data, but is necessarily combined with them in a higher unity. It is no more dependent on them than any other abstraction from a whole is on its fellow abstractions from the same whole. Each step which it takes depends, as we have seen, on the relation which the previous step bears to the goal of the process. The whole process may thus fairly be said not to be dependent at all. The independence of the idea of God is declared to rest on its negation and exaltation above the empirical side of consciousness. This independence cannot possibly mean, therefore, the absence of all connection between the two, for to be related to a thing even negatively, is, as Hegel himself points out on occasion (as in his treatment of the ideas of finitude and infinity, Section 95), itself a condition, and in this sense a dependence. The independence here can only consist in the fact that, although the beginning is in experience, which contains an empirical side, yet in the result the idea of God is separated from the particular empirical facts with which the process started, and is free from all likeness to them, although they form its demonstration and justification. Whether this is possible or not, it appears to be this which Hegel means in asserting his dialectic to be independent of all experience, and this is quite compatible with an experiential basis. It may be objected that in this Section Hegel is not speaking of his own system, but of the origin of philosophy in general. It is, no doubt, true that the origin of philosophy from a historical standpoint is one of the points discussed here. But if we look at Section 14, we shall find that the two questions are considered by Hegel as identical. “The same evolution of thought,” he says, “which is exhibited in the history of philosophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself.” It is clear, therefore, that he regards the process traced in Section 12 as one which is not only historically accurate but also philosophically valid, and that he holds the relation of experience to the dialectic, which is there defined, as that which really exists.

37. We find similar statements in his criticism of the Intuitionist School. In explaining their position, he says (Section 70), “What this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the Idea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own account; that mere being per se, a being that is not of the Idea, is the sensible and finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms, without demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being, and being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate knowledge rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract being, or pure unity taken by itself) and affirms in its stead the unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not merely a purely immediate unity, i.e. unity empty and indeterminate, but that it involves the principle that one term has truth only as mediated through the other, or, if the phrase be preferred, that either term is only mediated with truth through the other.” On the one hand then he asserts that truth does not lie in the idea as separated from the sensible and finite being of the world. But the idea in its unity with the sensible and finite being of the world is experience. This unity, however, is only mediate – that is to say, it is not, as the Intuitionists supposed it to be, perceived immediately, nor evident from the nature of thought itself. It lies rather in the mediation of each with truth only by means of the other, which supports the view asserted above – that Hegel makes no attempt to use pure thought in abstraction from the data of sense, but holds truth to lie only in the whole from which these two elements are abstracted. Hegel here denies one immediacy and admits another, both of which are called by the same name in English. He denies the validity of intuition, if by intuition is meant Jacobi’s unmittelbares Wissen, which perceives immediately the unity of thought and being. But he admits that intuition, if we mean by it the Kantian Anschauung, is essential to knowledge, for without “the sensible and finite being of the world” the idea has no truth.

38. Bearing this in mind we are able to see that there is nothing in Section 75 inconsistent with the position I have attributed to Hegel. He there says, “It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an immediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of something else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned categories only, which are always mediated by something else, and to forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes.” The first of these statements will present no difficulties, for it is quite consistent to deny the existence of immediate knowledge, while admitting the existence of an immediate element in knowledge. Indeed, the assertion that all knowledge consists in the mediation of the immediate at once affirms that there is an immediate, and denies that it is knowledge. Hegel’s reminder that in the act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes does not concern us here. For we are now considering the basis on which the dialectic process rests, and not the end which it reaches. The latter must be considered further on. The fact that the dialectic process consists in mediating the immediate is enough to show that it must have some relation to experience, since only in experience can the immediate be found.

39. Passing on to the Doctrine of the Notion, we have (Section 166, lecture note): “The notion does not, as understanding supposes, stand still in its own immobility. It is rather an infinite form, of boundless activity, as it were the punctum saliens of all vitality, and thereby self-differentiating (sich von sich selbst unterscheidend). This disruption of the notion into the difference of its constituent functions, – a disruption imposed by the native act of the notion, is the judgment. A judgment, therefore, means the particularising of the notion. No doubt the notion is implic itly the particular. But in the notion as notion, the particular is not yet explicit, and still remains in transparent unity with the universal. Thus for example, as we remarked before (Section 160, lecture note), the germ of a plant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c., but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not realised till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the judgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how neither the notion nor the judgment is merely found in our head, or merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes them what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to become aware of its notion; and when we proceed to a criticism or judgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its notion.” This analogy may illustrate the view which we have been considering. In the growth of a tree the positive element is in the seed only. The air, earth, and water, although they are necessary to the development of the tree, do not play a positive part in its growth. It is the nature of the seed alone which determines that a plant shall be produced, and what sort of plant it shall be. But the surrounding conditions, of suitable soil and so on, are conditions without which the seed cannot realise the end of its nature. In this analogy, the seed will correspond to the category of Being, the completely mature plant to the Absolute Idea, and the air, earth, and water, to the matter of intuition. If we look more closely, the resemblance to actual plant life is not perfect, since different amounts of light, heat, and manure will change the size and colour, though not the species of the flower, which gives to these surroundings a more active part than Hegel allows to the matter of intuition. But since Hegel says, without restriction, that the germ of the plant contains its particulars, he must be supposed to ignore the amount of quantitative change which depends on the circumstances in which the plant is placed, and in this case the analogy is exact. The point of the comparison, if the above explanation is correct, lies in the fact that the growth of the plant has certain conditions which do not determine the nature of the development, though without their presence the development could not exist at all. That this is the point which Hegel wished to make is rendered probable by his having taken as his example a case of organic life. For in organic life we are able to distinguish between the cause of growth and the essential conditions of it in a way that would be impossible if we were considering an event governed only by mechanical laws. In the latter case we can only say that the cause is the sum of all the necessary conditions, and we are unable to consider any one of them as more fundamental than the others. But with organic life we have introduced the idea of a final cause, and we are thus enabled to distinguish between the positive cause and the conditions which are necessary but not positive. Hegel’s declaration that the growth of the notion must be judged by the principles of organic growth, enables us to make this distinction, without which we should be unable to understand that the relation held by the data of sense to the dialectic process should be indispensable, and yet negative.

40. Again (Section 232, lecture note) he says, “The necessity which cognition (Erkennen) reaches by means of demonstration is the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point cognition had a given and a contingent content; but now, at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity is reached by means of subjective activity. Similarly, subjectivity at starting was quite abstract, a bare tabula rasa. It now shows itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass from the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active, and form-imposing.” Hegel is speaking here of finite cognition at the point at which it passes over into volition. But he is speaking of it before the change has yet been made, for the “it", which knows its content to be necessary, can only be taken as meaning cognition. The process here described starts with finite cognition, which is not philosophy, but the ordinary thought of every-day life. By this process the passage is made to volition. The advance lies in the fact that, while knowledge started from the given and contingent, it now knows its content to be necessary. But when this change has taken place in the content, cognition has become philosophy. (Compare Section 9, quoted in section 34 above. “The second defect is that the beginnings are in every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced. In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence, reflection whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes speculative thinking, the thinking proper to philosophy.") And the universal, under the form of subjectivity, has been apprehended as a self-moving notion, which also shows that by this point knowledge has become philosophy. And the process by which it has advanced begins with the given and the contingent, which can only be found in sense. The advance of the dialectic towards the Absolute Idea has therefore a basis in experience.

41. In Section 238, Hegel, in considering the organic elements of the speculative method, states that its beginning is being or immediacy. “When it means immediate being the beginning is taken from intuition (Anschauung) and perception – the initial stage in the analytical method of finite cognition. When it means universality, it is the beginning of the synthetic method. But since the Logical Idea (das Logische) is as much a universal as it is in being, since it is as much presupposed by the notion as the notion itself immediately is, its beginning is a synthetical as well as an analytical beginning. (Lecture note.) “Philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements, therefore, it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical. Philosophic thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only accepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way is only, as it were, an onlooker at its movement and development. To this extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought, however, is equally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action of the notion itself. To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions.” Continuing the same subject, he says in Section 239, “The advance renders explicit the judgment implicit in the Idea. The immediate universal, as the notion implicit, is the dialectical force, which on its own part deposes its immediacy and universality to the level of a mere stage or ‘moment.’ Thus is produced the negative of the beginning, the original datum is made determinate: it exists for something, as related to those things which are distinguished from it – the stage of Reflection. Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was involved in the immediate notion, this advance is analytical, but seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated, it is equally synthetical. (Lecture note.) “In the advance of the idea the beginning exhibits itself as what it implicitly is. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for the consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated by Nature. The truth is that Nature is due to the statuting of Spirit, (das durch den Geist Gesetzte,) and it is Spirit itself which gives itself a presupposition in Nature.”

42. In this passage the double foundation of the dialectic is clearly admitted, and its connection with the double aspect of the process is made clear. We must have, in the first place, pure thought given to us as a fact – we cannot know the nature of thought unless thinking has taken place. From one point of view, then, the dialectic process is the observation of a subject matter already before us. In this aspect philosophy “allows the idea its own way” and “is only, as it were, an onlooker at its movement and development.” And in so far as this is so we have the unequivocal declaration that “the beginning is taken from sensation or perception" – since pure thought is never found except as an element in the whole of experience. But at the same time the process is not merely one of empirical selection of first one character and then another from the concrete whole. When once the first and simplest judgment has been made about experience – the judgment which is involved in the application of the category of Being – the various steps of the dialectic process will grow by an inner necessity out of that judgment. This judgment will be the beginning as universality, as the other aspect was the beginning as immediate being; and, in so far as the beginning is universal, the process is synthetic and “evinces itself to be the action of the notion itself.” The explanation of the union of the two processes lies in the fact that the reality present to our minds in experience is always the full and concrete notion. This is the logical prius of the movement, although the unanalysed mass and the abstract notion of Being may be the temporal prius in that stage of finite reflection which precedes philosophy. “In the onward movement of the idea the beginning exhibits itself as what it is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy.” And again, in Section 242, the notion “is the idea, which, as absolutely first (in the method) regards this terminus as merely the annihilation of the show or semblance, which made the beginning appear immediate, and made itself seem a result. It is the knowledge that the idea is one systematic whole.” All less complete ideas are illegitimate abstractions from this whole, and naturally tend therefore to approximate to it. And such a process may be viewed from two sides. It may be regarded from the point of view of the whole – in which case the dialectic process will be viewed as gradually retracing the steps of abstraction which had led to the idea of pure Being, and rebuilding the concrete object till it again coincided with reality. Or it may be regarded from the point of view of the incomplete and growing notion, when the advance will seem to be purely out of the notion itself. “Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was involved in the immediate notion, this advance is analytical, but seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated, it is equally synthetical.” And these two aspects – the analytic from the stand-point of the concrete and perfect notion, and the synthetic from the stand-point of the yet imperfect notion, – correspond respectively to aspects for which the beginning is taken from sensation or perception, and from the action of the notion itself. In so far as we look on the motive force of the dialectic process as residing in the completeness of the concrete notion, the process depends on the contemplation of reality and therefore of sensation and perception. For the sensation, although contributing no positive element to the process, is the necessary condition of our becoming conscious of the nature of thought. But in so far as we look on the motive force of the process as supplied by the incompleteness of the growing notion, we shall bring into prominence the fact that the process is after all one of pure thought. And we only get a true view of the whole when we combine the two and see that the stimulus is in the relation of the abstract and explicit idea to the complete and implicit idea, that the process is one of pure thought perceived in a medium of sensation and therefore synthetic and analytic at once.

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