RUSSIA'S MILITARY TRANSPORTATION SERVICE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS - 戀戀生活

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RUSSIA'S MILITARY TRANSPORTATION SERVICE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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RUSSIA'S MILITARY TRANSPORTATION SERVICE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Title: Russia's Military Transportation Service: Problems and Prospects.
Subject(s): TRANSPORTATION, Military -- Russia (Federation); RUSSIA
(Federation) -- Armed Forces; MILITARY telecommunication
Source: Military Thought, 2000, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p71, 5p
Author(s): Sokolov, G.G.
Abstract: Focuses on the military transportation service in Russia. Evolution
of the military transport communications service; Problems in the maritime and
air transport; Details on the right of servicemen to free travel; Automation
of military transportation command and control system.
AN: 3654216
ISSN: 0869-5636
Full Text Word Count: 1865
Persistent Link to this Article:
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Database: Military & Government Collection
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RUSSIA'S MILITARY TRANSPORTATION SERVICE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Amid the ongoing reform of the RF Armed Forces, including their down-sizing
and the creation of a highly mobile army, operating across a vast space, in a
highly intense mode and with considerable expenditure of materiel and the need
for its prompt supply, military transport movement takes on special
importance.

The military transport communications service--one of the oldest in the RF
Armed Forces--has evolved considerably since its inception. The 1716 Military
Regulations, approved by Peter the Great, stated that the transport movement
of troops and military cargoes and the use of roads for military purposes and
their maintenance in the Russian Army Field Administration was under the
jurisdiction of a special establishment headed by the wagon-master general.
Transport communications used in the interest of troops, combined with special
army transport, came to be known as military transport communications.

At present the Military Transportation Service (VOSO) addresses specific tasks
that are key to the combat readiness and operational efficiency of the Armed
Forces both in peacetime and in wartime: It provides transport movemerit
services for the army and navy and controls preparation of communications in
their interests.

Control over the preparation of railways, maritime, river and air
communications and organization and management of this transport movement are
exercised by the VOSO Central Directorate of the RF Defense Ministry; in
military districts and in fleets, by corresponding military communications
services; with respect to modes of transport, by VOSO line agencies
responsible for organization and supervision of military transport movement on
the ground. Chiefs of VOSO line agencies are representatives of the Defense
Ministry at administrative units on railway, maritime, river, and air
transport and are authorized, within their jurisdiction and jointly with
military command and transport authorities, to deal with all matters connected
with military transport movement. The VOSO Central Directorate deals with all
matters pertaining to organization and conduct of military transport movement
and preparation of modes of transport in the country and on the theater of
military operations.

In present-day conditions, successful performance of tasks before the service
is hindered by the declining logistic, technical, and materiel supply base and
the deteriorating standards of transport movement per se. Provision of rolling
stock, aircraft, and sea and river vessels has declined sharply. Oftentimes
they are operated past their service life; spare parts and other types of
materiel are not supplied in required volumes or on time, while capital
investment in construction and modernization of transport communications has
diminished considerably.

The breakup of the Soviet Union aggravated the problems of Russia's maritime
transport. It inherited mostly uneconomical vessels with low technical
characteristics. With every passing year, the fleet continues to shrink
catastrophically while many vessels have outlived their life span. Unless
urgent measures are taken to restore the national fleet, capable of protecting
the country's economic and political interests, in several years Russia will
end up completely dependent on foreign ship owners, effectively losing its
maritime transport. Normal operation in northern and eastern parts of the
Russian Federation will be disrupted while the Navy will be unable to use
civilian vessels in volumes needed to ensure military transport movement in
the interest of the country's security. Lack of balance between the transport
system and the needs of the Armed Forces impairs the combat readiness of
troops (forces) and the defense capability of the state as a whole.

To ensure successful performance of tasks before it, the VOSO Central
Directorate carefully processes and analyzes all military transport movement
requisitions, calculating the actual needs for transport expenditures.
Nonetheless, even approved funding does not come in full or at regular
intervals. In the past three years, between 33 percent and 37 percent of
funding was actually disbursed with arrears to transport enterprises growing
every year.

Today a near crisis situation has emerged over military servicemen's right to
free travel on all types of public transport on city and local communication
routes. To defuse the situation somewhat, the VOSO drafted a government
resolution On Procedure for Reimbursement of Costs Involved in the Transport
Movement of Military Servicemen and Citizens Discharged from Military Service,
Their Family Members, and Their Property.

It is important to stress that transition of transport companies, enterprises,
and organizations to market relations and new forms of ownership placed an
additional burden on the operation of military transportation services at all
levels, substantially increasing the volume of work. Whereas under a planned
economy, the VOSO, in tackling maritime and river military transport movement,
interacted with ministries (the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet and the
RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet) and 30 shipping companies, at present, in
the wake of reform in the maritime and river transport sector, thousands of
joint-stock and private companies have emerged, operating quite independently.

Russia's air transport is going through a difficult period. Amid a chaotic
transition to a market economy, the once integrated and powerful Aeroflot
broke up into a great number of big and small air carriers based on different
forms of ownership. In providing military transport movement services on
credit and getting no compensation from the state in recent years, many air
carriers eventually had to abandon such "charity operation." The management of
other air carders, still hoping that state arrears will be eventually paid,
thus far continue to provide transport services to the military. Nonetheless,
air fares are often overpriced.

In recent years, VOSO agencies were assigned a large number of new functions
and tasks, one of them being organization of state-to-state military transport
movement within the CIS. The VOSO service also had to operate under extreme
conditions in the course of regional conflicts. To ensure timely transport
movement in the course of the anti-terrorist operation in the Northern
Caucasus, a special package of organizational and technical measures was
carried out: conferences with the RF Railways Ministry to organize effective
transport movement in the region; comprehensive preparation of railway
stations on the North Caucasian railway line for detraining of troops and
materiel; planning efficient transport movement; organization of entraining of
troops and military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and other materiel;
traffic control and regulation of entraining, advance, and detraining of
troops and materiel.

Within a short time span, VOSO and military railway agencies provided 469
passenger cars, 135 mobile field kitchens, 310 cars for ammunition and
materiel, and more than 6,000 flatcars. Military trains were provided with the
necessary rolling stock in time. They were conveyed to destinations strictly
on time as established by orders of the chief of the General Staff of the RF
Armed Forces. Conveyance of military equipment, combat hardware, weapon
systems, ammunition, fuel and other materiel was planned and carried out as a
matter of urgency. The average rate of transport movement of military trains
was 900 kilometers to 950 kilometers a day, often exceeding the standard of
600 kilometers to 800 kilometers a day.

Entraining (detraining) of troops proceeded at fixed military and commercial
loading/unloading installations. In some cases temporary loading/unloading
facilities of industrial enterprises were used. Thus, installation of a
five-section metal ramp at the station of Kochubey on the North Caucasian
railway line as well as the use of fixed loading/unloading facilities located
near a local industrial enterprise helped increase the station's unloading
throughput capacity from one to three trains a day, thus considerably reducing
the time of raising a force in the western sector. Special traffic control and
regulating services were set up in detraining areas to facilitate the process.

On all routes, military trains were regularly supplied with foodstuffs, fuel,
and water. In some cases, bath and laundry services were provided en route.

To ensure security on the North Caucasian railway line, a special package of
transport protection, guarding, defense, and concealment measures was
developed and carded out. All stations, bridges and other engineer structures
on sections abutting the Chechen Republic were placed under reinforced
protection of interior troops and police. In most dangerous sectors, the
command of North Caucasian Military District army aviation ensured air escort
of military trains. Movement on the Artenzian-Karlan-Yurt section proceeded
only during the day time. Military trains that could not pass the stretch
before dark were stopped until day break. To prevent explosive demolition with
radio controlled explosive devices, jamming systems were installed on trains
and special engineer subunits were detailed to detect and destroy explosive
devices. Furthermore, special mobile railway engineer complexes were provided
on two main routes, designed to check the route and to restore the railway
line if damaged or destroyed.

At the same time, in ensuring military transport movement in the North
Caucasian Military District on a broad scale, the VOSO service was confronted
with a number of organizational problems. In particular, it transpired that
military districts do not give enough priority to preparing troops for
military transport movement while personnel does not have the necessary skills
in arranging and fixing military equipment on railway rolling stock, as a
result of which more time was spent on entraining than should have, which had
a negative effect on the organization of federal forces and performance of
their combat missions. Failure by headquarters staffs of moving troops to
provide transport movement requisitions in due time hindered the timely
provision of rolling stock. Some requisitions were drawn up in a purely formal
way with data indicated in them not always corresponding to the actual
configuration of transported troops, which had to be adjusted and finalized in
the entraining process, pointing to the low standards of work by respective
military logistic agencies. In some cases transport movement requisitions
failed to take the real needs of recipients into account completely, which
resulted in an amassing of unclaimed flatcars at detraining points.

So, one major line in improving the operation of the military transportation
service is automation of military transport movement planning and control on
the railway, maritime, river, and air transport. This applies to all command
and control levels: the VOSO Central Directorate and district (fleet) and line
military transportation agencies. At present work is under way to put in place
a multi-tier automated military transportation command and control system
designed to enhance the effectiveness and concealment of military transport
movement in peacetime and in wartime, during transition from peacetime to
martial law, and in emergency situations. It is designed to ensure automated
collection, processing, storage, and transmission of military-transport,
organizational, and financial-economic data on the status and condition of
transport routes, military transport movement, and VOSO agencies, and is set
up as an aggregate of interrelated complexes of VOSO automated command and
control agencies interacting with the existing and developing automated
command and control systems of respective transport agencies and departments.
Unfortunately, today funding of R&D projects in the field has been effectively
frozen.

Resolution of the aforementioned problems is impossible without further
streamlining and upgrading the operation of the military transportation
service. We believe that the main lines of reforming the VOSO today are as
follows: bringing the service's T/O structure in line with the general plan
for the organizational development and employment of the Armed Forces,
increasing the level of its technical equipment, upgrading the professionalism
of its personnel, and enhancing the prestige of military service in military
transportation agencies.

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