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| 2022/04/25 11:12:58瀏覽778｜回應0｜推薦13 | |
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..禁航區（英語對應詞：no-fly zone、no-flight zone，簡寫為NFZ,中國,香港,澳門,新加坡稱禁飛區）,是指禁止任何未經特別申請許可的航空器（包括飛機、直升機、熱氣球、無人機等）飛入或飛越的空中區域。其劃定大多出於國防考量,例如軍事基地,重要政府機構,重要公共設施（如核電廠、水壩）上空等。另外也有基於飛行安全的理由，例如摩天大樓,火山活動區上空等。此外在國際社會上,在發生戰亂的國家或地區,為了人道的需求,會由聯合國出面劃設禁航區。 至於美國建議台灣四周都要設立禁航區就是為什麼引起戰爭而準備? 由此看來台灣地區兵兇戰危臨近戰爭的時刻愈來愈近喇? A no-fly zone, also known as a no-flight zone (NFZ), or air exclusion zone (AEZ),] is a territory or area established by a military power over which certain aircraft are not permitted to fly. Such zones are usually set up in an enemy powers territory during a conflict, similar in concept to an aerial demilitarized zone, and usually intend to prohibit the enemys military aircraft from operating in the region. Military action is employed by the enforcing state and, depending on the terms of the NFZ, may include preemptive attacks to prevent potential violations, reactive force targeted at violating aircraft, or surveillance with no use of force. Air exclusion zones and anti-aircraft defences are sometimes set up in a civilian context, for example to protect sensitive locations, or events such as the 2012 London Olympic Games, against terrorist air attack. No-fly zones are a modern phenomenon established in the 1990s. They can be distinguished from traditional air power missions by their coercive appropriation of another nations airspace only, to achieve aims on the ground within the target nation. While the RAF conducted prototypical air control operations over various contentious colonies between the two World Wars, no-fly zones did not assume their modern form until the end of the Gulf War in 1991.[ During the Cold War, the risk of local conflict escalating into nuclear showdown made military intervention as a tool of United States statecraft unappealing. Furthermore, air power was a relatively blunt instrument until the operational maturation of stealth and precision-strike technologies. Before the Gulf War of 1991, it had not been possible to perform nuanced attacks against transitory, difficult-to-reach targets, and air power thus lacked the ability to produce decisive political effects short of total war. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and technological advances in aerospace capabilities made no-fly zones viable in both political and military contexts.[] . 如果台灣接受美國的建議,設置禁航區就是等於向中國宣戰,台灣被美國徹底的利用成為炮灰犧牲掉,屆時海峽兩岸戰爭開打,美國隔岸觀火拍手叫好,因為死亡的是台灣人而不是美國人.台灣必須慎重其事的考慮清楚?
美國前海軍副部長（Seth Cropsey）主張,台灣比烏克蘭難防守,又沒辦法在東部設人道走廊,應該現在就開始計畫設禁航區。 《防務一號》（Defense One）指出,要保衛台灣不能只防守台灣的領空。台灣是一個島嶼,與美國基地相隔數千英里的公海。其最合理的補給路線將穿過菲律賓海,沿琉球向南,或從呂宋島向北。每個區域都超出其領土和專屬經濟區。 台灣禁飛區的供應和後勤方面將意味著保衛台灣以外的領土。鑑於這些作戰,戰略和地理現實,要贏得對台空戰,需要四個步驟。 國際戰略專家分析認為: 美國有意在台灣四周圍的海域劃出禁航區接受美國的, "指揮"與"保護"? 但是美國的陰謀詭計,沒有公開說明要求駐軍台灣的陰謀詭計,一旦台灣的禁航區成立,就是引進美國空軍駐防,美國空軍重返台灣的台中清泉崗空軍基地與台南空軍基地的計劃得以實現,因為這2座空軍基地,都是按照美國空軍基地的標準建設,其中台中清泉崗空軍基地,可以停駐B-52.長程戰略轟炸機,進行運輸,補級,保養,其次美國海軍的艦艇,又可以重返基隆港與高雄港停泊駐紮,顯示出美國海軍陸戰隊及陸軍接者以演習為由停下來駐紮台灣,如此一來美國1魚3吃,詐騙台灣納稅人辛苦的血汗錢,上述那些空軍基地海軍基地及各地區的陸軍營區,都要大肆整建耗費巨額資金至少300億美元左右,其中強迫台灣購買各式各樣的武器設備,也就是說要耗費1000億美元,屆時台灣的軍事力量在西太平洋又可以排名第三者僅次於日本及南韓. . 中國的反應截至筆者發稿為止中國尚未有任何反應.,因為中國空天軍的東風家族的各式各樣的導向飛彈,早已鎖定台灣所有的陸,海,空,軍事基地,一旦戰爭爆發那些中國飛彈,就可以將台灣的軍事基地完全摧毀殆盡.所以中國是有勝算的,反而台灣聽從美國的建議設立禁航區等系列的軍事舉措,到頭來不僅損失金錢與人員迪傷亡,因為戰爭爆發美國早已溜之大吉,他們情報預測準確,台灣的阿兵哥就成為犧牲品給犧牲掉喇..
美國前海軍副部長克羅普希（Seth Cropsey）主張,台灣比烏克蘭難防守,又沒辦法在東部設人道走廊,應該現在就開始計畫設禁航區。 SC在《防務一號》（Defense One）撰文指出,要保衛台灣不能只防守台灣的領空。台灣是一個島嶼,與美國基地相隔數千英里的公海。其最合理的補給路線將穿過菲律賓海,沿琉球向南,或從呂宋島向北。每個區域都超出其領土和專屬經濟區。因此台灣禁飛區的供應和後勤方面將意味著保衛台灣以外的領土。 鑑於這些作戰、戰略和地理現實，要贏得對台空戰，需要四個步驟。 1:美國必須確保其在琉球群島,呂宋島和台灣之間以及菲律賓海的海空優勢。 中國將從東部和西部包圍台灣,可能一側是航空母艦打擊群,另一側是陸基空中增援。琉球是北部合理的防線。此群島擠滿了美國海軍陸戰隊和防空火砲。呂宋海峽更難防禦,可能需要前沿部署的戰術航空。最重要的是菲律賓海的補給線,因為中國幾乎可以肯定會將潛艇推入菲律賓海並進入西太平洋。美國應該用水面艦艇和其他資產創建一個反潛拉網,並由持續的戰鬥機屏幕進行防禦。琉球的陸軍呂宋海峽的空軍和菲律賓的海軍,每個軍種都可以在這個系統中發揮明確的作用。 2:需要一個綜合防空網絡來保護台灣免受中國導彈轟炸。中國的導彈庫實在太大了,無法以傳統的防空系統相抗衡。如果戰鬥機和雷達糾察隊數據可以與防空系統融合,台灣就可以擴大其老式陸基系統的交戰範圍。 3:美國必須獲得更多的加油機。禁飛區需要在台灣上空和台灣海峽附近即非常接近中國領土進行空戰。美國空軍基地太遠，目前的加油機隊太小,無法提供加油以確保戰鬥機在台灣以及呂宋海峽和宮古海峽的持續覆蓋。 4:美國必須在開戰時擁有顯著的數量優勢。空戰是一種數字遊戲：在同等訓練的部隊和類似的裝備之間,數量提供了決定性的優勢,並隨著規模的增加而提高。考慮到解放軍可以從東部和中部戰區迅速部署到台灣海峽的飛機，保持對台灣的優勢將需要 30 個或更多的戰鬥機中隊。台灣有17個中隊。假設導彈防禦相當有效,在第一波中國導彈襲擊後,也許還有 12 個中隊仍能飛行。美國需要填補的 18 個中隊的空缺。兩個美國航母航空聯隊將提供8個中隊，而一個遠征打擊群可以提供另1個中隊。其餘9個將來自地面航空。可用的日本空軍戰術航空兵可以提供4個戰鬥機中隊,以及陸基美國海軍陸戰隊航空兵2個。美國將需要向日本部署至少3個額外的戰鬥機中隊,甚至可能更多。美國必須準備好打贏台海空戰，應該準備在任何敵對行動之前公開表示，贏得台灣衝突是美國的目標，作為其中的一部分，美國將在台灣實施禁飛區。 SC指出如果美國在多年前以更大的決心幫助烏克蘭進行自衛,那麼今天這場戰爭本可以避免。同樣的中共領導人想打台灣是無庸置疑的,而美國如果想要保持太平洋的主導地位，希望在該地區盟友要繼續站在美國這邊，就必須保衛台灣的這片天空。 . Plan Now for a No-Fly Zone Over Taiwan.Thwarting a Chinese invasion depends on air defense, and that starts with these four steps..Taiwan is not Ukraine. It is, rather, in a far more vulnerable position. No matter what other idea guides the defense of the island republic, air superiority will be critical. Washington and Taipei must prepare now to ensure this air superiority. And while discussion of a Ukrainian no-fly zone has given a wide berth to military reality, planning for Taiwan’s air defense must be grounded in hard truth. Proportionally, Taiwanese airspace is much more difficult to defend than that of Ukraine. While Russia must deploy combat power across a 1,400-mile border, China could concentrate tactical air forces in a much smaller area in assaulting Taiwan. One could not, by the way, defend just half of Taiwan from Chinese aerial attack. The country is too small, and the Taiwanese population lives on the island’s western side. There is no “humanitarian corridor” one could create over eastern Taiwan. A Taiwanese no-fly zone is, in effect, an air exclusion zone over Taiwan – that is, a combat action, whether or not the U.S. declares it as such. One could not even defend only Taiwanese airspace. Taiwan is an island, separated by thousands of miles of open ocean from U.S. bases. Its most reasonable supply routes would run through the Philippine Sea, south along the Ryukyus, or north from Luzon. Each area is beyond its territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus, the supply and logistical aspect of a Taiwanese no-fly zone would mean defending territory beyond Taiwan. Given these operational, strategic, and geographic realities, four steps are necessary to win the air war over Taiwan. First, the U.S. must ensure its naval and aerial superiority in the Ryukyu archipelago, between Luzon and Taiwan, and in the Philippine Sea. China should be expected to bracket Taiwan from the east and west, likely with an aircraft carrier strike group on one side and a ground-based air surge on the other. (China’s violations of Taiwan’s airspace over the past 18 months can be taken as practice for the latter.) The Ryukyus are a reasonable defensive line in the north. The archipelago can be turned into an anti-air nest, packed with forward-deployed U.S. Marines and Air Defense Artillery. The Luzon Strait is harder to defend and would likely require forward-deployed tactical aviation. Most important, however, is the Philippine Sea supply route, as China almost certainly will push submarines into the Philippine Sea and out into the western Pacific. The U.S. should create an anti-submarine dragnet with surface ships and other assets, defended by a constant fighter screen. Each service can play a clear role in this system: the Army in the Ryukyus, the Air Force in the Luzon Strait, and the Navy in the Philippines. Second, an integrated air defense network is needed to protect Taiwan from Chinese missile bombardment. China’s missile arsenal is simply too large to blunt with a traditional air defense system. Integration would allow for better tracking and target prioritization and enable far more effective layering. If fighter and radar picket data can be fused with air defenses, Taiwan can extend the engagement range of its older ground-based systems like its Patriot surface-to-air missiles, or PAC-2s. American interceptors can help, but given the scale of the operational problem, bolstering Taiwan’s missile defenses to ensure they survive an opening bombardment makes more sense. Third, the U.S. must obtain more tanker aircraft. A no-fly zone would require air combat over Taiwan and near the Taiwan Strait—that is, extremely close to Chinese territory. U.S. air bases are too far away and the current tanker fleet is too small to provide the refueling that will ensure consistent fighter coverage over Taiwan and in the Luzon and Miyako Straits Fourth, the U.S. must begin the fight with a significant numerical advantage, or risk being out-concentrated over time. Once again, China can focus a greater volume of aircraft against Taiwan than Russia could against Ukraine, even in the latter’s eastern region. Air combat is a numerical exercise: between forces of equivalent training and comparable equipment, quantity provides a decisive advantage that improves with scale. Chinese aircraft can refuel and rearm at bases far closer to the combat zone than their American counterparts. Unless the U.S. is willing to strike the Chinese mainland—an option that policymakers should consider despite their political aversion to it—the U.S. must expand its tactical air fleet. Maintaining superiority over Taiwan will require 30 or more fighter squadrons, considering the aircraft the PLA can deploy rapidly from the Eastern and Central Theater Commands to the Taiwan Strait. It may require more if the PLA executes a larger buildup. Taiwan has 17 squadrons. Assuming reasonably effective missile defenses, perhaps 12 will still fly after the first wave of Chinese missiles arrives. This creates an 18-squadron gap between Taiwan and China that the U.S. would need to fill. Two American carrier air wings would provide eight squadrons, while an Expeditionary Strike Group could provide another squadron. The remaining nine would come from ground-based aviation. Available Japanese-based Air Force tactical aviation could provide four fighter squadrons, and ground-based USMC aviation two. Thus, the U.S. would need to deploy to Japan at least three additional fighter squadrons and likely more, depending upon the state of Taiwanese air defenses. Winning the air war over Taiwan would be the central immediate concern during a cross-strait conflict. The U.S. must prepare to fight and win this conflict. It should be prepared to say publicly and in advance of any hostilities that winning a conflict over Taiwan is the U.S. objective and that as part of this the U.S. will enforce a no-fly-zone over Taiwan. Had we taken more seriously Mr. Putin’s attacks on such other Black Sea targets as Georgia and Crimea and acted with greater resolve years ago to help Ukraine defend itself, war might have been averted. Xi Jinping and his predecessors’ declared intent to subdue Taiwan—if needed, by force—is clear as blue skies. Those skies must be defended over Taiwan if the U.S. is to remain the Pacific’s pre-eminent power and our friends and allies in the region are to continue casting their lot with us. .
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| ( 時事評論｜兩岸 ) |
NO-FLY ZONE.FOR TAIWAN? 
