從2010年11月起在英國經濟學人雜誌The Economist討論區的文章，因應2018年2月該討論區關閉後文章有可能全被刪除，將資料改存放於此並作點回顧。有些英語字不洽當或需補述一些那就請看倌包涵囉。會陸續花一兩月時間作回顧。原文https://www.economist.com/user/2791934/comments 總共22個子網頁篇幅，在2011年秋天過後決定平均一週會發一篇回文，在2012年夏天經過一次國外網友的打擊決定文章變得嚴謹而非純聊天，儘量善用5000個字母上限，2015年初儘量以GRE辭彙及文章深度繼續寫成。會附標題及貼文時英國倫敦當地時間。原來的主文是付費會員才看得到，免費會員一週只能看三篇，請注意。

(2018,08,04補充，在分類已設「Economist.com Blog同步貼文」，因應在這本的「Blog」區的恢復開放討論)

筆者搬來這個udn部落格後，會儘快補齊這22頁原文，預計到端午節附近會把原文及原來的回文附上現在的感慨及註記幾句，其中幾篇也許會分好幾個小篇寫成。看原文以純文字寫成，大部份來說就不附圖片了，避免太多版權爭議。第一篇就是習近平確定是胡錦濤的下一任，今天習的修憲把國家主席任期無限期延長，又在憲法前言確立習的唯一政治正確，在筆者再來回顧當年一整頁開頭的這篇時，格外的棲涼無奈。

==========

Chinas succession - The next emperor

A crown prince is anointed in a vast kingdom facing vaster stresses. China is in a fragile state    Oct 21st 2010

“WITH you in charge, I am at ease,” Mao Zedong is supposed to have told his successor, Hua Guofeng. It proved a disastrous choice. Mr Hua lasted a couple of years before being toppled in 1978. A decade later succession plans once again unravelled spectacularly, against a backdrop of pro-democracy unrest. Only once, eight years ago, has China’s Communist Party managed a smooth transfer of power—to Hu Jintao. Now a new transition is under way. The world should be nervous about it for two reasons: the unknown character of China’s next leader; and the brittle nature of a regime that is far less monolithic and assured than many foreigners assume.

The man ordained to take over Mr Hu’s twin roles as party chief in 2012 and president the following year is hardly a household name. On October 18th Vice-President Xi Jinping was given a new job as vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, which Mr Hu heads. This is a position for leaders-in-waiting. The portly son of one of Communist China’s founders, little known to the outside world until a few years ago, Mr Xi is preparing to take the helm of a country with the world’s second-biggest economy and its biggest armed forces—and which is in the midst of wrenching social change.

Quite how he has risen so high in a party that, for all its growing engagement with the world, remains deeply secretive, is unclear. Mr Xi’s appointment was eerily similar to the recent anointing of Kim Jong Un in North Korea: he too was made vice-chairman of a military commission after a closed-door party conclave, without public explanation. China’s leaders at least offered a sentence on Mr Xi’s appointment, albeit at the end of an arid 4,600-character communiqué after the fifth party congress (see article).

Related items

Chinas next leader: Xi who must be obeyed

Oct 21st 2010

Chinas economy: A new epic

Oct 21st 2010

On the positive side, Mr Xi has held some big posts in the most economically dynamic and globally integrated parts of the country: the coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang as well as, briefly, Shanghai. He is a relatively cosmopolitan figure. His wife is a popular singer. But it is impossible to assess how well qualified he is to run the country or how assured his succession is. On the face of it, one engineer whose father was denounced during the Cultural Revolution is handing over to another. But Mr Xi is a relative newcomer to the inner circle; he has not served as long as Mr Hu had in 2002. There are plenty in the party who resent the rise to power of well-connected “princelings” like Mr Xi. A two-year transition will be a test.

All this one day will be yours

All the same, it is the immensity of the task, not the obscurity of the man, that should make the world nervous. For all their outward expressions of unity, there are signs of disagreement among Chinese leaders over what the country’s priorities should be—both on the economy and on political reform.

The economy is sprinting along by Western standards, but China faces a hard adjustment to wean itself off excessive investment and exports in favour of more reliance on consumption. The communiqué unveiled guidelines for a new five-year economic plan (see article). This calls for a more sustainable pace of growth, with wage-earners getting a bigger share of the national income. This would be good for China and the world, helping to narrow the trade surplus that annoys America so much. But the change will not be painless. Exporters fear business will suffer if wages soar or the yuan rises fast. Powerful state-owned enterprises, used to cheap credit, land and energy, will resist threats to these privileges.

As for political reform, Chinese leaders have talked about democracy for the past 30 years, but done little. Rapid growth and the spread of the internet and mobile phones have enabled Chinese citizens to communicate, vent their grievances and pursue their dreams more freely than before, so long as they do not attack the party. But some are now demanding more say in how the country is run. In the past few weeks China’s more liberal newspapers have enthused about calls by the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, for “political reform”. Conservative newspapers have censored them.

There is next to no chance of the cautious Mr Hu bringing in big reforms before he steps down. This week’s communiqué hailed the “political advantages of China’s socialist system” and mentioned political reform only briefly, saying—as Chinese leaders so often do—that it will require “vigorous yet steady” effort. Even Mr Wen, who will step down at the same time as Mr Hu, has wanted to move at glacial speed.

Expect paranoia and you may be pleasantly surprised

Might Mr Xi speed things up? There is no shortage of conservatives arguing for caution, but there is also a pragmatic argument for change: China’s economic gains could be jeopardised by a failure to loosen the party’s hold. Explosions of public discontent, fuelled by resentment of government callousness towards ordinary citizens, are becoming increasingly common in villages, towns and cities across the country. The (admittedly patchy) official data show a more than tenfold increase in the annual number of large protests and disturbances since 1993, with more than 90,000 cases reported in each of the past four years. In the past China’s leaders have relied on growth to secure social stability. If and when a more serious slowdown strikes, popular grumbles could increase.

The right path for Mr Xi should be clear: relax the party’s grip on dissent, lift its shroud of secrecy and make vital economic reforms. But the rest of the world would be unwise to assume that reason will prevail. In times of uncertainty, the regime is wont to appeal to nationalist sentiment. Large anti-Japanese protests erupted during the latest party meeting. America and the West have also been subjected to tongue-lashings. The party meeting called on officials to strengthen “the country’s comprehensive national power”.

Too many Westerners, including those urging trade sanctions over the yuan, assume that they are dealing with a self-confident, rational power that has come of age. Think instead of a paranoid, introspective imperial court, already struggling to keep up with its subjects and now embarking on a slightly awkward succession—and you may be less disappointed.

======

The next emperor

Nov 5th 2010, 17:00

I am a little bit late to write this comment...

First I celebrate the success of the fifth generation,

although I still feel unhappy and disappointed about this result.

As far as I concerned, this generation includes Xi Jin-Ping,

Li Kai-Chiang, Li Yuan-Tsaou, Wang Yang, Liu Ya-Chou, Wang Xi-Hsin.

Mr. Xi and Li Yuan-Tsaou are princeling partys leaders, and

Li Kai-Chiang along with Wang Yangs pedigree are close to

President Hu Jing-Tao. These six political figures have been

preparing for 2010-2012s power transition and political jobs

for at least five years.

At the beginning of this generations competition from 2003s Nov.

between Xi Jin-Ping and Li Kai-Chiang, Mr. Xi was apparently

surpassing Mr. Li. Seriously speaking, Xis princeling party has

a conspicuously difference from the other Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or you can say princeling party is the other political party,

different from CCP. This princeling party usually embrace big disparate thoughts and hold huge and high reputation from

south-eastern coastal region to Beijing.

Accumulating various work experiences in the party, Mr. Xi

winned over Li Kai-Chiang in 2007 after he had gotten

the party chief in Shanghai, gainning the highest number of

votes in a straw poll conducted at the Central Party School,

an academy for top cadres, on possible candidates

for the Politburo, although Li Kai-Chiang progressed

from the party chief in Liaoning to vice prime minister.

Sadly speaking, Hu Jing-Tao cannot appoint the more

democratic and efficent Mr. Li, his assistant in CCP, to be his "THINKABLE" successor.

I live in Taipei City, having been focusing on the two sides of

Taiwan Strait for a long time. In addition to the position of

Chinas vice president, Xi Jin-Ping owns the working officer

of CCPs Taiwan and Hong Kong-Macau affair.

According to his statement, he seems to intend to interfere with

Taipei authority more than President Hu Jing-Tao.

He knows that there are many parties and "pedigrees"

(as he used in his released researching articles). Among

these are flexible thoughts and conflicts (especially about

Taiwans future directions). He recognizes this phenomenon

emerges more and more "seriously" so that CCP should "work"

more and more "quickly" targeting Taiwan from islander

to Taipei authority. In the visible future Mr. Xi might activate

the whole CCPs mechanism in order to unify mainland China

and Taiwan island, follow Jiang Ze-Mins:

"only one motherland" and carry out "one china-two systems",

inclusive of ordering Peoples Liberal Army to attack Taipei authority.

In fact, the fifth generation knows Taiwans affairs

very much. In 2005s summer, Li Kai-Chiang visited

Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian in Taipei,

representing PRCs President Hu Jing-Tao

(because Mr. Hu would inaugurate as Chinas national chairman)

requesting Mr. Chen for Mr. Chen-3-year tenacys directions

of whether "unity with mainland" or "independence from China

(Beijing government)". After this meeting, Li Kai-Chiang

learned (you can say "studied") Taiwans brilliant democractic

achievement by directly having himself join in 2005 winter’s

Taiwanese Parlimentary election (once stood behind DPP

Chen Shui-Bians Campaign). Being a researcher of geopolitics

and one of Chen Shui-Bians fan, I feel disappointed that

Mr. Li cannot get the CCPs next leader (although he will

succeed Wen Jia-Bao as the prime minister in 2012).

    Recommended

    3

    Report

    Permalink

這篇說"我有點晚寫了"，一個中國的信念不錯，不過當年下一點歪注。彼時以現在中國國家主席及中共中央總書記的習近平為首的太子黨和以稍靠前任胡錦濤的李克強的共青團還算融洽但聽過要作有些區別的原因，在此就不多透露，這篇有參考時報出版的楊中美博士的「新紅太陽」及小小自我介紹。有時候沒有知道中南海內部一些事，寫稿的記者會有毀謗之虞。不會後誨當年曾經支持台灣的兩黨制，很喜歡聽陳水扁前總統講自由民主的美好，那已經很久很遠了，而如果有搭上這班車，我會好好努力，不用太過悲傷，就融入大家庭的溫馨。這篇一邊試寫一邊聊起天來，在從長庚大學醫學系肄業後，入伍稍安定一些寫的。之後幾年的文章有會作進一步描述。