第二卷  論概念(Book II: Of Ideas)有三十三章;第二十七章 論唯一性和差異性(Chapter XXVII: Of Identity and Diversity)----這一章涉及意識、物質實體、精神、獨立個人的原則(Principium Individuationis.)、時間和空間相關聯繫如何形成差異性等精細概念的辯證，也是如同二十一章，是非常的精彩!!

• 唯一性存在於何處 (Wherein identity consists.)另一個動機心靈常常進行比較，對存在的事物，在特定的時間及場所考量存在的任何事物，當我們將它和它本身在另一個時間的存在進行比較，因此形成唯一性和差異性的概念。 當我們看到一種事物在某個瞬間時刻和場所的存在，我們會確信（它就是它）它是這特定的事物，而且不是在相同時間在別的地方(存在)的另一個，無論它在所有其他方面多麼的相似和不可分辨:而這就存有唯一性，這時的概念歸因於考慮它們的先前存在的那一刻他們根本不會發生變化，我們和現在做比較。因為我們從不曾見到，也不曾想像，相同性質的兩種事物能在同時同地存在，因此，我們就正確的斷定，任何時候存在的任何東西，必然排斥與之相同的東西，而是它本身在那獨自的存在。（Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects : and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that, whatever exists anywhere at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone.）因此，當我們探究某種事物是否相同或不同，它總是涉及在某個時間和空間存在過的一種東西，它是被確定，在那一瞬間，是和它本身相同，而不是和其他的相同。從哪裡它必然結果，一個事物不能有兩個存在端點，兩個事物也不能只有一個端點;相同的兩個事物不可能存在於相同的瞬間及特定的相同場所;或(於相同的瞬間)一個相同的事物在不同的場所存在。因此，一個端點，就是相同的事物;而與之有不同時間和場所端點的事物，是不相同的，只能是相異的。對這種聯繫造成困難是因為不留意及關注使用所賦予事物的精確觀念。（ When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning ; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place ; or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing ; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.）
• 實體的唯一性(Identity of substances.) 我們只有三種實體概念：1. 上帝;2.有限的智能;3.本質。（We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances : 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies.）第一，上帝沒有端點，永恆、不變、無處不在，因此關於他的唯一性是毫無疑問的。（First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt.）第二，有限靈魂都存在它的每一個特定時間和場所的端點，對哪些時間和場所的聯繫將總是決定他們每一個的唯一性，只要它(有限靈魂)存在。（Secondly, Finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists.）第三，可對每一個物質的分子使用相同的觀點，對創作出的物質沒有增加或減少，它是相同的。 （Thirdly, The same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same.） 雖然這三種實體，如我們所稱呼的，在同一場所方面並不互相排斥，然而我們不能能想像他們一定不必然要在相同的場所互相排斥他們的各自同類實體 : 否則唯一性和差異性的觀念和名稱將是無意義的，而且各種實體和別的東西，彼此間亦就無從區別了。例如: 假設兩個物體能同時存在於想同的場所;那麼，假設他們大或小，這兩個物質分子都必然是一個而且是相同的; 而且，所有這樣的物體都必然是一個而且是相同的。因為，依據相同的理由兩個物質分子既可以存在於一個場所，則所有的物體亦都可以存在於一個場所:當它能這樣假設，則一個和多個唯一性和差異性的區別都被移除了，而呈現其荒謬。不過兩個或多個可以成為一個，那是一種矛盾，因此，唯一性和差異性是很有根據的聯繫和比較方法，而且有助於理解。 ( For, though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place : or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinctions of substances, or anything else one from another. For example : could two bodies be in the same place at the same time ; then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or little ; nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For, by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place : which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding.）
• 型相的唯一性和聯繫。（Identity of modes and relations.）至於其他的東西既然不外型相和聯繫，而且它們最後又得歸結於各種實體，他們各自特殊存在的唯一性和差異性也將是以相同的方式決定的:對事物僅只能是接續著，這些是有限存在事物的動作如:運動和思想，兩者組成續存的接續序列，有關他們的差異性是無疑意的: 因為它開始(存在)於每個消滅的一瞬間，他們不能存在於不同的時間，或在不同的地方，作為永久的存在的事物可以在不同的時間存在於遙遠的場所; 因此沒有任何運動或思想，被認為在不同的時間，能夠是相同的，其中每一部分都各有一個不相同存在的起點。 ( All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be by the same way determined : only as to things whose is in succession, such as are the actions of finite beings, v.g. motion and thought, both which consist in a continued train of succession, concerning their diversity there can be no question : because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places ; and therefore no motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.）

• 個體化原則(Principium Individuationis.) 由先前已經討論的，是很容易發現如此多探討的所謂個體化原則;而且，這是非常明顯的，就只是它自身的存在;其中決定任何本質的存在對特殊的時間和場所，不可言喻的是對相同本質的兩種存在(時間和場所)。這一點，雖然看起來是比較容易想像的簡單實體和型相;然而，當進一步反思，只要稍加留意，在複雜的(實體和型相)也不是更難的: 例如，如果我們假設有一個原子，即--持續的實體--在一個不可變的外觀，確定的時間和場所繼續存在; 很顯然，考量它的存在的任何瞬間，它在那一瞬間和它本身是相同的。因為，存在於那個瞬間就是它存在，不是別的，所以它是相同的，而且必須持續只要它的存在是持續的;……（From what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the principium individuationis ; and that, it is plain, is existence itself ; which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes ; yet, when reflected on, is not more difficult in compound ones, if care be taken to what it is applied : v.g. let us suppose an atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place ; it is evident, that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For, being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued ;……）……但如果這些原子之一被移除，或一個新的加進去，它不再是相同的質量或相同的實體。 在生物的狀況，他們的唯一性不是取決於許多相同粒子的質量，而是取決於別的一種東西。因為在他們的大批量物質的變異並不能變化唯一性:一棵橡樹由幼苗長成大樹，然後被砍伐，依然是相同的橡樹；幼馬長成大馬，有時肥、有時瘦，所有這段時間依然是相同的的馬: 雖然，在這兩種情況下，各部分的變化是很顯著的;因此，他們兩者真實的不是相同的批量物質，雖然他們真實的一個是相同的橡樹，另一個是相同的馬。在這兩件案例，這個道理可以證明---批量物質和生命體---唯一性是不適應於相同的物體。（……But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity : an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak ; and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse : though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts ; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that, in these two cases – a mass of matter and a living body – identity is not applied to the same thing.）

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